Little v. JB Pritzker for Governor

• Decision Date: 18 August 2021
• Docket Number: 18 C 6954
• Parties: MAXWELL LITTLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JB PRITZKER FOR GOVERNOR, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

MAXWELL LITTLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JB PRITZKER FOR GOVERNOR, et al., Defendants.

No. 18 C 6954

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

August 18, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Virginia M. Kendall, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs-Maxwell Little and eleven other Field Organizers of the JB Pritzker for Governor campaign-filed suit against Defendants JB Pritzker for Governor, the campaign organization (the “Campaign”), Juliana Stratton, and Caitlin Pharo for harassment and discrimination which allegedly occurred when they were employed by the Campaign and for defamation under Illinois law. (Dkt. 28). Before the Court are Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on all causes of action and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to § 1981 discrimination. (Dkt. 133; Dkt. 135; Dkt. 137; Dkt. 139; Dkt. 141; Dkt. 143; Dkt. 145; Dkt. 147; Dkt. 149; Dkt. 151; Dkt. 153; Dkt. 155; Dkt. 164). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

BACKGROUND

I. Evidentiary and Local Rule 56.1 Compliance

As a preliminary matter, all of Plaintiffs' briefing suffers several Local Rule 56.1 violations which significantly hampered review and adjudication of the motions. “The district court's discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1 has been upheld time and again” by the Seventh Circuit. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910 914 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Igasaki v. Illinois Dep't of Fin. and Prof'l Regulation, 988 F.3d 948, 956 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Stevo v. Frasor 662 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because of the high volume of summary judgment motions and the benefits of clear presentation of relevant evidence and law, we have repeatedly held that district judges are entitled to insist on strict compliance with local rules designed to promote the clarity of summary judgment filings.”)).

First Plaintiffs' statement of additional facts is, in the spirit of brevity, too long. (Dkt. 195). “An opposing party's LR 56.1(b)(3) statement[] of additional facts must not exceed 40 numbered paragraphs. A party must seek the court's permission before exceeding these limits.” LR 56.1(d)(5). On its face, Plaintiffs' statement of additional facts totals 39 numbered paragraphs; that number obscures a violation of remarkable proportion. (Dkt. 195). Twelve of these paragraphs state “Plaintiff . . . complained that he was discriminated against and harassed when, among other things” followed by as many as 28 separate subparagraphs. (Dkt. 195 ¶¶ 26-37). Each of these subparagraphs is substantive and, in its own right, a statement of additional fact more appropriate to its own, separate paragraph. Including these subparagraphs, Plaintiffs' statement of additional facts totals a whopping 251 paragraphs-more than 6 times the limit afforded under Local Rule 56.1. Plaintiffs failed to seek leave (likely to have been granted) to exceed their 40-paragraph limit, and therefore the Court would be well within its discretion to simply strike every fact beyond the 40 permitted by the rule. ¶ 26.n. (Dkt. 195); see Perez v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 576 Fed.Appx. 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding district court's decision to strike additional facts which “significantly exceeded the 40-paragraph limit”); Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014) (same). Yet, the vast majority of Plaintiffs' statements of additional facts fail on other grounds, and so the Court declines to exercise its discretion to strike them for that violation.

Second, at multiple points in their Local Rule 56.1(b) response to Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement, Plaintiffs wholly fail to respond to a given fact. (Dkt. 194 ¶¶ 36-37, 52). The entire purpose of the exercise outlined in the rule is to aid the Court in determining whether an issue of material fact exists such that ruling as a matter of law is inappropriate. By failing to respond, Plaintiffs foisted their work upon the Court, leaving the Court in the position of searching for the answers within the record, something district court judges are not required to do. Responses under Local Rule 56.1(b) “must admit the asserted fact, dispute the asserted fact, or admit in part and dispute in part the asserted fact.” LR 56.1(e)(2). “[F]ailure to admit or deny facts presented in the moving party's statement . . . render the facts presented by the moving party as undisputed.” Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218-19 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., 368 F.3d 809, 818 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009).

Third, in Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56.1(b) response to Defendants Local Rule 56.1 statement, their Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) statement of additional facts, and their Local Rule 56.1(c)(2) response to Defendants' statement of additional facts, Plaintiffs frequently fail to provide a record citation to support their denials. (Dkt. 194 ¶¶ 7, 32-33, 42-43, 46-51, 53, 55-56; Dkt. 195 ¶ 17; Dkt. 216 ¶¶ 4, 20).^[1] When disputing an asserted fact, “a party must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact . . . Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not contravened with specific citations to evidentiary material.” LR 56.1(e)(3), 56.1(d)(2); see also Curtis, 807 F.3d at 218 (citing Ammons, 368 F.3d at 818-19); Perez, 576 Fed.Appx. at 616 (upholding district court's decision to strike responses to movant's statement of facts which “do not cite anything in support”). Where Defendants' factual assertion is supported by their record citation, and where Plaintiffs' denial is unaccompanied by a record citation, Plaintiffs' response is stricken. See Bilal v. Rotec Indus., Inc., 326 Fed.Appx. 949, 956 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632) (“We have consistently . . . held that district courts are not obligated to go beyond parties' Rule 56.1 statements by conducting their own investigation of the record.”).

Fourth, Plaintiffs cited, but did not file, Jessica Montgomery's Complaint in their Local Rule 56.1 statement. (Dkt. 166 ¶¶ 39-40). Local Rule 56.1(d)(3) requires “all evidentiary material identified in LR 56.1(a)(2) . . . be included as numbered exhibits with the statement of fact.” LR 56.1(d)(3). Plaintiffs' footnote that the Jessica Montgomery Complaint “was marked confidential and so it has not been filed” does not obviate their duty to support factual assertions with evidence, particularly as Plaintiffs could have sought leave to file that particular exhibit under seal. (Dkt. 116-15 at 2). The relevant portions of Plaintiffs' Local Rule 56.1 statement are stricken.

Fifth, even where Plaintiffs did cite the record, in many instances that record citation did not support the factual assertion.^[2] Plaintiffs either mischaracterized, drew tenuous and unsupported conclusions from, or omitted necessary context from the record. The Court will not consider these statements. See, e.g., Bone Car Int'l, LLC v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 741 F.Supp.2d 854, 856 n. 1 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“Where a party has offered a . . . statement of fact without offering proper evidentiary support, the Court will not consider that statement.”).

Sixth, many of Plaintiffs' statements are inadmissible because the declarant lacks personal knowledge as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 602, ^[3] the evidence constitutes an improper lay opinion under Rule 701, ^[4] the statement is hearsay under Rule 802, ^[5] the evidence has not been properly authenticated under Rule 901, ^[6] or the evidence violates the best evidence rule under Rule 1002.^[7] On summary judgment, courts may only consider evidence that would be admissible at trial. Steffek v. Client Servs., Inc., 948 F.3d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (“A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.”). Consequently, the Court will not consider Plaintiffs' statements of fact bolstered by inadmissible evidence. See Cariel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (courts may not consider inadmissible hearsay at summary judgment); Widmar v. Sun Chem. Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A] plaintiff seeking to thwart summary judgment must comply with . . . Federal Rule of Evidence 602, . . . which require[s] that testimony be based on personal knowledge. Personal knowledge can include reasonable inferences, but it does not include speculating as to an employer's state of mind, or other intuitions, hunches, or rumors.”)); see, e.g., Alvares v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, No. 18 CV 5201, 2021 WL 1853220, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2021) (declining to consider improperly authenticated evidence at summary judgment); Echo, Inc. v. Timberland Machs. & Irr., Inc., No. 08 C 7123, 2011 WL 148396, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2011) (striking evidence based on improper lay opinion); Kasalo v. NCSPLUS Inc., No. 10 C. 1643, 2011 WL 2582195, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 27, 2011) (declining to consider affidavit evidence which violated the best evidence rule at summary judgment).

Seventh a handful of Plaintiffs' statements and responses are vague, imprecise, or incomplete. (Dkt. 166 ¶¶ 34-35, 40; Dkt. 195 ¶ 35.d; Dkt. 216 ¶¶ 13, 16). By way of example, Plaintiffs' statement that “Jackson was following the chain of command and following authority” fails to specify or provide context illuminating with regard to what he was purportedly following the chain of command and authority. (Dkt. 166 ¶ 34). Plaintiffs' denial that “[a]n African American field organizer who was already in the Southside field office and fluent in Spanish was passed over for the position. ...