Little v. Willis

• Decision Date: 17 December 1976
• Parties: , 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2973 Arthur D. LITTLE, as President of the Board of Education of the Liverpool Central School District, Appellant, v. Mary WILLIS and Donald Olech, as President of the United Liverpool Faculty Association, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 347

390 N.Y.S.2d 347

55 A.D.2d 854, 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2973

Arthur D. LITTLE, as President of the Board of Education of

the Liverpool Central School District, Appellant, v. Mary WILLIS and Donald Olech, as President of the United

Liverpool Faculty Association, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Dec. 17, 1976.

O'Hara, O'Hara & Vars, Michael Kawa, Liverpool, for appellant.

Bernard F. Ashe, Albany, Gerald DeWolf, for respondents.

Before MOULE, J.P., and SIMONS, DILLON, GOLDMAN and WITMER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Following the submission of her resignation and its acceptance by the Board of Education, but prior to its effective date, defendant Willis filed a grievance against the Board pursuant to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. This grievance was subsequently denied at the first two stages of the contractual grievance procedure. While an appeal to the full Board of Education was pending, the president of that Board instituted this action seeking a declaration that, by virtue of her resignation, Willis was not an employee on the date that she filed the grievance and was thus not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. The court converted the action for declaratory judgment into an application to stay arbitration, denied that stay and granted defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration.

Where, as here, 'a collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause, disputes arising thereunder are presumptively arbitrable in the absence of clear contractual language to the contrary (citations omitted). This rule applies to both procedural and substantive matters alike (citations omitted)' (Belmont Central School District v. Belmont Teachers Association, 51 A.D.2d 653, 654, 378 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200). Since the agreement in the instant case contained no such express exclusion with respect to the issue of a person's status as an employee, that question was one for the arbitrator to determine. While an action for declaratory judgment may be used to determine a party's status, a court in its discretion should nevertheless decline to exercise jurisdiction over such an action in favor of the contractual arbitration provisions (Adroit Metal Products, Inc. v. Young's Windows of America, Inc., 279 App.Div. 580, 107 N.Y.S.2d 713). Inasmuch as the court properly declined jurisdiction in the instant case, its dismissal of the action without declaring the rights of the parties was...