Littlefield v. Laughlin
| Decision Date | 14 September 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 47075,47075,2 |
| Citation | 327 S.W.2d 863 |
| Parties | Lansing LITTLEFIELD, Appellant, v. Alva C. LAUGHLIN, Respondent |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Edward V. Sweeney, Monett, for appellant.
Karl Blanchard, Seiler, Blanchard & Van Fleet, Joplin, for respondent.
STOCKARD, Commissioner.
In this res ipsa loquitur action plaintiff sought $25,000 for personal injuries sustained when a chain broke and a homemade elevator supported thereby fell. The jury returned a verdict for defendant and plaintiff has appealed from the ensuing judgment. The parties will be referred to as in the trial court.
Plaintiff's only contention on this appeal is that the trial court erred in giving what is commonly referred to as an accident instruction, but defendant contends that plaintiff did not make a submissible case and that any alleged error in the instruction is immaterial.
Plaintiff was an employee of defendant who operated a poultry farm. In one of his buildings he had constructed an elevator. The movable portion consisted of a wooden platform with no sides or roof. At each end there was a triangular wooden frame five feet in height, and extending between the top of these two frames was what is referred to as a 'bail' but which appears in a photograph to be a 2 by 8 inch piece of lumber. The lifting and lowering mechanism of the elevator consisted of an electric motor and hoist fastened to or suspended from the roof of the building. A metal chain, constructed in the same manner as that used on motorcycles, but of larger and heavier construction, extended through the hoist and one end was secured to the 'bail' of the elevator. Hanging from the motor was a cord and a small chain. The platform was caused to rise by pulling the cord and caused to descend by pulling this small chain. The platform moved at the rate of 17 feet per minute, and in order to keep it moving it was necessary to maintain tension on the cord or small chain.
Plaintiff and Miles Fletcher, a fellow employee, used this elevator in their work, and on December 14, 1956, while they were taking a chicken nest from the third and top floor of the building to the first floor the chain broke and the elevator platform fell. According to plaintiff and Fletcher it fell 18 to 20 feet. But, the maximum possible vertical movement of the elevator was less than 18 feet, and by reason of the amount of chain remaining secured to the platform it is difficult to see how it possibly could have fallen more than 6 feet.
Plaintiff pleaded general negligence and submitted his case on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, and the unusual occurrence hypothesized from which it is contended that the jury was authorized to infer negligence on the part of defendant was that 'the chain which supported the elevator broke, causing the elevator to fall to the bottom of the building.'
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only 'when (a) the occurrence resulting in injury was such as does not ordinarily happen if those in charge use due care; (b) the instrumentalities involved were under the management and control of the defendant; (c) and the defendant possesses superior knowledge or means of information as to the cause of the occurrence.' McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S.W.2d 557, 559, 92 A.L.R. 641; Cruce v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 358 Mo. 589, 216 S.W.2d 78; Layton v. Palmer, Mo.Sup., 309 S.W.2d 561, 66 A.L.R.2d 1242. The breaking of a chain being used to support an elevator is not something which in the ordinary course of things happens absent negligence. 'The rule of res ipsa loquitur is peculiarly applicable to an injury arising from the falling of an elevator, and hence such falling raises a presumption of negligence which, in the absence of explanation by the proprietor, carries the action for the injuries to the jury.' 18 Am.Jur., Elevators and Escalators, Sec. 71. See Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424, 99 S.W. 1062, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 929, where in a falling elevator case specific negligence was pleaded but the court commented on the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, and see also Kiernan b. Herbert M. Baruch Corporation, 20 Cal.App.2d 289, 66 P.2d 748; Artificial Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Waltz, 86 Ind.App. 534, 146 N.E. 826; Annotations, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 744, at page 749; 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 601, at page 619; 29 L.R.A.,N.S., 808, at page 816; L.R.A.1917E, 239. This does not mean that the chain could not have broken without negligence, but it is an occurrence, which in itself and without explanation, speaks of negligence.
The jury was unquestionably justified in finding from the evidence that the instrumentality involved in the unusual occurrence was under the management and control of defendant. See Maxie v. Gulf, M. & O. R. Co., 356 Mo. 633, 202 S.W.2d 904, 911. It is true that at the time of the occurrence Fletcher was operating the mechanism to lower the elevator, but the fundamental test of the applicability of res ipso loquitur 'that the instrumentality be under the management and control of the defendant does not mean, or is not limited to, actual physical control, but refers rather to the right of control at the time the negligence was committed.' McCloskey v. Koplar, supra, 46 S.W.2d at page 560; Cruce v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 361 Mo. 1138, 238 S.W.2d 674, 677.
Defendant contends, however, that no submissible case was made because 'plaintiff and his witness Fletcher had superior knowledge or at least equal opportunity to know and determine what caused the chain to break.' Defendant relies primarily n Klebe v. Parker Distilling Co., 207 Mo. 480, 105 S.W. 1057, 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 140; Sabol v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 313 Mo. 527, 282 S.W. 425; Grindstaff v. J. Goldberg & Sons Structural Steel Co., 328 Mo. 72, 40 S.W.2d 702, and Pronnecke v. Westliche Post Pub. Co., 220 Mo.App. 640, 291 S.W. 139 Those cases involved master and servant situations, as does this case, and on the question of equal opportunity to know or determine the cause of the unusual occurrence considerable reliance was placed on the fact that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and, as a general rule, would have as good or better opportunity to know or determine the cause of the casualty. The language in some of the above cases seems to imply that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine should be applied with great caution in master and servant situations, but there is no doubt that the doctrine is applicable to such cases provided the facts are sufficient for its application. Cruce v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 358 Mo. 589, 216 S.W.2d 78; Gordon v. Muehling Packing Co., 328 Mo. 123, 40 S.W.2d 693; Beebe v. St. Louis Transit Co., 206 Mo. 419, 103 S.W. 1019, 12 L.R.A.,N.S., 760; 35 Am.Jur., Master and Servant, Sec. 498. The fact alone that there exists an employer and employee relationship has no bearing on the issue of the application of the rule. Charlton v. Lovelace, 351 Mo. 364, 173 S.W.2d 13, 16. The Pronnecke and Sabol cases, relied on by defendant, involved falling objects. In both cases it was held that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine did not apply, and in each case considerable reliance was placed on the determination that the facts were not peculiarly within the knowledge of the employer and that the employee had a better or at least an equal opportunity to know or determine the cause of his injury. Whether or not we would agree with the results there reached, in view of the facts of this case we do not consider the results of those cases to be controlling. The facts of Klebe v. Parker Distilling Co., supra [207 Mo. 480, 105 S.W. 1060], are very similar to those of this case except that a cable instead of a chain broke and permitted the elevator to fall. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine was held inapplicable because the elevator was not 'peculiarly within his [employer's] knowledge and under his control,' and the employee was in a better position to explain the cause of the accident than the employer. Under the facts of that case we think the result reached was incorrect. In Grindstaff v. J. Goldberg & Sons Structural Steel Co., supra, a chain supporting a truss broke and an employee was injured. It was held that no submissible case under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was made because an inference that the unusual occurrence was due to a cause or causes other than the negligent act of defendant could as reasonably be drawn. Some of the language in that case, which is rather restrictive of the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, seems not to be completely in accord with that of the court en banc in the recent case of Adam Hat Stores, Inc. v. Kansas City, Mo.Sup., 316 S.W.2d 594, but in any event, in this case we think the permissible inference of negligence on the part of defendant and the inference that the chain broke because of negligence or an occurrence for which defendant was not responsible are not equal.
We conclude that the evidence in this case was sufficient to show that defendant did possess superior knowledge or means of information as to the cause of the occurrence. Defendant knew how frequently, if at all, the chain had been inspected, what maintenance it had required, if any, and what had been done to prevent rust or other deterioration. In addition, he had possession of the broken chain and had repaired it, and he either kept, or could have retained, the broken parts for examination. We do not have the situation where an employee is furnished a tool or appliance for his exclusive use and he is in possession of it and is charged with its care and maintenance. Here plaintiff had no duties whatever concerning the inspection or maintenance of the elevator or the chain suspending it. In a factual situation such as this, one of the principal issues is whether the defendant performed hid duty to maintain and inspect the chain, and if so whether he would have...
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