Littlefield v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 July 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 76449,76449 |
| Citation | 857 P.2d 65,1993 OK 102 |
| Parties | Murl LITTLEFIELD, individually and as surviving spouse and as personal representative of the Estate of Linda Littlefield, deceased, Appellee. v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, an Illinois Insurance Corporation, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, an Illinois Insurance Corporation, Appellants. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division 2, William J. Whistler, Trial Judge.
Dennis King and Jeffrey L. Wilson, Tulsa, for appellants.
Richard W. Lowry, Donna L. Smith and David E. Jones, Vinita, for appellee.
The first impression question presented is whether an uninsured motorist insurance policy which limits payment based on the number of persons "bodily injured" is ambiguous. The precise issue is whether a claim for "bodily injury" based on the loss of consortium by a spouse, who is not
involved in an accident, is payable under the "per person" or "per accident" policy limit. If the "per accident" provision is applicable, the spouse may recover $20,000 under the terms of each of the policies. If it is not, the "per person" compensation is $10,000 under each policy. We find that the loss of spousal consortium is not a separate "bodily injury" insofar as it relates to the "each accident" limits of the uninsured motorist insurance contract. Because the policy language is unambiguous--referring to "all damages due to bodily injury to one person"--and because only the wife suffered physical injury, the "each person" limit applies.
On April 24, 1990, Margaret Odle (Odle), an underinsured motorist, ran a stop sign and collided with Linda Littlefield's (wife) vehicle. The wife and the appellee, Murl Littlefield (Littlefield/insured husband), were insured by two State Farm insurance policies. 1 The policies contain uninsured or underinsured motorist (UM) coverage and provide limits of liability based on the number of people injured. The maximum limits under these policies are:
Littlefield sued Odle for negligence, wrongful death and loss of consortium. 2 The facts were stipulated, and Odle's insurance carrier paid its policy limits. In addition, State Farm paid the $10,000 "per person" limits of the UM coverage under both policies for the wife's wrongful death. These payments settled all aspects of the negligence and wrongful death actions.
At issue here is whether the loss of consortium claim is to be paid under the "per person" limits of the UM policies or under the "per accident" limits. Both parties agree that Littlefield's loss of consortium
damages were at least $45,000. Of this amount, Odle's insurance carrier paid its $25,000 limit. This leaves at least $20,000 of the consortium claim unsatisfied. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The insured husband argued that the policies' language was ambiguous. He insisted that his loss of consortium claim should be considered a separate "bodily injury" under the policies, thus invoking the "per accident" limits. State Farm asserted that the policy terms relating to bodily injury were unambiguous and that the loss of consortium claim was payable under the lower "per person" limit. Finding the policy language ambiguous, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the husband. The insured husband was awarded $20,000, the amount remaining under the "per accident" limits of each policy. The Court of Appeals, Division 2, affirmed. Certiorari was granted to decide a first impression question in this Court.
WIFE SUFFERED PHYSICAL INJURY, THE LOWER "EACH PERSON" LIMIT APPLIES.
The insurer argues that the UM policies limit recovery based on the number of people actually injured in an automobile accident. Under this scenario, liability would be based on the "per person" limits of the policy because the wife was the only person physically present and injured in the accident. However, the husband contends that the language in the insurance policies is ambiguous, and that the policies must be construed in his favor and against the insurer. Because of this, he argues that his loss of consortium claim is a separate "bodily injury" claim covered under the policies. He asserts that there are two compensable "bodily injuries", his and his wife's, bringing the policies' "per occurrence" limits into effect.
Title 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 allows recovery under a UM policy for physical injury claims and for other claims a person may suffer because of an accident. 3 Subsection B states that any UM policy issued in Oklahoma must provide coverage "for the protection of persons ... who are legally entitled to recover ... because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death ..." In Oklahoma, a person is legally entitled to recover damages for the loss of spousal consortium. 4 The State Farm policies at issue do provide this coverage. Under Section III--Coverage U, an insured is defined as both a covered person's spouse and any person entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury to an insured. Section 3636 does not identify which limit of liability must cover derivative claims such as loss of consortium. Insurers are free to set limits of liability in individual policies. 5
In the State Farm policies at issue, the liability limits provide:
(Emphasis in original.)
Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion. If susceptible of two constructions, the contract will be interpreted most favorably to the insured and against the insurance carrier. 6 If the contractual language is ambiguous as to which limit applies for consortium claims, then the policy must be construed in favor of the insured. 7 However, a policy is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to two interpretations. 8 If the language is unambiguous, it is construed in its "plain and ordinary sense." 9
The language in the policies under Section III--Coverage U alone is unambiguous. References to "bodily injury to each person" refer to the insured persons who were actually present and injured in an accident. 10 Where a policy states that "each person" limits apply for all damages due to bodily injury, then all damages that anyone may have because of that injury are included under that limit. 11 The word "all" is "one of the least ambiguous in the English language [leaving] no room for uncertainty." 12
Under Coverage C, 13 the State Farm policies also refer to bodily injury. While this section does not encompass the UM coverage, reference is made to all provisions of a policy before deciding whether ambiguities exist. 14 Because bodily injury is defined on the definitions page only as "bodily injury, sickness, disease or death ...", other portions of the policy may be looked to for more clarification. Coverage C states that payments for bodily injury are payable only for people who "operate or occupy a vehicle ... or [are] struck as a pedestrian." A thorough reading of the complete policy reveals that a bodily injury is an injury suffered by someone actually involved in an accident.
Additionally, the State Farm policies provide that the "limits of liability are not increased because more than one person is insured." (Emphasis supplied.) This language indicates that limits for people bodily injured is different from the number of people insured. The husband is an insured. However, the policy unambiguously dictates that status as an insured does not allow recovery under the higher limits if the insured is not injured in the accident. The policies differentiate between an "insured" and a "bodily injured" person. 15
The Court of Appeals in White v. Equity Fire and Cas. Co., 823 P.2d 953, 954 (Okla.App.1991), decided a case which, even though not binding on this Court, is nevertheless quite helpful. 16 The White Court held that "bodily injury" was not an ambiguous term. There, the policy language provided a "per person" limit "for all damages for bodily injuries sustained by any one person in any one accident." Although it did not involve a loss of consortium claim, the court found that a wrongful death claimant had not suffered a separate bodily injury from that of the person physically injured in an accident. 17 Under the White analysis, the husband's derivative loss of consortium claim would not be considered a bodily injury. The wife was the only person injured in the automobile accident. The husband's damages are a result of the wife's injury. While the husband may have suffered emotionally, he has not incurred a bodily injury within the meaning of the policy. The husband's damages are due to the accident that caused his wife's death. As the State Farm policies provide, "all damages due to bodily injury to one person" are payable under the "each person" limits.
Courts in other jurisdictions have looked at similar policies to determine whether language is ambiguous and, if not, under which limit loss of consortium is payable. In Creamer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 161 Ill.App.3d 223, 112 Ill.Dec. 748, 749, 514 N.E.2d 214, 215 (1987), the Illinois Court of Appeals determined that an identically worded State Farm policy was not ambiguous. The Creamer Court held: that loss of consortium, while a compensable claim, was not a bodily injury; that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co.
... ... In Homestead Fire Ins. Co. v. De Witt, 206 Okla. 570, 245 P.2d 92, 94 (1952), ... in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the ... 2 Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Iowa 1995); ... Corp., see note 5 at 990, supra ... 20 Littlefield v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., see note 25, infra; ... 32 Carraco Oil Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 484 P.2d 519, 521 (Okla.1971); National Life & ... ...
-
Siloam Springs Hotel, LLC v. Century Sur. Co.
... ... (Western District) certified a single question of state law to this Court under the Revised Uniform Certification ... by the state's highest court, 392 P.3d 268 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 175 U.S. 91, 20 ... Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Cowen Const., Inc. , 2002 OK 34, 9, 55 P.3d ... State Farm Ins. Co., 1994 OK 54, 880 P.2d 877 (Per Curiam) ... , 1996 OK 28, 7, 912 P.2d 861. 34 Littlefield v. State Farm Fire & Cas ... Co. , 1993 OK 102, ... ...
-
77 Hawai'i 2, First Ins. Co. of Hawai`i, Ltd. v. Lawrence
... ... The circuit court, relying on RODRIGUES V. STATE, 52 HAW. 156, 472 P.2D 509 (1970) 5 and CAMPBELL V ... , 633, 851 P.2d 321, 328 (1993) (citing National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Ferreira, 71 Haw. 341, 345, 790 P.2d 910, 912 ... and cite, as support for this proposition, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Ramsey, 295 S.C. 349, ... 693 (brackets in original omitted); see also Littlefield v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 857 P.2d 65 (Okla.1993); ... ...
-
May v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.
... ... II ... ¶ 0 A fire damaged the plaintiff's condominium unit as well as certain ... the action against the insurer for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court of ... Northland Cas. Co., 1993 OK 125, 861 P.2d 308; Adelman v. Associated ... 35. Littlefield v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1993 OK 102, ¶ 7, 857 P.2d ... ...