Littlejohn v. New Orleans City

• Decision Date: 08 October 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION No. 20-888
• Parties: Deangelia LITTLEJOHN v. NEW ORLEANS CITY, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

493 F.Supp.3d 509

Deangelia LITTLEJOHN

v.NEW ORLEANS CITY, et al.

CIVIL ACTION No. 20-888

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

Signed October 8, 2020

Clarence Roby, Jr., Law Office of Clarence Roby, Jr., APLC, Tony Dooley, Dooley Law Office, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Deangelia Littlejohn.

SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS

LANCE M. AFRICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

New Orleans police were involved in a high speed chase that ended in a crash and the tragic death of three individuals, two of whom perished inside the fleeing vehicle.¹ Deangelia Littlejohn ("Littlejohn") brings this action individually and on behalf of C.K.,² one of the decedents. The remaining defendants (collectively, the "defendants") in the suit are the City of New Orleans (the "City"), the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD"), Jeffrey Harrington ("Harrington"), Alex Florian ("Florian"), William Hery ("Hery"), and Colby Stewart ("Stewart")—(collectively, the "officers") all NOPD officers sued in their official and individual capacities³ —as well as NOPD Superintendent Shaun Ferguson ("Superintendent Ferguson") and New Orleans Mayor LaToya Cantrell ("Mayor Cantrell") in their official capacities. Littlejohn asserts federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claims under Louisiana law.⁴

Each of the above named defendants has moved to dismiss these claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).⁵ They all contend that Littlejohn failed to state a claim of any constitutional violation or point to a policy, practice, or custom that caused constitutional violations.⁶ The officers also argue that the Court should dismiss the claims against them in their individual capacity because they are entitled to qualified immunity.⁷ Finally, all defendants ask that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Littlejohn's state law claims.⁸ For the following reasons, the motions are granted.

I.

According to the amended complaint, on March 20, 2019, fourteen-year-old C.K. was a passenger in a vehicle driven by another minor, B.W.⁹ The pair were traveling in New Orleans when four NOPD officers, suspecting that the vehicle was stolen, attempted to stop the vehicle.¹⁰ B.W. did not stop, and a high speed chase ensued.¹¹ Eventually, two additional officers joined the pursuit.¹² During the chase, patrol cars, attempting to apprehend the vehicle, reached speeds of nearly 80 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone.¹³ Eventually, the car driven by B.W. crashed into a building.¹⁴ The fiery collision killed C.K.¹⁵

Under NOPD policy, officers should engage in vehicle pursuits only where there is "reasonable suspicion that the suspect committed a crime of violence or ... posed an imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm to [officers] or another person."¹⁶ NOPD officers violated this internal policy when they engaged in the pursuit because they had no reasonable suspicion that the minors had committed a violent crime or posed a risk of imminent harm.¹⁷ NOPD policy also "requires [that] officers seek supervisory approval before initiating pursuit."¹⁸ The officers made no such request.¹⁹ Additionally, every officer deactivated his body camera during the chase; this also violates internal policy.²⁰

Plaintiff argues that this improper pursuit fits a troubling pattern for the NOPD.²¹ She points to four separate instances where NOPD officers engaged in high speed pursuits prompted by property crimes.²² Littlejohn contends that these improper pursuits are sanctioned by NOPD and evidence an informal "custom" promulgated by NOPD and New Orleans officials.²³ This custom, she alleges, was "the moving force" behind the death of her son.²⁴

II.

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court must dismiss a complaint or part of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to set forth well-pleaded factual allegations that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Gonzalez v. Kay , 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009). The complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

A facially plausible claim is one in which "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). If the well-pleaded factual allegations "do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," then "the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ " and cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ).

In assessing the complaint, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and liberally construe all such allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Spivey v. Robertson , 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999) ; Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. , 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "the factual information to which the court addresses its inquiry is limited to the (1) the [sic] facts set forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the complaint, and (3) matters of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201."²⁵ Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist. , 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019).

"Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’ " Cutrer v. McMillan , 308 F. App'x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co. , 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986) ). Where applicable, qualified immunity can operate as one such bar. See Turner v. Lieutenant Driver , 848 F.3d 678, 696 (5th Cir. 2017).

B. Qualified Immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity "balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). In striking this balance, qualified immunity shields "government officials performing discretionary functions" from civil liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ; see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ("Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.").

Where a public official invokes qualified immunity as a defense to a civil action against him, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing a constitutional violation and overcoming the defense. See Jackson v. City of Hearne , 959 F.3d 194, 201 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing McClendon v. City of Columbia , 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curium) (en banc)). To meet this burden, the plaintiff must show "(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct." Morgan v. Swanson , 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074 ). The Court has discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to examine first. See Jackson , 959 F.3d at 200.

At the 12(b)(6) stage, to find that a defendant violated the law at step one of the qualified immunity analysis is to say that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted—that is, that the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right. See Morgan , 659 F.3d at 384.

As to the second step, for "a right to be clearly established, ‘[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ " Turner , 848 F.3d at 685 (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ). "In other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’ " Reichle v. Howards , 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (quoting al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074 ). Once a plaintiff alleges that an official's conduct violated a clearly established right, the court must then determine "whether the official's conduct was objectively reasonable under the law at the time of the incident." Michalik v. Hermann , 422 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2005).

An official's conduct is not objectively unreasonable "unless all reasonable officials in the [official's] circumstances would have then known that the [official's] conduct violated the plaintiff's rights." Carroll v. Ellington , 800 F.3d 154, 169 (5th Cir. 2015) ; see also Thompson v. Upshur Cty. , 245 F.3d 447, 460–63 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that multiple officers’ actions were objectively reasonable because, among other reasons, not all reasonable officers would recognize the unconstitutionality of their actions). When denying qualified immunity, a court must point to "controlling authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority—that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particularity." Wyatt v. Fletcher , 718 F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Morgan , 659 F.3d at 371–72 ). Precedent existing at the time of the challenged conduct "must have placed the statutory or constitutional...