Littlewind v. Rayl
| Decision Date | 01 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. A1-91-079. |
| Citation | 839 F. Supp. 1369 |
| Parties | Eugene LITTLEWIND, Plaintiff, v. Richard RAYL, Director of Institutions; Terry Haines, Warden of the North Dakota State Penitentiary; Bob Coad, Director of Security, North Dakota State Penitentiary; Cordell "Corky" Stromme, Daryl Fischer, Linda Leuwer, Stan Cadotte, and Bill Wilz, North Dakota State Penitentiary Staff, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
Donald R. Becker, Thomas J. Gaughan, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff.
Bill Peterson and JoAnn C. Toth, Asst. Attys. Gen. N.D., Bismarck, ND, for defendants.
GOLDBERG, Judge, sitting by designation.
Before the court is plaintiff Eugene Littlewind's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and/or Motion for New Trial.
Plaintiff, Eugene Littlewind, filed a Second Amended Complaint on June 21, 1993, in which he sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.1983 for violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights while he was incarcerated at the North Dakota State Penitentiary in April, 1988. Plaintiff named numerous guards and officials at the Penitentiary, as well as the Penitentiary itself1, as defendants in the complaint. A jury trial was held in this matter from July 12, 1993 through July 22, 1993. On July 22, 1993, the jury reached a verdict for defendants.
Plaintiff then submitted his Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and/or Motion for New Trial. Plaintiff contended that the evidence did not support judgment for defendants. In addition, several errors by the court, including denial of plaintiff's motion for mistrial2, required a new trial. Defendants filed a response in which it disputed all of plaintiff's arguments. Oral argument was heard by the court on these motions on August 6, 1993.
The court notes from the outset that the facts underlying plaintiff's complaint and present motions are not in dispute. Uncontradicted evidence at trial demonstrated that by April, 1988, plaintiff had been convicted of numerous crimes, including burglary, assault, disorderly conduct, auto theft, attempted criminal trespass, and escape. Plaintiff had also committed disciplinary violations at the North Dakota State Penitentiary prior to April, 1988.
Both parties also agree that on April 5, 1988, plaintiff and three other inmates attacked guard Frank Freezon in a hallway of the administrative segregation unit of the North Dakota State Penitentiary. The inmates poked Mr. Freezon with a broken broom handle. The parties agree that plaintiff returned to his cell within a few minutes after the conclusion of the attack, although conflicting evidence existed as to whether plaintiff made verbal threats to the guards during this time. Undisputed evidence showed, however, that plaintiff fully cooperated in permitting defendants to handcuff and shackle him, and transport him to a cell in the observation unit.
In the observation unit, plaintiff was placed face down and without any clothes, in a "North Dakota-style" four point restraint3 at approximately 1:00 p.m. In this form of restraint, plaintiff was handcuffed behind his back, his legs were shackled together by legirons, and a length of chain connected the two behind his back. The evidence regarding the length of the chain, called a Martin chain4, ranged from a few inches to several feet. Plaintiff remained face down on his bed, with his feet bowed toward his head. The evidence was inconsistent whether plaintiff could rest his head on the bed, or whether it too was bowed toward his feet.
Plaintiff remained in these restraints for seven hours and forty minutes, with only a 40 minute meal break after approximately five hours. During this break, plaintiff's hands were cuffed in front of his body, and his legs remained shackled. In addition, because plaintiff was unable to use any bathroom facilities throughout the entire seven hour, forty minute period, he was forced to urinate on the bed and the floor.
The parties agree that plaintiff was removed from the North Dakota-style four point restraint at 8:40 p.m. It was conceded that plaintiff was then placed in a modified form of four point restraint, called a "three point restraint" by the parties. While the evidence showed that plaintiff remained in these restraints for 23 hours, the evidence was inconclusive regarding the actual form of the three point restraints. Uncontradicted evidence did provide, however, that plaintiff spent the majority of this time in a stooped position with his wrists handcuffed together underneath one leg, and both legs shackled together. In this position, plaintiff was able to use bathroom facilities, but unable to use toilet paper.
Uncontradicted evidence further demonstrated that plaintiff spent the next seven days and fourteen hours handcuffed and in leg irons. He was released from restraints entirely on April 14, 1988.
The evidence also demonstrated that plaintiff was permitted to shower three or four times, each time while in handcuffs and leg restraints. It established that from April 5 through April 11, 1988, plaintiff was stripped and kept naked5, and was not supplied with a blanket until April 7, 1988. Defendants testified deprivation of these articles was necessary to prevent plaintiff from stuffing clothing or bedding into his toilet and breaking it, or from tying his cell door closed. Plaintiff stated, without contradiction, that he was so cold that he eventually tore the cover off his mattress in an attempt to crawl inside for warmth.
Unrebutted evidence showed that plaintiff was taken to court on approximately April 8, 1988 for an appearance in regard to the attack on Mr. Freezon. For this hearing, his restraints were eased, and he was provided with clothes. All witnesses testified that during transportation and the appearance, plaintiff remained cooperative and unthreatening.
The evidence also demonstrated that plaintiff was not given a toothbrush or toothpaste until April 13, 1988, and his cell was illuminated twenty four hours a day throughout the entire period of confinement. During the first few days of confinement, the water in plaintiff's toilet was also disconnected. In addition, defendants failed to introduce any evidence showing that plaintiff was checked by any medical personnel during the entire period.
Evidence at trial showed that at all times plaintiff willingly permitted defendants to keep him in restraints, and he did not attempt to physically harm anyone while he remained confined. However, it did show that in the initial stages of his confinement, plaintiff made a limited number of verbal threats to his guards.
Undisputed evidence also demonstrated that the three other inmates who attacked Mr. Freezon were restrained in virtually the same manner, and released at approximately the same time as plaintiff.
At trial, all defendants testified that plaintiff was not placed in restraints for punishment reasons. Rather, each stated that the measures were taken as an emergency safety measure solely to prevent plaintiff from hurting himself or another person.
Mr. Joseph R. Rowan testified on behalf of plaintiff. Mr. Rowan was the director of International Survey and Consultation Agency, a company which surveys prisons, jails, police departments, and mental hospitals. He testified as an expert regarding the use of force in correctional facilities.
Dr. David Sharbo, a psychiatrist, testified on behalf of defendants. He conducted a psychiatric examination and analysis of plaintiff the week prior to commencement of trial.
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
On a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed with the jury. Nelson v. Production Credit Assn., 930 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir.1991). Moreover, a court:
must give the party securing the jury verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. The verdict, however, must be supported by substantial evidence; a mere scintilla is not enough. In making that determination, the record must be examined and the testimony reviewed without assigning credibility or weight to the witnesses and evidence. A trial court cannot substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the jury, and should grant a judgment as a matter of law `only where the evidence points all one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inferences sustaining the position of the nonmoving party.'
J & J Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 693 F.2d 830, 835 (8th Cir.1982) (quoting Singer Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 579 F.2d 433, 440-1 (8th Cir.1978)).
In this action, plaintiff asserted that his civil rights were infringed upon by defendants because he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court emphasizes that "federal courts must tread warily in reviewing the administration of internal prison discipline." Maxwell v. Mason, 668 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir.1981). However, "it is equally...
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