Littreal v. Littreal

• Citation: 253 S.W.2d 247
• Parties: LITTREAL v. LITTREAL et al.
• Decision Date: 05 December 1952
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)

Page 247

253 S.W.2d 247

LITTREAL v. LITTREAL et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Dec. 5, 1952.

Leonard S. Stephens, Whitley City, for appellant.

R. L. Brown, Williamsburg, for appellee.

MOREMEN, Justice.

This appeal is prosecuted from a judgment which annulled a marriage between appellant, Dovie Littreal, and James B. Littreal. Walter Brown, committee for James B. Littreal, was joined as a defendant, but, herein, we will use the word appellee to designate James B. Littreal.

In December, 1944, appellee was adjudged by the Pulaski County Court to be an incompetent. No exemplification of these proceedings is in the record, so we do not know into which of the three classifications outlined by KRS 387.010, appellee was placed. The fact that there had been an adjudication is shown only by allegations and admissions in the pleadings and rather terse statements of witnesses--all of which were general in character.

The couple had known each other for four or five years before the wedding. Appellee was a veteran of the Spanish-American War and his disability was rated by the Veterans Bureau at one hundred per cent for which he received a pension of $261 per month. He had suffered a paralytis stroke. On leg had been removed. The use of one of his arms was greatly impaired, and the paralysis extended to the facial region. His speech was affected. The bride, who had been married several times before, was 64 years of age; weighed 95 pounds; had little education; suffered from rheumatism and was able to do little work other than that required by her house and garden.

On December 20, 1946, the appellee, a hopeless cripple, was carried to a taxicab where he joined appellant, and they were driven to Rossville, Georgia, where they were married. After the ceremoney, they returned to Whitley City. Shortly thereafter, appellant learned that appellee's pension was being administered through Mr. Brown, his committee, who purchased for them, out of the funds in his care, a small residence near the city.

For some time their marital relationship seemed to be endurable. Appellant did the housework and raised a garden. Appellee required considerable care and she gave attention to his needs. He could feed himself all right with his good hand, but, she testified, 'I had to roll him to the table and lift him in and out of bed and lift him over the slop jar.' Appellee liked to drink beer with his friends, but there was no showing that he drank to excess, or even that his wife, an abstainer, objected to the practice. It is mentioned only because counsel seems to have emphasized it.

They lived together (not without interruption) until March, 1949, at which time appellee departed. Appellant testified that appellee's daughter carried him away; that 'she came there in a truck and hauled him to her house. There wasn't any trouble between me and him. I asked him not to go and he just went on.'

After that she stayed on at the little house and the committee gave her $30 per month living expenses. She had some difficulty living on this amount. Sometime after the separation, the committee requested that she surrender possession of the house.

On July 21, 1949, appellant filed suit for separate maintenance and for an order that the home be set aside for her lifetime use. The committee filed answer and counterclaim which stated that the separation was caused by cruel treatment inflicted upon appellee, and, further, that because of appellee's mental condition the marriage ceremony was void under the laws of both Georgia and Kentucky, and was against the public policy of the latter. It was prayed that 'the marriage relation heretofore existing between plaintiff and defendant, Littreal, be declared void from its inception, and that said marriage be set aside, annulled and held for naught.' The chancellor granted that prayer.

Appellant contends, first, that the court erred in his finding that appellee did not have sufficient mental capacity to enter into a contract of marriage.

In Cook v. Cook, Ky., 243 S.W.2d 900, 901, we said:

'In determining whether one has mental capacity sufficient to contract a valid marriage, the test usually applied is whether there is a capacity to understand the nature of the contract and the duties and responsibilities which it creates. Gellert v. Busman's Adm'r, 239 Ky. 328, 39...