Litvaitis v. Litvaitis
| Decision Date | 22 March 1972 |
| Citation | 295 A.2d 519,162 Conn. 540 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jean LITVAITIS v. William G. LITVAITIS. |
John H. Cassidy, Jr., with whom were Peter E. Greene, Waterbury, and, on the brief, W. Fielding Secor, Waterbury, for appellant (defendant).
Brian A. Barnes, with whom was Howard R. Matzkin, Waterbury, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before HOUSE, C.J., and THIM, RYAN, SHAPIRO and LOISELLE, JJ.
In this action the plaintiff seeks reimbursement from the defendant for past support and an order requiring the defendant to contribute to her furture support. The plaintiff alleges in her amended complaint that she and the defendant were married November 12, 1938, and are husband and wife; that on or about January 25, 1954, the defendant abandoned her; that he failed and neglected to provide reasonable support for her; that she was compelled to expend her own money for her support; and that the defendant has refused to reimburse her for these expenses. In his answer, the defendant denied the material allegations of the plaintiff's complaint and in a special defense alleged that the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant was dissolved by a decree of divorce on February 20, 1965, by the Third Civil Court of Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Republic of Mexico. The plaintiff denied the allegations of the special defense. The trial court found the issues of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of $4680 for her expenditures for a period of six years, and ordered the payment to the plaintiff of the sum of $35 per week as future support beginning March 25, 1968, the date of the inception of this action by service on the defendant.
The trial court found the following facts: The plaintiff and the defendant were married on November 12, 1938, and separated about June 11, 1946. The defendant voluntarily abandoned the plaintiff because he wanted to be free and could not accept responsibility. Thereafter, in 1954, the defendant brought a divorce action against the plaintiff in the Superior Court in New Haven County, but on trial of the action the court denied the defendant a divorce. In that divorce action the Superior Court ordered the defendant to pay temporary alimony of $15 a week to his wife and also ordered that he pay temporary support in the amount of $15 for each of the two minor children. From the time of this temporary order in 1954 until February 1, 1968, the defendant made payment of $15 a week to the plaintiff regularly. He continued to pay $15 a week for the support of each minor child until each of them had married. All of the net earnings made by the plaintiff between 1962 and 1969 were used by her for her support. In July, 1964, the defendant went to Mexico and filed a petition for a divorce against the plaintiff in the Third Civil Court, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Republic of Mexico. A decree of divorce was entered by that court on February 20, 1965. The defendant remarried on July 22, 1966, and is presently living in Middlebury, Connecticut, with his second wife. About February 1, 1968, the defendant ceased making support payments to the plaintiff, whereupon the present action was instituted by the plaintiff on March 22, 1968. The defendant traveled to Mexico merely for a vacation and never intended to take up residence there. He did not change his address when he went there, nor did he ever change his address for voting or license purposes. He went to Mexico for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce and with the intention of returning to Waterbury. The plaintiff never submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Mexico. She has resided in the state of Connecticut since the 1940's and has never left Connecticut since that time. The defendant gave the plaintiff no money whatsoever during the period from February 1, 1968, to November 26, 1969. From these subordinate facts the trial court concluded that the divorce obtained by the defendant in Mexico was colorable and invalid; that the Mexican court was without jurisdiction to render a decree of divorce affecting the status of the plaintiff and the defendant; that the defendant abandoned the plaintiff some time prior to 1954; that the defendant voluntarily paid the plaintiff the sum of $15 a week by way of support from 1954 until February, 1968; that the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff the sum of $4680 for past due support; that a reasonable amount for future payments of support to the plaintiff is $35 per week. The date of judgment was September 10, 1970. The order for future support was to take effect from March 25, 1968, the date of the inception of this action by service on the defendant.
The defendant assigns error in the conclusion of the trial court that the Mexican court was without jurisdiction to enter a decree of divorce affecting the status of the plaintiff and the defendant and that the divorce so obtained was invalid. The duty of a husband to provide past and future support is dependent on the existence of a valid marriage relation. General Statutes § 46-10; Yates v. Yates, 155 Conn. 544, 547, 235 A.2d 656; Zybura v. Zybura, 142 Conn. 533, 556, 115 A.2d 452.
The full faith and credit clause of the constitution of the United States does not apply to a divorce obtained in a foreign country. Courts of the United States are not required by federal law to give full force and effect to a judgment granted in a foreign nation. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95; Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902; Caldwell v. Caldwell 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60; Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818; 33 Fordham L.Rev. 449; 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 802. On the other hand, judgments of courts of foreign countries are recognized in the United States because of the comity due to the courts and judgments of one nation from another. Such recognition is granted to foreign judgments with due regard to international duty and convenience, on the one hand, and to rights of citizens of the United States and others under the protection of its laws, on the other hand. This principle is frequently applied in divorce cases; a decree of divorce granted in one country by a court having jurisdiction to do so will be given full force and effect in another country by comity, not only as a decree determining status, but also with respect to an award of alimony and child support. The principle of comity, however, has several important exceptions and qualifications. A decree of divorce will not be recognized by comity where it was obtained by a procedure which denies due process of law in the real sense of the term, or was obtained by fraud, or where the divorce offends the public policy of the state in which recognition is sought, or where the foreign court lacked jurisdiction. 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 964.
A divorce judgment is a judgment in rem. Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 670, 174 A.2d 122. If a divorce judgment is pronounced by a tribunal which does not have jurisdiction to do so, it may be attacked collaterally on that ground in this country; comity will not demand its recognition. Thus, ordinarily, our courts will not recognize a divorce obtained in a foreign country if neither spouse had a domicil in that country. The rule that a domicil of at least one of the spouses is essential to give the court jurisdiction to grant a divorce applies to decrees of foreign nations as well as to decrees entered within the United States, even though a domicil is not required by the laws of the jurisdiction which grants the divorce. 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 965; see Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn. 440, 445, 58 A.2d 523, aff'd, 336 U.S. 674, 69 S.Ct. 751, 93 L.Ed. 957; State v. Cooke, 110 Conn. 348, 351, 148 A. 385; Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 692, 92 .a 685. The traditional requisite for subject-matter jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings has been domicil. Rice v. Rice, supra. 'Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce . . . is founded on domicil.' Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 1095, 89 L.Ed. 1577. Regardless of its validity in the nation awarding it, the courts of this country will not...
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