Lively ex rel. Lively v. Union Carbide Corp.
| Decision Date | 13 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. E2012-02136-WC-R3-WC,E2012-02136-WC-R3-WC |
| Parties | ARMETHIA D. LIVELY EX REL. ROBERT E. LIVELY v. UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court — Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Anderson County
Upon the death of her husband from asbestos-related pulmonary disease, the plaintiff filed suit for workers' compensation benefits. Because her husband had previously settled a disability claim for 400 weeks of benefits, the employer denied the claim. The trial court awarded the funeral expenses of the husband but declined to grant benefits to the plaintiff as his dependent over and above the amount of the settlement. Her appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Although the plaintiff may make a separate claim for benefits, she is not entitled to any recovery beyond funeral expenses because the amount of her entitlement, as controlled by the date of her husband's injury, would not be in excess of the amount of his settlement. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
of the Trial Court Affirmed
Loring Justice and B. Chadwick Rickman, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Armethia D. Lively.
Kristi McKinney Stogsdill, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the appellee, Union Carbide Corporation.
OPINIONRobert Lively (the "Employee"), a sheet metal worker for Union Carbide Corporation (the "Employer") at its Y-12 facility in Oak Ridge, received a "medical termination" on February 26, 1982. Because of chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and osteoarthritis of the .spine, the Employer classified the Employee as permanently and totally disabled.1 After being diagnosed with asbestosis on May 11, 2006,2 the Employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits against both the Employer and the Second Injury Fund.3 The Employee, the Employer, and the custodian of the Second Injury Fund entered into a settlement on August 24, 2009.4
The settlement provided that the Employee's asbestosis was caused by his exposure to asbestos at the Employer's Y-12 facility prior to his medical termination in 1982. The terms of the settlement designated February 26, 1982 as the date of his injury, and granted a lump sum of $90,000.00 as "compensation based upon an agreed residual permanent total disability of 100%, which equates to 400 weeks of benefits at a negotiated compromised workers' compensation rate of $225.00 per week." Several paragraphs emphasized that the award was for asbestosis and not for occupational asthma. The settlement further provided that the Employer was "exonerated from any and all further liability with regard to disability benefits related to the [Employee's] occupational lung injuries." The Employee's "claim for occupational asthma and related lung diseases from work-related exposures prior to February 26, 1982 [was] dismissed with prejudice."
The Employee died of asbestosis on October 4, 2010. In April of 2011, his widow, Armethia Lively (the "Plaintiff"), brought this action against the Employer seeking benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law based upon the Employee's "asbestosis and/or occupational lung disease" that resulted in his death. The Plaintiff requested "[s]tatutory death benefits including, but not limited to, funeral and burial expenses," and "[a]ll other benefits provided under Tennessee Law." A trial was held in November of 2011, at which no testimony was presented by either party. After reviewing court records, considering stipulations of fact, and hearing arguments by counsel, the trial court found that the Employee had died as a result of a compensable occupational disease and, therefore, the Plaintiff, as his dependent, was entitled to "the maximum total benefit, established at 400 weeks times the applicable workers' compensation irate, less the amount of workers' compensation disability benefits paid directly to [the Employee]."5 The trial court determined that the 2009 settlement established by agreement the applicable workers' compensation rate ($225.00 per week) and date of injury (February 26, 1982), resulting in a maximum total benefit of $90,000.00 ($225.00 per week times 400 weeks). The court then deducted the $90,000.00 settlement from the maximum total benefit, resulting in a net sum of $0.00. While awarding the Plaintiff funeral expenses in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(c) (2008), the trial court concluded that the Plaintiff was "not entitled to any additional monetary disability benefits" because the amount of the 2009 settlement was equal to the maximum total benefit, leaving nothing more for the Plaintiff to recover.
Afterward, the Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, challenging the trial court's determinations as to the applicable date of injury and maximum total benefit. The Plaintiff asked the trial court to find that there were actually two different dates of injury—one in 1982 for the Employee's medical termination due to occupational asthma, and one in 2010 for the Employee's death from asbestosis. As stated, the trial court found the date of injury to be February 26, 1982—the date of the Employee's medical termination—as established in the 2009 settlement. According to the Plaintiff, however, if the Employee's medical termination was actually the result of "occupational asthma/asthmatic bronchitis," and not the asbestosis that caused his death, then his date of death—October 4, 2010—would control as the date of his injury. Using the 2010 date, the Plaintiff calculated her maximum total benefit as $306,000.00,6 subject to deduction of the $90,000.00 settlement, resulting ina maximum potential recovery of $216,000.00.
When the trial court denied the motion to alter or amend, the Plaintiff filed a second motion asking the trial court to reconsider the date of injury and seeking to supplement the record with decisions of the United States Department of Labor's Division of Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation ("EEOIC"). Her stated purpose was "to clarify and correct" any "misperception" by the trial court "that the [Employee's] February 26, 1982 medical retirement was related to the occupational disease of asbestosis pleural disease that caused his death." The decisions of the EEOIC purportedly corroborated the Plaintiff's claim that the asbestosis that caused the Employee's death in 2010 was not present at the time of his medical termination in 1982. In response, the Employer contended that the Employee was forced to retire due to a "respiratory disorder," and mat no proof existed "one way or the other" as to whether it was occupational asthma or asbestosis that caused the retirement. According to the Employer, the EEOIC decisions showed that the Employee was not diagnosed with occupational asthma until 2009, three years after he was diagnosed with asbestosis and twenty-seven years after he retired. The trial court refused to consider the EEOIC decisions as evidence, denied the Plaintiff's motion, and upheld the judgment denying any benefits other than funeral expenses.
In this appeal, the Plaintiff continues to argue that she is entitled to additional death benefits because there is a distinction between the cause of the Employee's medical termination in 1982 and the cause of his death in 2010. Her brief summarizes the related issues as follows:
Although the evidence was presented by stipulation and no witnesses testified at the trial, the Plaintiff's claim presents issues of both fact and law.7 We review a trial court's factual findings "de novo upon the record . . . , accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding[s], unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." Term. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2) (2008 & Supp. 2012): see also Orrick v. Bestwav Trucking. Inc., 184 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tenn. 2006). The interpretation and application of our workers' compensation statutes, however, are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Nichols v. Jack Cooper Transp. Co., 318 S.W.3d 354, 359 (Tenn. 2010). "Our primary objective when engaging in statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the legislature without unduly broadening or restricting the statute[s]." Id. at 359-60. "We determine legislative intent from the natural and ordinary...
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