Livingston v. Noland Corp., 22792
| Decision Date | 20 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 22792,22792 |
| Citation | 362 S.E.2d 16,293 S.C. 521 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 72 A.L.R.4th 83, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,645 W.R. LIVINGSTON, Appellant-Respondent, v. NOLAND CORPORATION and Copeland Corporation, Respondents, of whom Copeland Corporation is Respondent-Appellant. Appeal of Copeland Corporation. . Heard |
Robert H. Hood and John F. Martin, of Robert H. Hood & Associates, Charleston, for appellant/respondent.
Thomas J. Wills, IV, of Barnwell, Whaley, Patterson & Helms, Charleston, for respondents.
Richard A. Steadman, Jr., North Charleston, and Douglas N. Truslow, Columbia, for respondent/appellant.
W.R. Livingston (Livingston) brought this products liability action to recover damages incurred when his catfish and eel farming operation was partially destroyed by fire. Livingston alleged the fire was caused by a defective refrigerator compressor, originally manufactured by Copeland Corporation (Copeland) and remanufactured, prior to installation, by Our Way, Inc. A total of six (6) remanufactured compressors were sold by Noland Corporation (Noland) to Livingston's refrigeration repairman and were installed at Livingston's business between October, 1978 and the fire in August, 1979.
At the conclusion of Livingston's case, the trial judge granted Noland an involuntary nonsuit on all causes of action except implied warranty. Livingston was granted a voluntary nonsuit with prejudice as to Noland on the cause of action for breach of implied warranty. Copeland was granted an involuntary nonsuit on all causes of action except negligent manufacture and breach of express and implied warranties.
At the conclusion of the evidence, Livingston withdrew his cause of action for express warranty as to all defendants. A verdict of $922.00 actual damages was returned against Copeland for breach of implied warranty.
Copeland appeals the denial of its motions for involuntary nonsuit and for judgment n.o.v. on the implied warranty cause of action. Livingston appeals various rulings, including the involuntary nonsuits on the causes of action for strict liability and negligent failure to warn.
In reviewing the rulings of a trial judge on motions for involuntary nonsuit and judgment n.o.v., this Court must review the evidence and all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rewis v. Grand Strand General Hospital 290 S.C. 40, 348 S.E.2d 173 (1986). If more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, the issues of negligence and proximate cause must be submitted to the jury. Id.
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the denial of Copeland's motion for judgment n.o.v. on the implied warranty cause of action and affirm the remainder of the trial judge's rulings.
Livingston argued two theories to support his causes of action for strict liability and breach of warranty. First, he asserted the first replacement compressor, installed in October 1978, failed because of a manufacturing defect. This failure allegedly contaminated the entire refrigeration system, causing the failure of the last compressor, which led to the fire. Alternatively, he theorized the final replacement compressor was independently defective and caused the fire. Livingston failed to introduce sufficient evidence to sustain either of these theories.
A common element of actions for strict liability and breach of implied warranty is proof the product was not reasonably fit or safe for its intended use. Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 286 S.E.2d 129 (1982). The proof must be sufficient to show not only that the product was defective but that the defect was the direct and efficient cause of plaintiff's injury. Benford v. Berkeley Heating Co., 258 S.C. 357, 188 S.E.2d 841 (1972); Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 328 S.E.2d 108 (Ct.App.1985).
As to the first theory, Livingston's experts testified that if the mechanical and electrical systems had been properly flushed and checked at the time of installation, any subsequent problems resulting from the failure of the first compressor would have been eliminated. Additionally, both experts testified that approximately 40,000 compressors fail every year, resulting in no further harm.
The only reasonable inference from the evidence is that the refrigeration system failed because of improper servicing of the...
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