Liz WW. v. Shakeria XX.

• Decision Date: 07 May 2015
• Citation: 8 N.Y.S.3d 713,2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 03888,128 A.D.3d 1118
• Parties: In the Matter of LIZ WW., Appellant, v. SHAKERIA XX. et al., Respondents. (And Other Related Proceedings.).
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

128 A.D.3d 1118

8 N.Y.S.3d 713

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 03888

In the Matter of LIZ WW., Appellant

v.SHAKERIA XX. et al., Respondents.

(And Other Related Proceedings.).

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

May 7, 2015.

Law Office of Eric R. Gee, Delmar (Eric R. Gee of counsel), for appellant.

Sandra M. Colatosti, Albany, for Shakeria XX., respondent.

Paul J. Connolly, Delmar, for Alvin YY., respondent.

Jeffrey S. Berkun, Albany, attorney for the child.

Before: LAHTINEN, J.P., GARRY, LYNCH and CLARK, JJ.

Opinion

LYNCH, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Albany County (Duggan, J.), entered December 27, 2013, which, among other things, granted respondents' motion for summary judgment dismissing petitioner's applications, in proceedings pursuant to Family Ct. Act article 6, for custody of respondents' child.

Respondent Shakeria XX. (hereinafter the mother) and respondent Alvin YY. (hereinafter the father) are the parents of a child (born in late 2007). In late 2006 or early 2007, the mother, who has six other children, began a relationship and lived with petitioner and the child; petitioner later moved out, at some point taking the child to live with her with the mother's consent. Although there are factual disputes as to when petitioner moved out and what precisely transpired thereafter, it is undisputed that the child lived with petitioner for many years. In August 2012, the mother consented to an order giving petitioner physical custody and shared legal custody, without prejudice to the father. ¹

From 2009 to 2012, the father was incarcerated and, upon his release in December 2012, he petitioned for a modification of custody and visitation and had some limited visitation with the child. The child resided with petitioner until July 2013, when Family Court abruptly issued a temporary order, without an evidentiary hearing, giving primary physical custody of the child, then almost six, to the father, with joint legal custody to the mother and the father. The court declined to order visitation for petitioner, leaving her access to the child up to the mother and the father. The court directed the parties to submit papers on whether there were extraordinary circumstances to support an award of custody to petitioner as a nonparent (see Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 544–545, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 356 N.E.2d 277 [1976] ).

Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for sole custody and, after the father was again incarcerated, she filed a petition for modification of custody and the mother filed a petition for primary physical custody. Family Court issued a temporary order in November 2013 giving the mother physical custody with visitation to petitioner. The court thereafter concluded, again without a hearing, that petitioner had not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances, granted summary judgment to the mother and father, and dismissed petitioner's petitions. Petitioner now appeals.

Under settled law, “a parent has a claim of custody of his or her child, superior to that of all others, in the absence of surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness, disruption of custody over an extended period of time or other extraordinary circumstances” (Matter of Curless v. McLarney, 125 A.D.3d 1193, 1195, 4 N.Y.S.3d 666 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Battisti v. Battisti, 121 A.D.3d 1196, 1196–1197, 993 N.Y.S.2d 804 [2014] ), and the nonparent bears the “heavy burden of establishing extraordinary circumstances to overcome the [parent's] superior right to custody” (Matter of Roth v. Messina, 116 A.D.3d 1257, 1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 221 [2014] ). “The pertinent factors to be considered in determining whether extraordinary circumstances exist include the length of time the child has lived with the nonparent, the quality of that relationship and the length of time the ... parent allowed such custody to continue without trying to assume the primary parental role” (Matter of Curless v. McLarney, 125 A.D.3d at 1195, 4 N.Y.S.3d 666 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Aida B. v. Alfredo C., 114 A.D.3d 1046, 1048, 980 N.Y.S.2d 601 [2014] ), as well as “the child's psychological bonding and attachments, the prior disruption of the parent['s] custody, separation from siblings and potential harm to the child” and other relevant factors (see Matter of Pettaway v. Savage, 87 A.D.3d 796, 798, 928 N.Y.S.2d 869 [2011], lv. denied 18 N.Y.3d 801, 2011 WL 6155545 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). A “consent order, standing alone, does not constitute a judicial finding [or an admission] of ... extraordinary circumstances” (Matter of McBride v. Springsteen–El, 106 A.D.3d 1402, 1403, 967 N.Y.S.2d 768 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). However, we have stressed that, “with few exceptions, an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether extraordinary circumstances exist” (Matter of Daniels v. Lushia, 101 A.D.3d 1405, 1406, 956 N.Y.S.2d 652 [2012] ; see Matter of Wayman v. Ramos, 88 A.D.3d 1237, 1238, 932 N.Y.S.2d 199 [2011], lv. dismissed 18 N.Y.3d 868, 938 N.Y.S.2d 850, 962 N.E.2d 274 [2012] ).

Upon our review of the parties' submissions, we find that summary judgment was not appropriate.² “[S]ummary judgment should only be granted when there are no material facts disputed sufficiently to warrant a trial” (Matter of LaBier v. LaBier, 291 A.D.2d 730, 732, 738 N.Y.S.2d 132 [2002], lv. dismissed 98 N.Y.2d 671, 746 N.Y.S.2d 459, 774 N.E.2d 224 [2002] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. v. James M., 83 N.Y.2d 178, 182, 608 N.Y.S.2d 940, 630 N.E.2d 636 [1994] ; Matter of Singer v. Levitt, 65 A.D.3d 634, 634, 883 N.Y.S.2d 728 [2009] ). Although petitioner would ultimately bear the burden of proof at trial to show extraordinary circumstances, on this motion, the mother and the father “had the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of triable issues of fact regarding the existence of extraordinary circumstances” (Matter of Daniels v. Lushia, 101 A.D.3d at 1406, 956 N.Y.S.2d 652 ), “by tender of evidentiary proof in admissible form” (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718 [1980] ), that is, “entitlement to judgment as a matter of law” on this threshold issue (Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 [1985] ; see Matter of LaBier v. LaBier, 291 A.D.2d at 732–733, 738 N.Y.S.2d 132 ; CPLR 3212[b] ). Here, the mother and the father did not dispute that the child had lived with petitioner for a majority of his life, during most of which the father was in jail and had limited contact; the mother had consented to the child living with and being cared for by petitioner during most of those years. The father submitted an affidavit averring that he was an “active parent” from the child's birth until his 2009 incarceration, that he had unquantified visits with the child in prison, and that he “remained active” in the child's life despite his incarceration. In our view, given the undisputed circumstances under which the child lived with petitioner for most of his life, we do not find that the mother's and the father's conclusory submissions demonstrated the absence of triable issues of fact regarding the existence of extraordinary circumstances (see Matter of Battisti v. Battisti, 121 A.D.3d at 1197–1198, 993 N.Y.S.2d 804 ; Matter of Aida B. v. Alfredo C., 114 A.D.3d at 1049, 980 N.Y.S.2d 601 ; Matter of Pettaway v. Savage, 87 A.D.3d at 798–799, 928 N.Y.S.2d 869 ; see also Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d at 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718 ; Matter of Daniels v. Lushia, 101 A.D.3d at 1406, 956 N.Y.S.2d 652 ; cf. Matter of Curless v. McLarney, 125 A.D.3d at 1194–1195, 4 N.Y.S.3d 666 ).

Further, in her petitions, petitioner asserted that she had provided for all of the child's needs for five years and that she was the only mother he had ever...