Lizzi v. Alexander
| Citation | 255 F.3d 128 |
| Decision Date | 04 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-2104,No. 00-2126,No. 00-2103,00-2103,00-2104,00-2126 |
| Parties | (4th Cir. 2001) CHRISTOPHER T. LIZZI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT ALEXANDER; CHARLES THOMAS; PHILLIP WALLACE; ANTHONY JOHNSON; AL MCCOY; DENNISE KURTZ, Defendants-Appellants, and WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY; JACK BYRD; MICHAEL KURTZ, Defendants. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Movant. CHRISTOPHER T. LIZZI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT ALEXANDER; CHARLES THOMAS; PHILLIP WALLACE; ANTHONY JOHNSON; AL MCCOY; DENNISE KURTZ; WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY; JACK BYRD, Defendants-Appellees, and MICHAEL KURTZ, Defendant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Movant. CHRISTOPHER T. LIZZI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT ALEXANDER; CHARLES THOMAS; PHILLIP WALLACE; ANTHONY JOHNSON; AL MCCOY; DENNISE KURTZ, Defendants-Appellants, and WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY; JACK BYRD; MICHAEL KURTZ, Defendants. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Movant. Argued: |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. (CA-98-2660-DKC) COUNSEL ARGUED: Gerard J. Stief, Associate General Counsel, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Paul Francis Evelius, WRIGHT, CONSTABLE & SKEEN, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Cheryl C. Burke, General Counsel, Robert J. Kniaz, Deputy General Counsel, Sonia A. Bacchus, Assistant General Counsel, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and LUTTIG and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
In this case, we must decide whether the Eleventh Amendment shields the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), an agency created by interstate compact, from plaintiff Christopher Lizzi's assertions that the agency violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. SS 2601 et seq. (1994). We also must decide the related question of whether sovereign immunity bars Lizzi's allegation that several individual employees of WMATA violated the FMLA and are thus subject to personal liability for the alleged damages. The district court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars Lizzi's claims against WMATA, but that the FMLA permits Lizzi to bring an action against the employees of WMATA in their individual capacities. Because sovereign immunity extends to WMATA, and because the claims against the WMATA employees are in reality claims against the agency itself, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions to dismiss the action.
Plaintiff Christopher Lizzi worked as a bus wheelchair lift mechanic for WMATA until September, 1997. WMATA fired Lizzi for allegedly combining sick days and vacation leave to miss work for the entire summer. WMATA maintained that Lizzi fabricated his sick leave and did not submit to a medical exam, as required by the agency's policies. Lizzi contested this, and filed suit under the FMLA alleging that WMATA terminated him in violation of the Act.
Lizzi sued WMATA as well as seven individual supervisors at WMATA. The complaint stated that "Plaintiff Christopher T. Lizzi sues defendants Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Robert Alexander, Charles Thomas, Anthony Johnson, Michael Kurtz, Phillip Wallace, Al McCoy, and Jack Byrd." The complaint further declared that the individual defendants"have, at all relevant times, been employees of WMATA." The complaint also noted the supervisory positions of some of these defendants. McCoy and Byrd were Garage Shift Supervisors; Johnson oversaw the Garage Shift Supervisors; Alexander was WMATA's Absenteeism Supervisor; and Kurtz was WMATA's Bus Maintenance Superintendent. The complaint did not specify the positions of either Thomas or Wallace. Lizzi asked for, inter alia, reinstatement, back pay, damages, and an order prohibiting the defendants from violating the FMLA.
The district court granted summary judgment for WMATA on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but kept the individual defendants in the case. The lower court held that the WMATA compact does not waive the agency's Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that the FMLA is not a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment, S 5 power. But the court also held that the FMLA specifically defines "employer" to include supervisors, and thus the plain language of the FMLA authorizes suits against the individual employees in their individual capacities. The district court certified for interlocutory appeal the issues of WMATA's waiver of immunity and the liability of the individual defendants under the FMLA. WMATA appeals the decision to keep the individual supervisors in the case, and Lizzi crossappeals the district court's decision that the compact does not waive WMATA's sovereign immunity.
WMATA is an interstate compact agency and instrumentality of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Its purpose is to ensure the proper functioning and operation of a mass transit system in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. See Morris v. WMATA, 781 F.2d 218, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1986). WMATA receives approximately 44% of its budget from the signatory states. The WMATA compact was approved by Congress in 1966. See Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact, Pub. L. No. 89-774, 80 Stat. 1324 (1966).
Three sections of the compact are at the heart of this case. First, S 12 states that WMATA may "[s]ue and be sued." Id. at 1328. Second, S 80 declares that WMATA
shall be liable for its contracts and for its torts and those of its Directors, officers, employees and agent [sic] committed in the conduct of any proprietary function, in accordance with the law of the applicable signatory (including rules on conflict of laws), but shall not be liable for any torts occurring in the performance of a governmental function. The exclusive remedy for such breach of contracts and torts for which the Authority shall be liable, as herein provided, shall be by suit against the Authority. Nothing contained in this title shall be construed as a waiver by the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, and the counties and cities within the zone of any immunity from suit.
Id. at 1350. Third, S 81 says in pertinent part:
The United States District Courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Courts of Maryland and Virginia, of all actions brought by or against [WMATA] and to enforce subpoenas issued under [this compact]. Any such action initiated in a State Court shall be removable to the appropriate United States District Court.
We note at the outset that WMATA possesses Eleventh Amendment immunity. The signatories of the compact intended to confer Eleventh Amendment immunity on WMATA. See Delon Hampton & Assoc. v. WMATA, 943 F.2d 355, 359 (4th Cir. 1991). Further, both this circuit and the D.C. Circuit have held that Eleventh Amendment immunity may attach to WMATA's actions. See id. at 359; Morris, 781 F.2d at 220. WMATA is a state agency, subject to all the benefits and liabilities of a state itself, including sovereign immunity. See Morris, 781 F.2d at 219-20. It does not matter that WMATA was created by interstate compact, as opposed to being an agency of one state alone. See Delon Hampton, 943 F.2d at 359; Jones v. WMATA, 205 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
In Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the Port Authority Trans-Hudson, an interstate compact entity, could not claim sovereign immunity. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 52-53. But the Court in Hess relied heavily on the fact that the Port Authority did not receive any funding from any state. Instead, it was a "self-sustaining" agency. Id. at 50. Indeed, the Court in Hess specifically distinguished the Port Authority from WMATA because WMATA was not self-sufficient. Id. at 49-50. Thus, the conferral of Eleventh Amendment immunity on WMATA "is compatible" with the holding in Hess. Id. at 50 n.20.
Lizzi argues that under Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990), SS 12 and 81 of the WMATA Compact read together effect a waiver of the agency's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
In Feeney, the Supreme Court ruled that an interstate compact entity, the Port Authority Trans-Hudson, had given its consent to suit in federal court. See 495 U.S. at 308-09. The statutory consent to suit provision in Feeney proclaimed that the states gave "consent to suits, actions, or proceedings of any form or nature at law, in equity or otherwise . . . against the Port of New York Authority." Id. at 306 (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). This provision standing alone, although "broadly framed," may have reflected "only a State's consent to suit in its own courts." Id. The Court thus looked at the venue provision of the compact, which stated that venue "shall be laid within a county or judicial district, established by one of said States or by the United States . . . ." Id. at 307 (internal quotations omitted). Since the venue provision explicitly referred to federal courts, the Court held that the statutory consent to suit provision must encompass both federal and state courts. See id. at 307-09.
Lizzi argues that the similar provisions in the WMATA compact also effect a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Section 12 states that WMATA may "[s]ue and be sued." 80 Stat. at 1328. And S 81 makes clear that venue is proper in federal court. Thus, Lizzi maintains that under the reasoning of Feeney, WMATA must have waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
We disagree. Even were we to assume that WMATA's consent to suit provision is coextensive with the broader consent to suit provision in Feeney, Lizzi's argument has one fatal flaw: S 80 of the WMATA compact "specifically and expressly delineates the scope of WMATA's...
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