Llanes v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.
| Decision Date | 25 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-1768-Civ.,95-1768-Civ. |
| Parties | Manuel LLANES, Plaintiff, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Jay Mitchell Levy, Jay M. Levy, P.A., Miami, FL, for plaintiff.
Jeffrey Elliot Mandel, Muller, Mintz, Kornreich, Caldwell, Casey, Orlando, FL, for defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY FINAL JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Sears, Roebuck and Company's ("Sears") Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 31, 1996.
Plaintiff Manuel Llanes ("Llanes"), has sued Sears, his former employer, contending that Sears discriminated against him because of his disability in violation of Title I of the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (See Plaintiffs' Complaint). Llanes further asserts that Sears' actions were intentionally committed to cause him severe emotional distress and were thereby violative of state law. (Id.) Sears denies that it discriminated against Llanes because of his disability. Specifically, Sears contends that Llanes is not disabled within the meaning of Title I of the ADA and that even if Llanes were disabled, Sears reasonably accommodated him and thereby discharged its duty under the ADA. (See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter "MSJ"). Sears also asserts that no reasonable factfinder could find that its conduct was sufficiently outrageous to establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.) Accordingly, Sears moves for summary final judgment as to Llanes' claims.
THE COURT has considered the Motion, the responses, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Final Judgment is GRANTED for the reasons set forth below.
The procedure for disposition of a summary judgment motion is well established. Summary judgment is authorized only when:
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of meeting this exacting standard. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). In applying this standard, the Adickes Court explained that when assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the courts should view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. All reasonable doubts about the facts should be resolved in favor of the non-movant. Id.
The party opposing the motion may not simply rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings; after the moving party has met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986).
If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir.1981). Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these facts. Lighting Fixture & Elec. Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir.1969). If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment. Impossible Electronic Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Systems, Inc., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir.1982).
Moreover, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not respond to it with any affidavits or other evidence unless and until the movant has properly supported the motion with sufficient evidence. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. at 1610. The moving party must demonstrate that the facts underlying all the relevant legal questions raised by the pleadings or otherwise are not in dispute, or else summary judgment will be denied notwithstanding that the non-moving party has introduced no evidence whatsoever. Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 611-12 (5th Cir.1967). The Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
On or about August 8, 1975, Llanes began his employment with Sears. (Joint Pretrial Stip, hereinafter "Stip." at p. 12). From 1988 to 1992, Llanes worked as an outside commission sales associate selling roofing and aluminum products for Sears' Home Improvements organization. ("HIPS"). (Id.). On July 15, 1992, while at a customer's home, Llanes fell from a ladder and injured his left knee. (Id. at 13). This injury resulted in Llanes having operations on both of his knees and ultimately led to Llanes developing a back and hip problem. (Id.). Thereafter, Llanes filed a workers' compensation claim and, on February 28, 1994, entered into a settlement agreement with regard to the indemnity portion of his claim. (Id.). It was determined by his treating physicians that Llanes was disabled with a six percent permanent partial impairment to his body as a whole, (see P's MSJ at p. 2), and it was further determined that as a result of his injuries, Llanes should not drive for more than thirty minutes successively. (Id. at 2-3; Stip. at 15).
Nevertheless, despite his injuries and his driving limitations, Llanes continued his employment with Sears as an outside sales associate. In April 1993, Sears reorganized the HIPS organization for which Llanes previously worked and created a new organization, Unit 5596, devoted to the sale of central air conditioning and heating units. (Stip at 15). Llanes, along with Frank Heiss, Ron Hawkins, George Guiterrez, and Ernie Anderson were the five sales associates who comprised Unit 5596. (Id. at 13-14). Unlike the HIPS organization, in which the sales associates worked out of a central facility, the sales associates in Unit 5596 worked out of their homes. (Id. at 14). In addition to any customer leads that they could generate on their own, the sales associates in Unit 5596 were assigned additional customer leads by lead distributors who were stationed in a Sears central office located in Winter Park, Florida. (Id.).
The sales leads were generated by potential customers responding to advertisements by calling toll-free telephone numbers and leaving their names, addresses, and telephone numbers. (Id. at 12). Pursuant to the standard lead distribution policy, these sales leads from both the Northern and Southern parts of Dade County would be assigned in equal numbers to each of the five outside sales associates. (See id.). As an outside sales associate in Unit 5596, Llanes essential job functions included traveling to and visiting customer homes throughout Dade County, assessing their needs, and selling them heating and cooling units. (Id. at 14). However, Llanes, who lived in South Dade County, informed Michael Gill ("Gill"), the Central Installation Manager, that due to his driving limitation, he could not accept sales leads from the Northern part of Dade County. (See P's MSJ at p. 3). Therefore, Llanes requested that any leads that he received in North Dade County be substituted with leads from South Dade County. (See P's Response to MSJ). Gill acceded in this request and instructed the lead distributors to assign to Llanes only leads from South Dade County and to substitute South Dade leads for any North Dade leads that would have otherwise been assigned to Llanes. (See id.).
This lead distribution policy, whereby Llanes received substituted South Dade County leads, lasted until October 1994. In October 1994, however, two of the other sales associates from Unit 5596, Ron Hawkins ("Hawkins") and Frank Heiss ("Heiss"), complained to Gill about the lead distribution policy. (Stip. at p. 4). According to Hawkins and Heiss, the South Dade leads were considerably more lucrative than the North Dade leads. Indeed, it is undisputed that the most affluent areas of the County are in South Dade and that most of the sales associates experienced less credit declines and better closing rates in South Dade. (See D's MSJ at p. 12; Statement Undisputed Facts at ¶ 12). Hawkins and Heiss complained that they had suffered a loss in their income as a result of the lead distribution policy and that it was unfair that Llanes received more than his fair share of the lucrative South Dade leads. Moreover, Hawkins and Heiss threatened to quit unless the distribution policy were equalized and, in fact, Hawkins and Llanes got into a heated confrontation over the distribution of the leads from South Dade. (See Stip.).
In response to the complaints by Hawkins and Heiss, Gill consulted Sears' Human Resource Manager Michael Stubbs ("Stubbs") about the lead distribution policy and, with Stubbs' approval, authored a memorandum dated October 22, 1994, to clarify the policy. (Id. at 4, 16; Exhibit E to P's Statement of Disputed Facts). Pursuant to the new policy, Llanes would no longer receive substituted South Dade leads, but rather, would only be given the South Dade leads that came up in his rotation. (See id.). Thus, under the new policy, each of the five sales associates from Unit 5596 received an equivalent number of South Dade sales leads. (Id.).
Despite the implementation of the new policy, Gill attempted to accommodate Llanes by instructing the lead coordinators that Llanes would be...
To continue reading
Request your trial