Lloyd Garretson Co. v. Robinson, 25070.

• Decision Date: 27 August 1934
• Docket Number: 25070.
• Citation: 35 P.2d 504,178 Wash. 601
• Parties: LLOYD GARRETSON CO. et al. v. ROBINSON, State Director of Agriculture, et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

35 P.2d 504

178 Wash. 601

LLOYD GARRETSON CO. et al. v. ROBINSON, State Director of Agriculture, et al.

No. 25070.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 27, 1934

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, Judge.

Action by the Lloyd Garretson Company and others, suing on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, against Walter G Robinson, State Director of Agriculture, and another. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

Richards Gilbert & Conklin, of Yakima, for appellants.

G. W Hamilton, Atty. Gen., and George G. Hannan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

Patterson & Patterson, of Seattle, amici curiae.

MAIN Justice.

The plaintiffs brought this action to restrain the defendants, the director of agriculture of this state and one of his deputies, from enforcing, as against them, chapter 67 of the Laws of 1933 (page 342), which was entitled, an act relating to merchants engaged in buying and selling agricultural products, and amending certain sections of the prior law. To the complaint, a demurrer was interposed and sustained. The plaintiffs elected to stand upon their complaint, as amended by stipulation, and refused to plead further. Judgment was entered dismissing the action, from which they appeal.

The appellants, at the time of bringing the action, and for many years prior thereto, had been dealers engaged in buying and selling, for profit, in the ordinary course of business, horticultural and agricultural products in Yakima county, none of the appellants being a nonprofit co-operative marketing organization or exclusively retail merchants having a fixed place of business.

In 1907 (chapter 139, p. 266, Laws of 1907) the Legislature passed an act regulating commission merchants and persons selling farm, dairy, orchard, and garden products on commission. This act required a license and the giving of a bond by those coming under it. The previous act of 1895 (Laws 1895, p. 369) was by that act repealed. In State v. Walter Bowen & Co., 86 Wash. 23, 149 P. 330, Ann. Cas. 1917B. 625, the constitutionality of the 1907 act was sustained.

In 1923 (chapter 134, p. 366, Laws of 1923) the Legislature passed an act relating to commission merchants engaged in selling agricultural products and repealed the act of 1907. The 1923 act defined the term 'agricultural product' to include horticultural, viticultural, forestry, dairy, live stock, poultry, bee, or 'farm product.' Section 1. That act defined 'commission merchant' as meaning any person or corporation that received any agricultural product to be sold on commission for the account of another and excluded from its operation 'non-profit cooperative marketing organizations.' Section 1. The constitutionality of the 1923 act was sustained in the case of Northern Cedar Co. v. French, 131 Wash. 394, 230 P. 837.

In 1925 (chapter 194, p. 586, Laws Ex. Sess. 1925) the Legislature passed another act relating to commission merchants engaged in selling agricultural products other than grain, and repealed the act of 1923. That act provided that within the term 'agricultural product' there should be included 'any horticultural, viticultural, dairy, livestock, poultry, bee or farm product other than grain.' Section 1. Like the preceding act, it defined ' commission merchant' to mean any person or corporation who received any agricultural product to be sold on commission for the account of another and exempted from its operation nonprofit co-operative marketing organizations. Section 1. This act differs from the previous act, in that it covers farm products 'other than grain,' while the previous act did not make that exception.

In 1933 (chapter 67, p. 342, Laws of 1933) the Legislature passed an act relating to merchants engaged in buying and selling any agricultural product except live stock, and amended sections 1, 2, and 3 of chapter 194, Laws Ex. Sess. 1925. This act, like the previous act, included farm products other than grain. It defined 'commission merchant' to include all persons or corporations who received any agricultural product to be sold on commission for the account of another, or 'who buys such product from the producer thereof for the purpose of resale, but shall not include nonprofit cooperative marketing organization, nor exclusively retail merchants having a fixed place of business.' Section 1. For the first time there is brought into this act the provision bringing one under the act who buys any of the products therein mentioned from the producer for the purpose of resale and excluding from that operation retail merchants having a fixed place of business. Whether those purchasing agricultural products mentioned in the act from the producer for the purpose of resale may be included within the designation of 'commission merchants' is not a matter of controlling importance. The question is, not what they are called, but whether they may be properly brought under the regulation provided by the act.

It is said that the act offends against the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which provides that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws, section 3 of article 1 of the Constitution of this state, which provides that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, and section 12 of that article, which says that no law shall be passed granting to any citizen or corporation, other than a municipal corporation, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations. A legislative act is not violative of any of the constitutional provisions mentioned so long as the classification involved is reasonable and has a fair basis. It is generally held that the courts will not look too nicely into legislative acts to determine whether a reasonable distinction exists. A discrimination is valid, if not arbitrary in the legislative sense, and a classification may rest on narrow distinctions.

In State v. Cannon, 125 Wash. 515, 217 P. 18, 19, it is said: 'The settled rule is that a discrimination is valid if not arbitrary in a legislative sense, that is, outside of the wide discretion that the Legislature may exercise, and only when it clearly appears that no reasonable distinction exists may we hold the legislative action to be unconstitutional.'

In Northern Cedar Co. v. French, 131 Wash. 394, 230 P. 837, 841, it is said: 'But a legislative act such as this is not violative of constitutional inhibitions so long as the classification involved is reasonable and has some fair basis, and it is universally held that the courts will not look too nicely into legislative acts to determine whether a reasonable distinction exists.'

In the case of German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Superintendent of Ins. of State of Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 34 S.Ct. 612, 621, 58 L.Ed. 1011, L. R. A. 1915C, 1189, it was said: 'A legislative classification may rest on narrow distinctions. Legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear, and even degrees of evil may determine its exercise. * * *'

That excerpt was quoted with approval in the Northern Cedar Company Case.

We now come to the question of whether there was any reasonable basis for requiring those who purchase agricultural products from the producer to comply with the provisions of the act and not require those who purchase from those other than the producer to comply therewith.

It may be that, since the development of the automobile truck as a means of transportation of merchandise, there has grown up a business of considerable magnitude conducted by the operators of trucks who buy directly from the producer, load it into their trucks, take it to the populous centers, and there sell it to small dealers or consumers. In fact, it is so stated in appellants' brief. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the evils that may have grown up in connection with this business were not different from those that would exist where the purchase was made from other than the producer. The Legislature may have determined that the same incentive and opportunity for evil sought to be corrected did not present themselves where purchases of the products mentioned in the act were made from others than the producer.

In the case of People v. Perry, ...