Lloyd v. Ashcroft

• Decision Date: 27 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 97-1287(PLF).,Civ.A. 97-1287(PLF).
• Citation: 208 F.Supp.2d 8
• Parties: Arthur L. LLOYD, Plaintiff, v. John ASHCROFT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

208 F.Supp.2d 8

Arthur L. LLOYD, Plaintiff, v. John ASHCROFT, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 97-1287(PLF).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

June 27, 2002.

Veronice Annette Holt, Washington, DC, Everald Fitzgerald Thompson, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

Michael Anthony Humphrey, Edith M. Shine, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, Joe Lazar, U.S. Marshal's Service, Arlington, VA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

Before the Court are defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur of the verdict, plaintiff's opposition and defendant's reply. Upon consideration of the arguments of the parties and the entire record herein, the Court grants defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law in part and denies it in part. The Court denies defendant's motion for a new trial and his motion for remittitur.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 26, 2001, after an eight-day trial on plaintiff Arthur Lloyd's claims of discrimination and retaliation, the jury returned a verdict in Mr. Lloyd's favor on all six claims, answering affirmatively to each of the following six questions:

1. Has plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his failure to receive a promotion to a GS-12 Senior Deputy U.S. Marshal position in September 1992 was, more likely than not, motivated by plaintiff's having engaged in protected activity?

2. Has plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his failure to be assigned to the Warrant Squad between 1990 and 1994 was, more likely than not, motivated by plaintiff's race?

3. Has plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his failure to be assigned to the Warrant Squad between 1990 and 1994 was, more likely than not, motivated by plaintiff's having engaged in protected activity?

4. Has plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was required to go through additional procedures regarding his leave and that such requirement was, more likely than not motivated by plaintiff's having engaged in protected activity?

5. Has plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was denied overtime on February 11, 1994 and that such denial was, more likely than not, motivated by plaintiff's having engaged in protected activity?

6. Has plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was denied various assignments before 1994 and that such denials were, more likely than not, motivated by plaintiff's having engaged in protected activity?

See Jury Verdict Form at 1-2. On the verdict form in response to a seventh question, the jury awarded Mr. Lloyd a total of $36,000 in compensatory damages. See id. at 3.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Entry of judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is warranted only if "`the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not' have reached a verdict in plaintiff's favor." McGill v. Munoz, 203 F.3d 843, 845 (D.C.Cir.2000) (quoting Duncan v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 201 F.3d 482, 485 (D.C.Cir.2000)). "In making that determination, a court may not assess the credibility of witnesses or weigh the evidence," Hayman v. National Academy of Sciences, 23 F.3d 535, 537 (D.C.Cir. 1994), nor may it "substitute its judgment for that of the jury." Boodoo v. Cary, 21 F.3d 1157, 1161 (D.C.Cir.1994); see 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2524 (2d ed.1995) (on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court "must view the evidence most favorably to the party against whom the motion is made"). "Because a judgment as a matter of law intrudes upon the rightful province of the jury, it is highly disfavored." Boodoo v. Cary, 21 F.3d at 1161. Viewing the evidence presented at trial in a light favorable to plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find in plaintiff's favor with respect to Claims 1, 3, 4 and 6. The Court therefore denies defendant's motion on these claims, but grants the motion with respect to Claims 2 and 5 for the reasons discussed below.¹

1. Plaintiff's Second Claim

With respect to Mr. Lloyd's second claim—his sole claim of discrimination— that he was not assigned to the Warrant Squad between 1990 and 1994 because of his race, the Court grants defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Mr. Lloyd contends that during the relevant period of this lawsuit, he was assigned to Court Support, Prisoner Coordination and Special Services but was not assigned to the Warrant Squad despite his request to then United States Marshal Herbert Rutherford. Plaintiff claims that by refusing to assign him to the Warrant Squad Marshal Rutherford engaged in unlawful discrimination based on Mr. Lloyd's race. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) other similarly situated employees from outside the protected class were not subject to that action. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 & n. 13, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). During trial, plaintiff never identified a similarly situated non-African American deputy marshal who was assigned to the Warrant Squad during the time period in question. He therefore cannot prevail on his discrimination claim.

At trial, the Court admitted in evidence an assignment memorandum offered by plaintiff dated September 22, 1992, demonstrating (in the words of plaintiff's counsel) that on that date "all white marshals assigned were either going to or coming from rotational assignments in Warrant Squad or Special Services and all African American employees were going from Court Support to Prisoner Coordination." See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial or Remittitur of the Verdict at 13. As the evidence at trial demonstrated, however, the white deputies named in this memorandum were not similarly situated to plaintiff because they were new deputies who recently entered the Marshal's Service. As the uncontradicted testimony at trial showed, Marshal Rutherford therefore was required to rotate them through all assignments within their first three years under the Three Year Deputy Development Plan. By contrast, plaintiff was not a new deputy because he had been in the Marshal's Service for several years in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia before being transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1990. His assignments therefore were controlled by the discretion of Marshal Rutherford, not by the Three Year Deputy Development Plan for new deputies. The white deputies assigned to the Warrant Squad and named in the memorandum—who were required to be assigned to the Warrant Squad during their first three years—therefore cannot be considered similarly situated.

Plaintiff argues that Earl Day, a white deputy marshal who testified at trial, was a similarly situated deputy who received preferential rotational assignments. Although the Three Year Deputy Development Plan did not apply to either plaintiff or to Mr. Day because neither of them was considered to be a new deputy, Mr. Day was not similarly situated to plaintiff either because Mr. Day never was assigned to the Warrant Squad during the time-frame of this lawsuit. See Keith v. Duffey, 77 F.Supp.2d 46, 50-51 (D.D.C.1999). Plaintiff's claim is that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race by not being assigned to the Warrant Squad between 1990 and 1994. Neither was Mr. Day, whose uncontroverted testimony at trial was that from 1990 to 1994 he worked in Court Support and Special Services, not in the Warrant Squad. Deputy Day therefore was not similarly situated.

Plaintiff now attempts to recast his discrimination claim, arguing that, unlike Mr. Day, he was required to spend a year in Court Support before being eligible for an assignment to the Warrant Squad, and he maintains that this constitutes discrimination based on race. The adverse action alleged in his amended complaint and tried before the jury as his claim of discrimination, however, is not that plaintiff had to spend a year in Court Support but that Marshal Rutherford did not assign him to the Warrant Squad between 1990 and 1994. A plaintiff cannot change the theory of his case in his post-trial motion in order to survive a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law. He is bound by what he pled and attempted to prove at trial. Cf. Kattan v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C.Cir.1993) (court should not grant motion for a new trial "in order to consider a new defensive theory which could have been raised during the original proceedings") (quoting Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 711 (D.C.Cir.1973), overruled on different grounds, 421 U.S. 168, 95 S.Ct. 1491, 44 L.Ed.2d 57 (1975)); 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2805 (2d ed.1995). Plaintiff failed to prove that any similarly situated non-African American deputy marshal was treated differently by being assigned to the Warrant Squad during the relevant period. The Court therefore grants judgement for defendant on this claim.²

2. Plaintiff's Fifth Claim

The Court also grants judgment for defendant on plaintiff's fifth claim—that he was denied overtime on February 11, 1994, and that such denial was, more likely than not, retaliation motivated by plaintiff's having engaged in protected activity. The only evidence related to this claim consists of plaintiff's trial testimony and the testimony of his supervisor at the time,...