Hardin v. Dadlani

• Decision Date: 17 October 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–cv–02052 (RBW)
• Parties: Briggitta HARDIN, Plaintiff, v. Mick DADLANI, Individually and in his capacity as Redline Owner and Manager, and Redline DC, LLC, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

221 F.Supp.3d 87

Briggitta HARDIN, Plaintiff,

v. Mick DADLANI, Individually and in his capacity as Redline Owner and Manager, andRedline DC, LLC, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–cv–02052 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed October 17, 2016

Filed November 1, 2016

Dennis A. Corkery, Matthew K. Handley, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs, Jennifer I. Klar, Jia M. Cobb, Megan Cacace, Relman, Dane & Colfax, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Claude–Eric Keller Nicolas, Sundeep Hora, Leslie David Alderman, III, Alderman, Devorsetz & Hora PLLC, Courtney R. Abbott, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Jonathan Wolfe Greenbaum, Lloyd Liu, Coburn & Greenbaum, PLLC, Angela D. Hart–Edwards, Shameka N. Bloyce, Gordon & Rees, LLP, Washington, DC, Gregory Paul Johnson, Offit Kurman, P.A., Bethesda, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

On January 29, 2016, the plaintiff, Briggitta Hardin, received a favorable jury verdict against the defendants, Mick Dadlani ("Dadlani") and Redline DC, LLC ("Redline"), including damages totaling $687,000.00. Judgment in a Civil Action ("Judgment"), ECF No. 176. Before the Court are the Defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Rule 50(b) ("Defs.' Judgment Mot."),¹ the defendants' Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59(a) ("Defs.' New Trial Mot."),² and the defendants' Motion, in the Alternative, for Remittitur Pursuant to Rule 59(e) ("Defs.' Remittitur Mot."). For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that it must deny each of the defendants' motions.³

I. The Defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

The defendants contend that the "[p]laintiff failed to satisfy her burden of proof to demonstrate that she was terminated because of discrimination based on her race and to show that [ ] Dadlani or Redline had the requisite mental state to support an award of punitive damages." Defs.' Judgment Mem. at 1. The defendants therefore argue that they are "entitled to judgment as a matter of law on [the] [p]laintiff's state and federal race discrimination claims," id. , and are also "entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the punitive damages award," id. at 2.

At the conclusion of a jury trial, a court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if it finds that "a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue." Huthnance v. District of Columbia , 793 F.Supp.2d 183, 196 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) ). Evaluating a motion filed under this Rule "mirror[s]" the standard courts employ when considering a motion for summary judgment, "such that ‘the inquiry under each is the same.’ " Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). When considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court "should review all of the evidence in the record[,]" but it "must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Id. Even though a "court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe[,]" meaning that "the court should give credence ... [to] that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that the evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." Huthnance , 793 F.Supp.2d at 197 (quoting Reeves , 530 U.S. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097 ). Judgment as a matter of law is "highly disfavored" because it "intrudes upon the rightful province of the jury." Boodoo v. Cary , 21 F.3d 1157, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Accordingly, a "court should grant the motion only when ‘the non-movant's evidence is so insufficient that a reasonable finder of fact could not possibly find for the non-movant.’ " Hancock v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr. , 13 F.Supp.3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Halcomb v. Woods , 767 F.Supp.2d 123, 134 (D.D.C. 2011) ).

A. The Judgment as a Matter of Law with Respect to Liability

The volume of evidence presented during the trial in this case was more than sufficient for a jury to find the defendants liable for the misconduct asserted by the plaintiff. When asked about Dadlani's preferred composition of wait staff at Redline, former Redline manager Jeremy Gifford testified that Dadlani stated that he "didn't want it to be an African American staff" and that he "often" expressly stated a specific hiring preference for "hot, white, blonde chicks." Pl.'s Judgment Opp'n, Exhibit ("Ex.") 2 (Transcript of Jury Trial, Jan. 5, 2016) at 232:3–24. Similarly, former Redline manager Jon Calvert testified that Dadlani "stated that he wanted hot, blonde chicks or hot, blonde, white chicks." Id. at 352:18–19. Gifford also testified that during one particular round of hiring for new wait staff, Dadlani stated that "[h]e was pretty upset and felt like [Redline managers] set him up with nothing but African American applicants." Id. at 234:19–20. Furthermore, both managers explained that Makesha Wade, an African American bartender that the managers intended to hire, was rejected by Dadlani because she did not have the right "look." Id. at 235:23–236:2; id. at 359:8. Calvert further testified that he "told [Dadlani] that [he] believe[d] that [Dadlani] was discriminating against [Wade] because she was black," to which Dadlani purportedly responded "so turn me in." Id. at 359:14–18. Where, as here, "the plaintiff offers direct evidence of discriminatory intent, that evidence will ‘generally entitle a plaintiff to a jury trial.’ " Ayissi–Etoh v. Fannie Mae , 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Vatel v. All. of Auto. Mfrs. , 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ); see also Wilson v. Cox , 753 F.3d 244, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that when the plaintiff offers "statements that constitute direct evidence of ... discrimination," she is "entitl[ed] to proceed to trial"). Here, the evidence not only entitled the plaintiff to a jury trial, but also warranted a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. See Metrocare v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 679 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The four individual plaintiff employees have each presented enough specific facts to make their prima facie cases of discrimination; WMATA's evidence was either wholly unresponsive or, to the extent it articulated a reason for the employer's action, could be believed by the jury to be overborne. Under the stringent standard we are compelled to apply to jury verdicts, these verdicts of discrimination must stand as reasonable.").

The defendants nevertheless contend that judgment in their favor is appropriate because Sonia "Bel Hadj—the front of house manager at the time that [the] [p]laintiff was hired and terminated—[was] at the heart of the decision to terminate the [p]laintiff. Yet there was no evidence that [ ] Bel Hadj acted with any discriminatory animus or was the vehicle for [ ] Dadlani's alleged discriminatory motivations." Defs.' Judgment Mem. at 6–7. This argument is baseless, as there was ample evidence in the record for the jury to conclude that it was Dadlani, not Bel Hadj, who was responsible for terminating the plaintiff. See, e.g. , Pl.'s New Trial Opp'n, Ex. 7, (Transcript of Jury Trial, Jan. 13, 2016) at 214:19–20 (Bel Hadj testifying that Dadlani "asked [her] to send [the plaintiff] home"); id. at 232:17–19 (Bel Hadj answering affirmatively to the question as to whether "Mick Dadlani instructed [her] that [she] had to let [the plaintiff] go"); Pl.'s New Trial Opp'n, Ex. 1 (Transcript of Jury Trial, Jan. 7, 2016) at 85:22–86:1 (the plaintiff testifying about Bel Hadj's demeanor when she was terminated, noting that Bel Hadj "just kept saying you have to leave. You have to leave. You should leave .... And she kept saying [Dadlani], the owner, you have to leave."). More importantly, the defendants' position is directly contradicted by their own assertions in their motion for judgment as a matter of law that "[i]t [is] undisputed that [ ] Dadlani made the decision to terminate [the] [p]laintiff." Defs.' Judgment Mem. at 1. Accordingly, the Court must conclude that the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied with respect to the defendants' employment discrimination liability.

B. The Judgment as a Matter of Law with Respect to Punitive Damages

Similarly, the evidence presented was sufficient to permit a jury to award punitive damages against the defendants. Under District of Columbia law, "in order to sustain an award of punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed a tortious act, and by clear and convincing evidence that the act was accompanied by conduct and a state of mind evincing malice or its equivalent." Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden , 665 A.2d 929, 938 (D.C. 1995). And under federal law, punitive damages are available where "the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n , 527 U.S. 526, 534, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999) (citation omitted). Specifically, "an employer must at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that [his or] its actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive damages." Id. at 536, 119 S.Ct. 2118.

Not only did the plaintiff submit evidence of blatant and pervasive discrimination on the part of Dadlani, but there were several instances where he was specifically warned of the discriminatory nature of his actions to no avail. As previously...