Lloyd v. Bridgeport Brass Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. IP 92-26-C.,IP 92-26-C.
• Citation: 811 F. Supp. 401
• Parties: Duane L. LLOYD, Sr., Plaintiff, v. BRIDGEPORT BRASS CORPORATION, d/b/a Olin Brass, Indianapolis, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

811 F. Supp. 401

Duane L. LLOYD, Sr., Plaintiff, v. BRIDGEPORT BRASS CORPORATION, d/b/a Olin Brass, Indianapolis, Defendant.

No. IP 92-26-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

January 25, 1993.

Vincent L. Scott, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff.

Robert E. Highfield, Lester H. Cohen, Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, IN, for defendant.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

McKINNEY, District Judge.

Defendant Bridgeport Brass Corporation, d/b/a Olin Brass, Indianapolis, has moved for summary judgment in this action brought by Duane L. Lloyd, Sr. pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"). For the reasons set forth, the motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Background

Bridgeport Brass Corporation ("Bridgeport") is the largest integrated producer of brass mill products in the United States. It produces brass sheet, rod, tube, and wire, principally for use in the automotive and housing industries. Bridgeport was purchased in 1988 by Olin Corporation ("Olin"). Both before and after this purchase, Bridgeport's Indianapolis facility (the "Indianapolis plant") employed approximately 750 employees. Of these, some 550 to 600 were hourly production and maintenance employees, and approximately fourteen percent were minorities.

Olin's relationship with the Indianapolis plant's employees was governed by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") that had been entered earlier by Bridgeport and the United Steelworkers of America ("USW"). Shortly before Olin bought Bridgeport, Bridgeport employees had agreed to concessions in their labor contract, and to an extension of their CBA's expiration date to May 7, 1989. The Indianapolis plant's hourly employees were unhappy with the concessions, and Olin anticipated that they might launch an economic strike against the company when the contract expired.

Olin therefore took steps to insure that plant operations would continue if a strike occurred. One step was the hiring of Kiser & Brown Investigative Group ("KBI") to handle security needs during the strike. Another step was the creation of a specific standard for the discharge of any striking employee. This standard was formulated by Bridgeport administrative services manager Bob Stultz, who recommended all disciplinary actions for the company, and Olin industrial relations director Paul Fultz, who had to approve all discipline in advance. Under the standard, a picketer could not be fired unless his or her conduct both rose to the level of a dischargeable offense, as defined by National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") precedent, and was adequately documented by reliable evidence. Specifically, this meant that a picketer could be discharged only if (1) he or she committed acts that were threatening, intimidating, or coercive toward Olin's nonstriking employees, vendors, or other agents, and (2) Olin (through Stultz and Fultz) obtained solid evidence of such acts, either on videotape or through the personal report of an Olin management-level employee or a KBI agent.

B. Plaintiff's Employment Before the Strike

Plaintiff Duane Lloyd worked as an hourly employee for Bridgeport for some twenty years. For eighteen of these years, Lloyd was happy; he held a variety of jobs, received regular raises, and did not receive any discipline he thought was unfair. Things changed on July 3, 1987, however, when Lloyd was fired for falsifying work records. Lloyd disagreed with the stated grounds for his termination, so later that month he filed a charge with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (the "ICRC charge"), alleging that Bridgeport had fired him because of his race. The USW brought Lloyd's discharge to arbitration in September 1987, and on February 8, 1988 the arbitrator ordered Bridgeport to reinstate Lloyd with backpay.¹ Lloyd claims that shortly after this, Stultz told him that he (Stultz) had no hard feelings about the reinstatement, because it would give Stultz "another shot" at Lloyd and his job. Stultz denies making the remark.

Between the time of Lloyd's reinstatement and his termination, two events of some importance to this case transpired. The first happened in May 1988, when Lloyd was elected president of USW Local 4266 — a position he held until his discharge. The second occurred on April 5, 1989, when Gloria Edmonds, a black female employee, started an argument with Lloyd in his office at the Indianapolis plant, and directed racial slurs and profanity toward him. Lloyd, rather than respond in kind, simply asked Edmonds to leave and go calm down. Sometime later, when Lloyd went onto the plant floor, Edmonds accosted him again. Lloyd listened for a moment, then "couldn't take it anymore," and unleashed his own stream of profanity and shouting at Edmonds. Later that day, Stultz suspended Lloyd for three days over the incident, on the ground that his outburst had included threats against Edmonds and her family. Edmonds, in contrast, was given only a warning for her role in the altercation.

C. The Strike and Discharge

Bridgeport's hourly employees went on strike May 7, 1989, and remained on strike until August 21, 1989. During the strike, some 200 to 300 employees worked a picket line outside the plant. Lloyd, as local union president, played an active role in the picketing — so active, in fact, that he was discharged for misconduct on May 15, 1989. Stultz and Fultz determined that Lloyd's conduct met the standard they had earlier established for discharge — i.e., it rose to the level of a dischargeable offense, and they had sufficient evidence in the form of videotapes, Stultz's first-hand knowledge,² and reports from KBI employees Charles Brown and Joe Buyoc. Lloyd's discharge letter stated:

You were profanely and verbally abusive to Plant Manager, Larry Stewart as he left the plant Saturday, May 13, 1989 at approximately 7:30 p.m. You threatened Chuck Brown of Kiser & Brown Investigative Group with bodily harm on several occasions. You threatened a truck driver leaving the plant on this date in a most vile and vulgar manner. You have been profane and verbally abusive to salaried employees, vendors, temporary workers, etc. on numerous occasions as they entered and left the plant. The Company will not tolerate behavior of this nature....

Plaintiff's Opposing Memorandum, Ex. 4.

Lloyd denies having threatened anyone while on the picket line. He has admitted, however, that he (1) called Stewart a "motherfucker"; (2) said to Stewart, "Fuck you and your no good plant"; (3) called mill superintendent Bob O'Neal a "fag"; (4) told a security person that he would "butt fuck" his daughter; (5) said to Brown that he was going to "take him out of this"; (6) confronted Brown in a very close, face-to-face manner; (7) said to Brown, "How would you like it if I fucked your old lady?"; (8) confronted Buyoc face-to-face; (9) called a security guard a "big mouth fagot motherfucker"; (10) called another security guard a "black Uncle Tom motherfucker"; and (11) slapped a bus filled with replacement workers leaving the plant. See Deposition of Duane L. Lloyd, Sr. at 448-56 hereinafter "Lloyd Dep.". Lloyd also has admitted that he learned, after his firing, that these acts were dischargeable offenses under NLRB precedent. Id. at 396, 413-14, 461-62.

Three employees besides Lloyd were discharged for picket line misconduct during the strike: Harold Baker, Steve Alford, and Joe Thurman. Baker and Alford, like Lloyd, were fired on May 15, 1989. Thurman was given a warning on May 15, 1989, but was terminated on May 31, 1989, after Stultz and Fultz determined that his conduct during the intervening period had risen to a dischargeable level. Baker, Alford, and Thurman are white; Lloyd is black.

Lloyd brought this action on January 8, 1992, claiming that his discharge violated Title VII because it was improperly based on race, or alternatively, was in retaliation for his filing of the ICRC charge in 1987. Olin moved for summary judgment on August 31, 1992. Lloyd timely responded and Olin timely replied, so the motion is ready for ruling.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A party moving for summary judgment initially has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact in evidence of record. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Schroeder v. Barth, Inc., 969 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir.1992). If the moving party carries this burden, the opposing party then must "go beyond the pleadings" and present adequate, specific facts which show that a genuine issue exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Scherer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 975 F.2d 356, 360 (7th Cir.1992). The opposing party, however, must do more than create a mere "colorable" factual dispute to defeat summary judgment; disputed facts must be material — i.e., outcome determinative. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Schroeder, 969 F.2d at 423; Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir.1992).

In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must draw all reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable" to the opposing party, and must resolve any doubt against the moving party. Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir.1992); Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Insurance Corp. of...