Lloyd v. Brinck

• Decision Date: 01 January 1871
• Citation: 35 Tex. 1
• Parties: R. LLOYD v. C. E. BRINCK AND ANOTHER.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

35 Tex. 1

R. LLOYD

v.C. E. BRINCK AND ANOTHER.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1871.

1. District judges have great legal discretion in all causes tried before them, and should exercise it to the end that the laws may be enforced, and justice and equity be administered to all; but that discretion is a sound and legal discretion, and to be exercised in compliance with known rules and principles of law. That discretion is not the mere arbitrary will and pleasure of the judge.

2. When a jury renders a verdict in proper form, and responsive to the issues presented by the pleadings and submitted to them by the court, no discretionary power is vested in the court to set that verdict aside upon its own motion, notwithstanding the verdict may be against the weight of the evidence, or in disregard of the instructions of the court; but the party aggrieved may, by his motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment, call forth the judicial power of the court to prevent wrong and secure the administration of the law.

3. The entry of judgment upon a valid verdict involves no judicial or discretionary powers, but is simply a ministerial act; and to enforce its performance by the district court, the writ of mandamus will issue from the supreme court in a proper case.

4. In an action of debt, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and for a specified amount. The court below received the verdict, but immediately, and of its own motion, set it aside and granted a new trial. On a subsequent day of the same term, the plaintiff moved for judgment in accordance with the verdict; which motion was overruled. Held, that the case is one in which an appeal is not an adequate remedy; and therefore the writ of mandamus is awarded by this court to compel the court below to enter judgment upon the verdict.

APPLICATION to this court for the writ of mandamus.

Lloyd was plaintiff in the court below. In November, 1867, he brought suit in the district court of Marion county, against Mrs. C. E. Brinck, to recover $18,000, which she was alleged to owe him by her promissory note. Without unnecessary detail of the pleadings or evidence in the court below, it suffices to state, that on the trial of the cause, in May, 1871, the jury returned their verdict, in regular form, in favor of Lloyd, for the amount of his debt and interest; “whereupon,” says the record of the court below, “the court ordered that the verdict rendered by the jury in the above stated cause be set aside, and that a new trial be granted.” At a later day of the term, the plaintiff moved that judgment be rendered in accordance with the verdict, but the motion was overruled, and he excepted.

No reason was assigned by the court below, so far as the record shows, for its arbitrary order setting the verdict aside and granting a new trial; but the charge of the court to the jury was strongly in favor of the defendant, who was a married woman when the note was given. It may, therefore, be safely inferred that the jury's disregard of the instructions was the cause which superinduced the order.

This proceeding in the supreme court was instituted by an original petition under oath, filed in this court on the first of July, 1871. It impleaded Mrs. Brinck, and also J. D. McAdoo, the judge of the district court, as defendants. Its allegations recapitulated the pleadings and proceedings in the district court, and exhibited a transcript of the record of the case in that court. It prayed that the defendants be cited to show cause why a peremptory mandamus should not issue, commanding the defendant McAdoo, as judge of the district court, or any other judge exercising the powers and duties of judge of such district court, to render final judgment according to the verdict in the cause, and to cause the same to be entered in the minutes of the court as a record thereof.

On this petition Mr Justice Ogden, in chambers, on the first of July, 1871, indorsed his fiat to the clerk of the supreme court, directing him to issue scire facias, returnable on the first day of the ensuing term, and requiring the defendants then to show cause why a peremptory mandamus should not be granted in accordance with the prayer of the petition. Thereupon the clerks issued a precept to the sheriff of Marion county to cite the defendants to show cause as required by the order of the judge. The precept was served on the defendants, and Mrs. Brinck filed her answer on the twenty-fifth of November, 1871. In her answer she excepted to the petition on three grounds, viz:

1. The cause, as shown from the proceedings, is still pending in the district court, and is not subject to revision by mandamus. 2. The action of the district court in granting or refusing a new trial is matter of judgment or discretion of the court, and cannot be revised on mandamus. 3. The remedy is to prosecute an appeal, or writ of error, on the final trial in the district court, if injustice should be done the plaintiff.

Besides these exceptions, the answer set forth an attempted justification of the action of the judge of the district court. This justification was based upon the contumacy of the jury in disregarding their instructions; and upon the coverture of the defendant Brinck, and her consequent incapacity to contract, at the date of the plaintiff's demand. Upon this state of pleadings in the supreme court the cause came to hearing.J. H. Rogers, A. W. O. Hicks, and W. L. Robards, for the relator Lloyd.

Culberson & Mabry, for the respondents.

1. The district judge acted in a judicial capacity when he determined that the verdict in this case should be set aside, and a new trial awarded the defendant. The question presented to the judge by the unauthorized action and conduct of the jury in returning a verdict wholly unsustained by the evidence, and, in view of the facts, in a spirit of defiance to the instructions of the court, involved the exercise of judgment and discretion, and his action cannot, therefore, be revised on mandamus. United States v. Lawrence, 3 Dall. 42; Paulding v. Decatur, 14 Pet. 599; ex parte Crane et al. 5 Pet. 190;Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457.

2. While the statute regulating new trials seems to contemplate a written application therefor, in which the grounds relied on shall be set out, and that none other than those specified shall be heard, yet it is insisted that nothing more was contemplated by this statute than that the party making the application should call the attention of the court to some one or more of the grounds upon which new trials are allowed. It was not intended to deny to the court the right to consider grounds not specified in the motion, or ex officio without any motion, to set aside a verdict and award a new trial. Sweeney v. Jarvis, 6 Tex. 44.

3. The verdict in this case was clearly contrary to the evidence, and to the charge of the court. More than that, it was manifestly without evidence or law to support it. It was not rendered by inadvertence or mistake. It was not a result arrived at after weighing conflicting testimony; but it was a deliberate effort on the part of the jury to disregard the law of the case, as given them by the court. In proof of this, we refer the court to the statement of facts. “There is nothing in the laws or constitution, or in the great principle of jury trials, which can justify, or for a moment tolerate, a verdict without evidence or contrary to all evidence,” especially when returned by the jury in the open, avowed, and manifest disregard of the law in the case. Hall v. Page, 4 Ga. 428; Graham and Waterman on New Trials, 1296.

4. A mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and will not be allowed if redress can be afforded in any other mode. The party who seeks it must show a clear legal right, and a corresponding obligation on the part of the officer. The plaintiff presents a verdict manifestly contrary to the evidence, and admitted by the jury in their action, to be returned contrary to the charge, and in opposition thereto; and asks that the judge may be required to set aside a new trial granted, and to enter up a...