Lloyd v. Greg Burt & Town of Southwick
| Decision Date | 07 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13–30011–KPN. |
| Citation | 997 F.Supp.2d 71 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
| Parties | Christina LLOYD, Plaintiff v. Greg BURT and Town of Southwick, Massachusetts, Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Hope C. Button, Denner Pellegrino LLP, Springfield, MA, for Plaintiff.
Andrew J. Gambaccini, Reardon, Joyce & Akerson, P.C., Worcester, MA, David S. Lawless, Nancy Frankel Pelletier, Robinson Donovan, PC, Springfield, MA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Presently before the court is a motion by Greg Burt (“Burt”) and the Town of Southwick, Massachusetts (“Southwick”) (together “Defendants”), seeking dismissal of the seven statutory and tort claims brought by Christina Lloyd (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff alleges a violation of Mass. Gen. Law Ann. ch. 12, § 11I (Count 1), as well as claims of assault and battery (Count II), negligence (Count III), malicious prosecution (Count IV), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VI), against Burt. Plaintiff also advances a sole count of negligence against Southwick (Count VII).
The parties have consented to this court's jurisdiction. See28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion will be allowed in part and denied in part.
Accepting as true Plaintiff's allegations, the facts are as follows. On May 18, 2010, Plaintiff, who resides in Connecticut, was babysitting her then two-year-old nephew at the child's residence in Massachusetts; the child's mother had been killed recently in an automobile accident and the child's father was not at home, as he was making funeral arrangements. (Amended Complaint (Document No. 17) at ¶ 6.) That evening, members of the Southwick Police Department, including Burt, arrived at the residence, purportedly to assist the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) in removing the child. ( Id. at ¶ 7.) Neither DCF nor the Southwick Police Department had a warrant or any court authorization to remove the child. ( Id.)
The officers told Plaintiff that the child needed to be handed over to DCF workers, and Plaintiff refused. ( Id. at ¶ 8.) She was shoved onto a nearby couch and handcuffed. ( Id.) Burt then “yanked” Plaintiff to her feet and led her from the residence. ( Id.) He “proceeded to jerk [Plaintiff] back and forth by her handcuffed wrists, causing her injuries to her left and right shoulders and back.” ( Id.) When Plaintiff “attempted to defend herself,” Burt “shoved her to the ground smashing her head on a rock in the driveway.” ( Id.) Burt “then yanked her up, placed her in the back seat of his cruiser and transported her to the Southwick Police Department.” ( Id.) She was later transported by ambulance from the Southwick Police Department to a hospital. ( Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Burt caused criminal proceedings of two counts of assault and battery on a police officer, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 13D, to be brought against her. ( Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff further avers that she suffered damages as a result of Burt's actions, including physical injury, emotional distress, and various other related expenses. ( Id. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff filed suit in state court on December 6, 2012, whereupon Defendants removed the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss which Plaintiff opposed, requesting at the same time permission for leave to amend her complaint. Given that request, which the court granted, the court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice, Plaintiff then filed her amended complaint, followed by the instant motion to dismiss.
Generally, a complaint requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). However, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). To meet this standard, a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Defendants seek dismissal of Count I, which alleges that Burt violated the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”), Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, §§ 11H and 11I, on grounds that Plaintiff fails to allege that actions taken by Burt were intended to threaten, intimidate, or coerce Plaintiff as required by the statute. Defendants also argue that, to the extent that the allegation rests on a direct violation of Plaintiff's rights, it should be dismissed and that, in any event, the doctrine of qualified immunity insulates Burt from liability.
The MCRA provides a state remedy for the interference “by threats, intimidation or coercion, or attempt[s] to interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any other person or persons of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth.” Mass Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, § 11H. Section 11I of the statute authorizes private actions to vindicate these rights. “The remedy provided in §§ 11H and 11I is coextensive with the remedy provided under Federal law by means of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), except that the State statute does not condition the availability of the remedy on State action.” Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 399 Mass. 93, 502 N.E.2d 1375, 1378 (1987). “Like all civil rights statutes, §§ 11H and 11I are entitled to liberal construction,” id., but the legislature did not intend to create “ ‘a vast constitutional tort,’ ” and thus “explicitly limited this remedy to situations where the derogation of secured rights occurs by ‘threats, intimidation or coercion.’ ” Bell v. Mazza, 394 Mass. 176, 474 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (1985) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, § 11H).
To establish a claim under the MCRA, Plaintiff “must prove that (1) [her] exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of either the United States or the Commonwealth (2) has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, and (3) that the interference or attempted interference was by ‘threats, intimidation or coercion.’ ” Sietins v. Joseph, 238 F.Supp.2d 366, 376 (D.Mass.2003) (quotation omitted). In other words, “[t]he MCRA contemplates a two-part sequence: liability may be found where (1) the defendant threatens, intimidates, or coerces the plaintiff in order to (2) cause the plaintiff to give up something that he has the constitutional right to do.” Spencer v. Roche, 755 F.Supp.2d 250, 267 (D.Mass.2010).
Here, Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff's assertion that she has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure, nor do they suggest a lack of interference with that right. Rather, Defendants contest Plaintiff's claim on the ground that she failed to show an interferencewith that right through threats, intimidation, or coercion, the first prong of the MCRA's two-part-liability sequence.
“Massachusetts courts apply an objective ‘reasonable person’ standard to determine whether conduct constituted threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Id. at 265. Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 631 N.E.2d 985, 990 (1994) (citations omitted). Coercion is “the application to another of such force, either physical or moral, as to constrain him to do against his will something he would not otherwise have done.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 473 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (1985) (). While threats and intimidation under the MCRA “usually require actual or threatened physical force,” coercion “is a broader category that may rely on physical, moral, or economic coercion.” Spencer, 755 F.Supp.2d at 265.
In view of these standards, Plaintiff's complaint contains sufficient facts, and inferences to be drawn therefrom, such that a reasonable person could conclude that Burt subjected her to an unreasonable seizure in order to intimidate or coerce her into relinquishing her nephew to state officials in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, § 11H. She alleges that when she refused to relinquish her nephew to DCF, Burt “yanked [her] to her feet and led her from the home” jerking her “back and forth by her handcuffed wrists,” that when she resisted he “shoved her to the ground smashing her head on a rock in the driveway,” and that he “then yanked her up, placed her in the back seat of his cruiser and transported her to the Southwick Police Department.” The reasonable inference that can be drawn from these facts is that Burt put Plaintiff in fear—of physical harm or of being arrested—for the purpose of compelling conduct or that he constrained her against her will to do something she otherwise would not have done, i.e., that she allow DCF to take custody of her nephew. The constitutional dimensions of this subject are addressed in subparagraph 3 below.
Relatedly, Defendants argue that a direct violation of a person's right...
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