Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Blake

• Decision Date: 11 April 1994
• Citation: 417 Mass. 467,631 N.E.2d 985
• Parties: PLANNED PARENTHOOD LEAGUE OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC., & others 1 v. Kevin BLAKE & others. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 985

631 N.E.2d 985

417 Mass. 467

PLANNED PARENTHOOD LEAGUE OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC., & others¹ v. Kevin BLAKE & others. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued Dec. 7, 1993.

Decided April 11, 1994.

Francis H. Fox, Robert A. Miley & Wendy A. Miklus, Boston, with him, for Kevin Blake & others.

Judith E. Beals, Asst. Atty. Gen., Donna L. Palermino, Asst. Atty. Gen., with her, for Atty. Gen.

John H. Henn, Teresa A. Martland, Boston, with him, for Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc., & others.

Cornelius J.P. Sullivan, Mattapan, for William Cotter & another, was present but did not argue.

Janet Benshoof, Catherine Albisa & Priscilla J. Smith, New York City, for Center for Reproductive Law & Policy, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Nonnie S. Burnes & Sarah R. Wunsch, Boston, for Civ. Liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

The five defendants appeal from an amended judgment that permanently enjoined them, among other things, from obstructing access to any facility in the Commonwealth that provides abortion counseling or services and from using force against persons entering or leaving or working at any such facility.

In April, 1989, the plaintiffs commenced this action pursuant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) (G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I [1992 ed.] ). ³ In April, 1990, the Attorney General was allowed to intervene in the name of the Commonwealth. The case was tried on a joint amended complaint stating a single claim under the MCRA and seeking a permanent injunction in accordance with G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H, 11I, & 11J (1992 ed.). ⁴ In the final judgment the judge dismissed the claims of certain plaintiffs and dismissed claims against many individual defendants. The injunction whose entry is challenged in this appeal was entered against Operation Rescue: Boston, Pro-Life Action Network of Arlington, and numerous individuals, including the five appellants. We allowed the defendants' application for direct appellate review.

The defendants make three substantive challenges to the permanent injunction which we shall consider in turn after commenting briefly on the standing of the Attorney General and the other plaintiffs to maintain this action. First, however, we set forth certain findings of fact that are typical of the circumstances that led the trial judge to rule that the defendants had violated the MCRA and should be permanently enjoined.

Operation Rescue: Boston and Pro-Life Action Network organized and encouraged participation in what they call "rescues," blockades or invasions of abortion clinics. They offered advice, training, and seminars to prepare participants in "rescues" for arrest, jail, and money judgments. The purpose of a "rescue" is to keep women out of an abortion clinic and to prevent abortions from taking place at that clinic. The judge found that on nine dates between August 30, 1989, and January 17, 1991, anti-abortion demonstrators blocked entrances or physically invaded abortion clinics or buildings housing abortion clinics in the Commonwealth. These "rescues" occurred in Hyannis, Boston, Brookline, New Bedford, Worcester, and Springfield, and involved six abortion clinics. In each of these instances, the blocking or invading demonstrators remained on private property after they had been notified that they were trespassing.

It would prolong this opinion unnecessarily to recite all the facts of each incident. As an example, we describe the August 10, 1990, blockade of Preterm Health Services, Inc. (Preterm), a clinic located on Beacon Street in Brookline, in which each of the defendants participated. From 6:40 A.M. until 8:30 A.M. on that day, a group of about twenty people sat with their backs up against the front door of the building that housed the clinic. It was not possible to open that door. Another group sat with their backs against the rear public entrance to the building, preventing the door from being opened. The defendants were advised that they were trespassing. Brookline police officers read the preliminary injunction to the groups at the two doors and demanded that they leave. Shortly after 8:20 A.M., Brookline police began removing the persons blocking access to the building. During the period of the blockade most patients and staff could not enter the building. A few patients entered the building through the garage or the back door during a brief period when that door was not blocked. Those patients who entered after 8:50 A.M. "appeared to be very upset--they were crying and shaking and holding on tightly to others as they walked into the clinic. Their demeanor differed markedly from the usually calm demeanor of patients entering Preterm on days when many picketers but no blockaders were present outside Preterm." When the police finally cleared the front door of protesters, a crowd of patients entered the building. They appeared upset; they were crying, breathing heavily, and shaking. ⁵

Each of the defendants before us participated in the occupation of a portion of the medical area of a clinic. We recite one typical example, in which the defendants Brogan and O'Shea participated on January 17, 1991, at Womancare of New Bedford. The doors to the medical area of the clinic were kept locked. A woman who pretended to be a patient was able by a ruse to have the doors unlocked, and fifteen to twenty people rushed into the medical area of the clinic, dragging a protesting clinic employee along with them where she was pushed up against a wall. One group of invaders sat with their backs to each other in one examining room, locked together with Kryptonite bicycle locks around their necks. Another group of six lay on the floor extending into the entrances of two other examining rooms, locked together by a series of Kryptonite bicycle locks around their necks. Three of these people also wore at their ankles a modified Kryptonite bicycle lock encased in a welded steel pipe in such a way that a locksmith found it impossible to reach the lock until the fire department cut the casing. No scheduled abortions were performed that day. A patient who was in the clinic when the incident started was extremely upset. The police ultimately removed the intruders.

1. The defendants correctly grant that the Attorney General has standing to maintain this action (see G.L. c. 12, § 11H [1992 ed.] ), but argue that no other plaintiff has. ⁶ We need not decide the standing of the other plaintiffs, a question which involves in part the right of a doctor or an abortion clinic to argue the constitutional rights of patients. ⁷ The trial judge made limited findings on the question whether the clinics sustained harm in their own right from the defendants' conduct. If they did, they could have standing to maintain this action on their own behalves. As we have said, however, the standing of the Attorney General supports the maintenance of this action. We, therefore, turn to the defendants' substantive challenges to the judgment entered against them.

2. The defendants' conduct amounted to threats, intimidation, and coercion within the meaning of those words in G.L. c. 12, § 11H. The defendants grant that they sat in clinics and in clinic doorways and thereby delayed or prevented abortions. This, they argue, cannot establish liability under the MCRA, because their conduct did not interfere with, or attempt to interfere with, anyone's rights "by threats, intimidation or coercion." G.L. c. 12, § 11H.

The defendants first say that their conduct was a direct frustration of the rights of others, and that a "direct violation of a person's rights does not by itself involve threats, intimidation, or coercion." Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 404 Mass. 325, 333, 535 N.E.2d 588 (1989). See Nicholas B. v. School Comm. of Worcester, 412 Mass. 20, 24, 587 N.E.2d 211 (1992); Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, 406 Mass. 156, 158, 546 N.E.2d 166 (1989); Pheasant Ridge Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Burlington, 399 Mass. 771, 781, 506 N.E.2d 1152 (1987). Each of these cases involved direct action against the plaintiff which "by itself" (Longval, supra ) did not amount to a violation of the MCRA. If, however, direct action also includes threats against, or intimidation or coercion of, a particular individual or individuals, liability under the MCRA can be established, and will be established if such threats, intimidation, or coercion interfered with that individual's exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by law. The judge correctly concluded that this case involved more than simple direct action in denial of the rights of women seeking abortion services.

The defendants next claim that the facts do not show an actual or potential physical confrontation accompanied by a threat of harm, proof of which has been an element of MCRA claims. See Willitts v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 411 Mass. 202, 210, 581 N.E.2d 475 (1991); Layne v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Cedar Junction, supra, 406 Mass. at 158, 546 N.E.2d 166; Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 403 Mass. 713, 719-720, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989). ⁸ In such circumstances a threat, intimidation, or coercion, interfering with secured rights gives rise to a MCRA violation. There is no doubt that the defendants' conduct involved physical confrontations accompanied by threats of harm.

This court has not adopted a comprehensive definition of the words "threats, intimidation or coercion." The trial judge defined the words in terms that we accept. "Threat" in this context involves the intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 399 Mass. 93, 104, 502 N.E.2d 1375 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Delaney v. Chief of Police of Wareham, 27 Mass.App.Ct....