Lloyd v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery

• Decision Date: 27 April 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:10–cv–1103–MEF.
• Citation: 857 F.Supp.2d 1252
• Parties: Curtis LLOYD, Plaintiff, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

857 F.Supp.2d 1252

Curtis LLOYD, Plaintiff,

v.HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, Defendant.

Case No. 2:10–cv–1103–MEF.

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Northern Division.

April 27, 2012.

Joseph Charles Guillot, McPhillips Shinbaum LLP, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Charles Andrew Stewart, III, Quindal Evans Segall, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Montgomery, AL, Summer Austin Davis, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

Memorandum Opinion And Order

MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Curtis Lloyd filed suit against his former employer, the Montgomery Housing Authority (MHA), claiming disability discrimination and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. Now the case comes before the Court on two motions filed by the MHA. The first is a Motion to Strike (Doc. # 35), which is due to be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The second is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 29), which is due to be GRANTED.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

This Court has jurisdiction over Lloyd's claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343 (civil rights). The parties do not claim that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them, nor do they dispute that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Court finds adequate allegations supporting both contentions.

III. Legal Standard

A motion for summary judgment looks to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A court should grant summary judgment when the pleadings and supporting materials show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party deserves judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying” the relevant documents that “it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To shoulder this burden, the moving party can present evidence to this effect. Id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Or it can show that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it ultimately bears the burden of proof. Id.

If the moving party meets its burden, the non-movant must then designate, by affidavits, depositions, admissions, and answers to interrogatories, specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir.1995). And a genuine issue of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in his or her favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.2001). Thus, summary judgment requires the nonmoving party to “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Indeed, a plaintiff must present evidence demonstrating that he can establish the basic elements of his claim, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, because “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value” at the summary judgment stage. Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir.1985).

A court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the non-movant's evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. It also must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion, the court must grant summary judgment if there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party deserves judgment as a matter of law. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

IV. The Relevant Facts

A. Background—The MHA and Curtis Lloyd's employment

In 1988, Curtis Lloyd began working at the Montgomery Housing Authority (MHA) as a maintenance man. (Lloyd Dep. 16.) Lloyd received generally positive performance evaluations and a number of pay increases during his time there. ( Id. at 42–43.) He even received a promotion from maintenance man to maintenance mechanic. ( Id. at 20.)

The MHA operates eight public housing communities and uses a similar structure for managing all of them. (Dawkins Dep. 7.) Each location has a property manager who reports to Melinda Dawkins, the Public Housing Director. ( Id.) Maintenance personnel, like Lloyd, report to the property manager at his or her respective location. The MHA also has a Human Resources Manager, Shannell Hardwick, who reports to Evette Hester, the MHA's Executive Director. (Hardwick Dep. 9; Hester Dep. 9.)

Over time, Lloyd worked at about five of the MHA's eight locations. (Lloyd Dep. 18.) This included a stint at Smiley Court starting sometime in 2005 and ending about two years later. ( Id. at 23–24.) At some point, the MHA moved Lloyd from Smiley Court to Gibbs Village West, another one of the MHA's properties. ( Id. at 24.) He worked at the Gibbs Village West location until July 2010. ( Id.)

B. Lloyd's harassment complaint

While working at Gibbs Village West, Lloyd heard a rumor about him allegedly having an affair with Amanda Bell, his direct supervisor and the property manager there. (Lloyd Dep. 146.) Lloyd thought that Cedric Cleveland, a coworker, made up the rumor about him and Bell out of jealousy. ( Id. at 123–24.) Then after attending a sexual harassment course, Lloyd reported Cleveland's supposed rumor mongering to Hardwick and Dawkins. (Lloyd Dep. 122–23; Dawkins Dep. 9–10; Hardwick Dep. 15–16.) He told Hardwick and Dawkins that some tenants and his aunt said that Cleveland started the rumor about he and Bell having an affair. (Dawkins Dep. 10; Hardwick Dep. 15–16.)

Cleveland denied spreading the rumor. (Hardwick Dep. 18–19.) And this denial tied Hardwick's hands: she had to tell Lloyd that, although she would look into it, she would have a hard time proving Cleveland's responsibility for the rumor. (Hardwick Dep. 19; Lloyd Dep. 147–48.) During her investigation, Hardwick spoke with a number of people, including Cleveland, Bell, and the tenants that allegedly heard the rumor. (Hardwick Dep. 19.) Cleveland told Hardwick that he had overheard a telephone conversation between Lloyd and an unidentified woman; this conversation suggested to him that Bell had visited Lloyd's house. (Hardwick Dep. 21; Cleveland Dep. 15, 19–20.) Cleveland also told Hardwick that he had heard tenants chatting about a potential relationship between Lloyd and Bell. (Cleveland Dep. 17.)

Bell, during an interview with Hardwick, denied having a personal relationship with Lloyd. (Hardwick Dep. 23; Bell Dep. 9.) Bell said only that she heard about the rumor from Lloyd when he told her that Cleveland had started it. (Hardwick Dep. 23; Bell Dep. 9.) At this point, Bell gave Hardwick the names of the two tenants who Lloyd said told him about the rumor. (Hardwick Dep. 23–24; Bell Dep. 10.) Hardwick then interviewed both tenants—one denied any knowledge of the rumor while the other said she heard it from someone other than an MHA employee. (Hardwick Dep. 28–29.)

Having concluded her investigation, Hardwick had no proof that Cleveland started any rumor about Lloyd. (Hardwick Dep. 31–32.) Nor did she find that Lloyd did anything wrong when it came to how he handled the matter. ( Id. at 32.) Yet, because the rumor existed, Hardwick recommended in her written report that the MHA separate Lloyd and Bell:

... Mr. Lloyd & Ms. Bell are both of legal age, unmarried & consenting adults. However, the subordinate/supervisor relationship that exists between them would leave MHA exposed, if it does become evident that the rumor is fact-based. Furthermore, Mr. Cleveland did not appreciate being transferred from a property where he worked hard to get a high REAC score to one that didn't perform as well; this fact, also, would place MHA in a compromising situation if [it] does become evident that the rumor is fact-based. In a proactive move to soften the basis of any litigation that could arise out [of] this situation, I strongly recommend the immediate transfer of Mr. Lloyd or Ms. Bell to another property to remove the threat of any Quid Pro Quo or retaliation claim that may arise.

(Hardwick Dep., Ex. 4.) As alluded to by Hardwick in her report, the MHA had recently transferred Cleveland from the Gibbs Village West location to another MHA property. (Hardwick Dep. 22; Cleveland Dep. 31.)

C. Lloyd's transfer and resignation

Following Hardwick's recommendation, Dawkins decided to transfer Lloyd. (Dawkins Dep. 8–9.) She swapped him with Tommy Duncan, the maintenance man at Smiley Court. ( Id. at 9; Bell Dep. 12.) Dawkins took this tact instead of transferring Bell because Bell was the only property manager at Gibbs Village West. (Dawkins Dep. 45.) Lloyd, moreover, had worked at Smiley Court before and had some familiarity with the tenants there. ( Id. at 37.) Besides the change in location, Lloyd's job at Smiley Court was the same as his job at Gibbs Village West: he had the same hours, pay, benefits, and responsibilities. (Lloyd Dep. 76.)

Bell delivered the news to Lloyd about his transfer, telling him on Thursday, July 15, 2010, to begin reporting to his new location starting the following Monday. (Lloyd Dep. 58, 60; Bell Dep. 12.) Lloyd asked why the MHA decided to transfer him; Bell responded by saying that Dawkins had made the decision. (Lloyd Dep. 60.) Lloyd then told Bell he did not want to work at Smiley Court because the chicken plant next door made him sick and because he previously had run-ins with tenants who had threatened him. ( Id. at 61.) Lloyd had never...