Lloyd v. State, A03A0520.

Decision Date12 February 2003
Docket NumberNo. A03A0520.,A03A0520.
Citation259 Ga. App. 636,577 S.E.2d 854
PartiesLLOYD v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Martin G. Hilliard, Savannah, for appellant.

Spencer Lawton, Jr., Dist. Atty., Ann M. Elmore, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. PHIPPS, Judge.

At a bench trial, Elizabeth Lloyd was convicted of fraudulently obtaining a controlled substance (hydrocodone) and of fraudulently obtaining a dangerous drug (amoxicillin), both drugs having been lawfully prescribed to Donetta Way. Following denial of her motion for new trial, Lloyd appeals her convictions. She challenges the effectiveness of her trial lawyer, the trial court's admission of similar transaction evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions, and the validity of her waiver of a jury trial. Finding no merit in any of these challenges, we affirm.

The State's evidence showed that Lloyd and Way knew one another primarily because their daughters were classmates and friends. On February 16, 2000, Way underwent a dental procedure and was given written prescriptions for amoxicillin (an antibiotic) and Lorcet (a painkiller containing the codeine-derivative hydrocodone). When Way arrived home, Lloyd was there with her daughter, Vanessa, and with Way's daughter, Brittany; and she offered to pick up the prescriptions for Way. Way accepted the offer, and Lloyd delivered the drugs to Way without incident.

Way testified that although the amoxicillin was effective, she had an allergic reaction to the Lorcet and did not request a refill of either prescription. Testimony given by Way's dentist authorized the jury to find that someone representing herself as Way called the dental office on or about March 1, 2000, and asked the receptionist to call in refills of the amoxicillin and Lorcet prescriptions to a Kroger pharmacy. Telephone records showed that at about this time, a call was placed from the Lloyd residence to Way's dentist's office. The Kroger pharmacist testified that on March 4, Lloyd telephoned the pharmacy and asked if the prescription refills had been called in and whether Brittany Way could pick them up. Brittany Way testified that on March 4, Lloyd gave her money while she was at the Lloyd home visiting Vanessa, drove her to the Kroger pharmacy, had her pick up the prescription refills, and then took possession of them. The Kroger pharmacist verified that the prescription refills were picked up by Brittany Way. Brittany Way testified that Lloyd never gave the prescriptions back to her so that she could give them to her mother and that she, Brittany, in fact observed Lloyd taking the medications. Way testified that she was not aware that the prescriptions had been refilled until Brittany told her. After verifying this information with the Kroger pharmacy, Way and her husband alerted the police. They also sued Kroger.

Similar transaction evidence included testimony by a CVS pharmacist and by Way's husband that in late February 2000, Lloyd attempted without success to have Way's amoxicillin and Lorcet prescriptions refilled at a CVS pharmacy. The pharmacist testified that Lloyd called the pharmacy, asked that the prescriptions be refilled, said that they were for her girlfriend, and later came in to pick them up. According to the pharmacist, the dentist had called and said not to refill the prescriptions. Way's husband testified that he was at the CVS pharmacy when Lloyd came in, heard the pharmacist utter his wife's name, asked if Lloyd was trying to pick up a prescription for his wife, and was told yes. Way's husband further testified that he alerted the pharmacist that Lloyd was not authorized to obtain prescription refills for his wife. The CVS pharmacist gave like testimony.

In Lloyd's defense, her husband gave testimony to the effect that he had overheard a telephone conversation between Lloyd and Way during which Way had authorized Lloyd to obtain the prescription refills. Brittany Way also testified that on the day in question she thought she overheard a telephone conversation between her mother and Lloyd. Lloyd's husband testified that after his wife was arrested, he found the pills on their refrigerator and threw them away.

Testimony given by an Eckerd pharmacist authorized the judge to find that, earlier in the month of February, Lloyd telephoned the Eckerd pharmacist and asked him to fill a prescription for the narcotic painkiller Oxy-Contin that had been issued to her sister, that the pharmacist insisted that Lloyd's sister pick up the prescription or verify that it had been issued to her, and that neither Lloyd nor her sister brought the prescription to the pharmacy to be filled.

1. Lloyd claims that she was deprived of her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Lloyd must show that counsel was deficient and that, but for the deficiency, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of her trial would have been different.1 She must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct.2

(a) Lloyd first complains of trial counsel's failure to call as defense witnesses Way's son and her dentist's receptionist. At the hearing on her motion for new trial, Lloyd claimed that Way's son would have testified that his mother asked Lloyd to have her prescriptions refilled and that Way's dentist's receptionist would have testified that Way called the dental office and requested the prescription refills. Neither witness, however, testified at the hearing, and no affidavits from them were introduced. Moreover, the receptionist's pretrial deposition does appear in the record, and, in it, she testified that a woman representing herself as a friend of Donetta Way's telephoned the dental office and asked for prescription refills. In addition, Lloyd's trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he did not call Way's son as a witness because he did not expect the child to give testimony favorable to the defense. Under the circumstances, the trial court was authorized to find that counsel's decision not to call the witnesses constituted reasonable trial strategy.3 (b) Lloyd complains of counsel's failure to object to hearsay testimony given by the CVS pharmacist and by Way's husband.

The bulk of the testimony given by the CVS pharmacist was admissible either as nonhearsay or as hearsay to explain conduct. "Testimony is considered hearsay only if the witness is repeating another's statement in order to demonstrate its truth. Otherwise it is a verbal act and thus original evidence rather than hearsay."4 "[H]earsay testimony is admissible to explain the conduct of an actor where the actor's conduct and motive are matters concerning which the truth must be found."5 Although both Way's husband and the CVS pharmacist testified to various inadmissible hearsay statements made by the other,6 Lloyd's constitutional rights under the confrontation clause were not violated because each hearsay declarant was present at trial and available for cross-examination.7 Moreover, any inadmissible hearsay was cumulative of legally admitted evidence of the same facts.

(c) Lloyd claims that trial counsel was ineffective in persuading her not to testify.

Whether to testify in one's own behalf is a decision to be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel.8 At the hearing on Lloyd's motion for new trial, counsel testified that he advised Lloyd not to testify because the facts underlying her defense were adequately established through the testimony of other witnesses and, for a number of reasons, he thought that subjecting Lloyd to cross-examination would prove harmful to the defense. The trial court was authorized to find this trial strategy reasonable.

2. Lloyd claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the similar transaction evidence.

In order for evidence of independent offenses or acts to be admitted into evidence under Williams, ... the state must make three affirmative showings with respect to each independent offense to be introduced: (1) the evidence must be admitted for a proper purpose; (2) there must be sufficient evidence to establish the accused committed the independent act; and (3) there must be a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent offense and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.9

"`A trial court's determination that similar transaction evidence is admissible will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.' [Cits.]"10

In exercising this discretion, the court should consider whether "the State's need for the similar transaction evidence outweigh(s) the prejudice inherent to the defendant." This consideration consists of at least two questions. First, is the issue for which the State is introducing the evidence a genuinely disputed issue? ... Second, does the State need this evidence to prove the issue, or can the fact be proved otherwise?11

The disputed issue in this case was whether Way authorized Lloyd to obtain prescription refills for her on the occasion in question. The State offered evidence of the two independent transactions to show that Lloyd was not authorized to obtain refills of the prescriptions and that she...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Dixon v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 11, 2013
    ...evidence than in jury trials.” Bazin v. State, 299 Ga.App. 875, 880(6), 683 S.E.2d 917 (2009), quoting Lloyd v. State, 259 Ga.App. 636, 640–641(2), 577 S.E.2d 854 (2003). On appeal, Dixon specifically challenges the admission of the five Bartow County robberies on the ground that they were ......
  • Patterson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 12, 2003
  • Bazin v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • August 28, 2009
    ...83 (2005). 27. (Punctuation omitted.) Mikell v. State, 281 Ga.App. 739, 742(2), 637 S.E.2d 142 (2006). 28. Lloyd v. State, 259 Ga.App. 636, 640-641(2), 577 S.E.2d 854 (2003). 29. Mikell, 281 Ga.App. at 743(2), 637 S.E.2d 142. See also Phelps v. State, 158 Ga.App. 219(2), 279 S.E.2d 513 30. ......
  • Serrate v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 1, 2004
    ...Ga.App. 402-403, 577 S.E.2d 82 (2003). 4. See Wright v. State, 265 Ga.App. 188, 190(3), 593 S.E.2d 391 (2004). 5. Lloyd v. State, 259 Ga.App. 636, 638(1), 577 S.E.2d 854 (2003). 6. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3(D). 7. 250 Ga.App. 555, 552 S.E.2d 513 (2001). 8. Rose v. State, 258 Ga.A......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT