LME v. ARS

• Decision Date: 08 June 2004
• Docket Number: Docket No. 242681.
• Citation: 261 Mich. App. 273,680 N.W.2d 902
• Parties: L.M.E. and Family Independence Agency, Petitioners-Appellants, v. A.R.S., Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

680 N.W.2d 902

261 Mich. App. 273

L.M.E. and Family Independence Agency, Petitioners-Appellants, v. A.R.S., Respondent-Appellee.

Docket No. 242681.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted January 7, 2004, at Detroit.

Decided March 16, 2004, at 9:10 a.m.

Released for Publication June 8, 2004.

Carl J. Marlinga, Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph F. Dillard, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the petitioners.

Peter L. Conway, Lapeer, and Patrick A. Keenan, Detroit, for the respondent.

Before: OWENS, P.J., and SCHUETTE and BORRELLO, JJ.

OWENS, P.J.

Petitioners appeal as of right from the order denying their motion for child support and dismissing the case with prejudice. Petitioners contend that the trial court erred by concluding that LME was not entitled to child support because the child was conceived as a result of her criminal action in having sexual relations with respondent when he was a fourteen-year-old boy. The purpose of child support is to provide for the needs of the child; it is awarded without regard to the fault of either of the parents. The trial court therefore erred by refusing to order child support because respondent was technically the victim of an uncharged act of criminal sexual conduct. We reverse the trial court and remand for a hearing and the entry of an order of child support.

I. Factual background and procedural history

Petitioner LME was born in 1968 and respondent was born in 1974. In 1989, while married, she gave birth to BME and listed her husband, DLE, as the child's father. In 2000, she and DLE were divorced in New York. In the course of the divorce proceedings, or immediately after the divorce was granted, blood tests established that DLE was not BME's biological father. In 2001, a New York hearing examiner entered a filiation order indicating that respondent had appeared with counsel and admitted being BME's father. The order therefore declared respondent to be BME's father, but, in a separate order, declined to order child support "based on the respondent's submission to the jurisdiction of Michigan for the entry of an order of support."

Subsequently, the Macomb County prosecutor, on behalf of petitioners, petitioned the trial court for child support.¹ Respondent objected on the basis that (1) BME was conceived as a result of criminal sexual conduct perpetrated against him by LME when he was fourteen years old, (2) BME was conceived and born while LME was married to DLE, (3) respondent had no knowledge of BME until this case was commenced, and (4) LME should not be allowed to profit (in the form of child support) by her misconduct.

The trial court determined that BME was a child born out of wedlock within the meaning of the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711(a). The court found no provision in the Family Support Act, MCL 552.451 et seq., that entitled LME to her requested relief or that prohibited the court from refusing to grant relief under the circumstances presented in this case. The court then applied equitable principles to deny the petition for child support. After the trial court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, petitioners appealed to this Court.

II. The trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction

Petitioners first claim that, where the New York court had already determined the filiation issue and had sent the case to Michigan specifically for a child support determination, the New York court acted improperly because it was required by New York law to order child support, and the Michigan court acted improperly because it resolved the child support issue rather than returning the case to New York. We disagree.

Initially, we note that petitioners waived this claim because they expressly acquiesced to the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction to determine child support under Michigan law. People v. Carter, 462 Mich. 206, 215, 612 N.W.2d 144 (2000) (waiver is the intentional abandonment of a known right and it extinguishes any error). Indeed, it was petitioners who petitioned the Michigan trial court to determine the appropriate amount of child support. This intentional resort to the Michigan courts waives their appellate claim that child support should have been decided by the New York court.

However, petitioners also claim that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to try this case because the New York statutes required the New York court to determine child support rather than send the case to Michigan for such a determination. "Subject-matter jurisdiction is not subject to waiver because it concerns a court's `abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending' and is not dependent on the particular facts of the case." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 465 Mich. 185, 204, 631 N.W.2d 733 (2001) (emphasis omitted), quoting Campbell v. St. John Hosp., 434 Mich. 608, 613-614, 455 N.W.2d 695 (1990). We will therefore review this issue for the limited purpose of determining whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide whether to award child support.²

We review de novo the issue whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Atchison v. Atchison, 256 Mich.App. 531, 534, 664 N.W.2d 249 (2003). Additionally, consideration of petitioners' claim also involves issues of statutory interpretation, which are reviewed de novo. Id. at 534-535, 664 N.W.2d 249. "The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. This determination is accomplished by examining the plain language of the statute itself. If the statutory language is unambiguous, appellate courts presume that the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed and further judicial construction is neither permitted nor required." Id. at 535, 664 N.W.2d 249 (citations omitted).

The trial court obtained personal jurisdiction over respondent when he appeared and contested the petition for child support. MCL 552.1201(b). But subject-matter jurisdiction "concerns a court's `abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending.'" Travelers Ins. Co., supra at 204, 631 N.W.2d 733 (emphasis omitted). It cannot be stipulated by the parties or waived by a party's failure to object. Harris v. Vernier, 242 Mich.App. 306, 316, 617 N.W.2d 764 (2000).

It is uncontested that Michigan courts have jurisdiction to award child support. Scott v. Scott, 182 Mich.App. 363, 366, 451 N.W.2d 876 (1990). Initially, this jurisdiction derives from the general jurisdiction imparted to circuit courts by the Michigan Constitution:

The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals except as provided by law; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial writs; supervisory and general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions in accordance with rules of the supreme court; and jurisdiction of other cases and matters as provided by rules of the supreme court. [Const 1963, art 6, § 13.]

The circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction will be presumed unless denied by constitution or statute. People v. Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 458, 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998); Bowie v. Arder, 441 Mich. 23, 38, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992). See also MCL 600.151 (circuit court is a court of "general jurisdiction") and MCL 600.601 (setting forth the jurisdiction and powers of the circuit court).

In addition to its general jurisdiction over "all matters not prohibited by law," our Legislature has specifically granted circuit courts jurisdiction over matters involving paternity and child support. MCL 722.714(1) provides that an "action under [the Paternity Act] shall be brought in the circuit court by the mother, the father, a child who became 18 years of age ..., or the family independence agency as provided in this act." (Emphasis supplied.) See also MCL 722.712 (parents of a child born out of wedlock are liable for necessary support of the child), MCL 722.714b (establishment of paternity under the law of another state has the same effect as an acknowledgment of paternity or an order of filiation entered in this state), MCL 722.717 (providing for order of filiation declaring paternity and providing for support of child), MCL 552.605 (providing that child support amount is to be determined according to formula developed by state friend of the court bureau).

Although a paternity action may not be brought "if the child's paternity is established under the law of another state," MCL 722.714(2), the Family Support Act (FSA), MCL 552.451 et seq., permits actions for child support against a noncustodial parent by either a custodial parent or the director of social services (now the director of the Family Independence Agency) if the child is supported by public assistance. See MCL 552.451a and MCL 552.451b.

This case was initiated in the circuit court by a petition for child support on the basis that respondent had acknowledged paternity, an order of filiation had been entered, and LME was relying on public assistance for support of her child. Under the plain language of the above-mentioned statutes, the circuit court clearly had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the question of child support. Petitioners contend, however, that the court's "ordinary" jurisdiction was lacking because this case was brought as an action under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), MCL 552.1101 et seq.

The stated general purpose for adopting the UIFSA in Michigan was "to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this act among states enacting it." MCL 552.1107.³ The UIFSA contains a number of definitions relevant to the resolution of the question presented in this case. MCL 552.1102(e) defines the "home state" as the "state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least 6 consecutive months immediately preceding the time of petitioning for...