People v. Goecke
| Decision Date | 02 June 1998 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 2,106433,108961,19,Docket Nos. 105878,3,s. 2 |
| Citation | 457 Mich. 442,579 N.W.2d 868 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jason Adam GOECKE, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard Allen BAKER, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James HOSKINSON, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, and Marilyn J. Day, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Pontiac, for People in Goecke.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Arthur A. Busch, Prosecuting Attorney, and David A. Kuebler, Chief, Research, Training, and Appeals, Flint, for People in Baker.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training, and Appeals, and Janet A. Napp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Detroit, for People in Hoskinson.
Mark G. Butler, Center Line, for defendant Goecke.
Denise D. Couling, Terrance P. Sheehan, Grand Blanc, and Joseph J. Farah, Flint, for defendant Baker.
Daniel J. Rust, Redford, for defendant Hoskinson.
William Forsyth, President, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, Detroit, amici curiae, for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
P.E. Bennett, Ann Arbor, for Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan.
In People v. Goecke we granted leave to decide two issues: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to bind defendant over on a second-degree murder charge, and (2) whether the circuit court properly granted the prosecution's motion to amend the information to reinstate the second-degree murder charge. In People v. Baker and People v. Hoskinson we granted leave to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to uphold defendants' second-degree murder convictions.
In Goecke, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. We reject the conclusion that the circuit court must obtain jurisdiction through an appeal as of right or an application for leave to appeal to review the magistrate's decision to dismiss some but not all felony charges. Jurisdiction vests in the circuit court when a return is filed by the magistrate. Neither statute nor court rule requires the prosecutor to appeal from the magistrate's refusal to bind defendant Goecke over on charges of second-degree murder. The prosecution's motion to amend the information was proper and the circuit court did not err in granting that motion. We also hold that there was sufficient evidence to bind defendant Goecke over on the charge of second-degree murder. In Baker and Hoskinson, we find that the evidence supported the juries' findings of guilt.
Six witnesses called at the preliminary examination 1 gave a factual basis for the finding that on November 11, 1993, 2 at 7:00 p.m., defendant and a friend met at a liquor store in Troy where they purchased beer. From 7:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m., the defendant and his friend drank beer as they sat in the parking lot of the liquor store. Defendant consumed approximately seven to nine bottles of beer. When a police cruiser drove into the parking lot, the defendant and his friend drove off, with defendant driving, in order to find another place to drink. The two drank beer as they drove around the area, waiting for the police to leave the parking lot.
Several hours later, at approximately 11:30 p.m., the defendant and his friend were driving on Wide Track Drive near Cass Road in the city of Pontiac. Wide Track Drive is a main thoroughfare through the city of Pontiac and is a five-lane southbound highway, with four lanes for through traffic and one turn lane. 3 One witness testified that he first noticed the defendant when the defendant's car came "flying" past his car, nearly hitting his van. Defendant's speed was estimated at approximately seventy to eighty miles an hour. 4 According to the testimony, this witness attempted to drive up to the defendant's vehicle to advise the defendant that he almost hit the witness' van and that he should slow down.
Defendant's passenger on the night of November 11, 1993, also testified at the preliminary examination and indicated that the defendant may have driven through a red stoplight at the intersection just before the intersection of Wide Track Drive and Orchard Lake Road. As the defendant neared the intersection of Wide Track Drive and Orchard Lake Road, one witness stated that the stoplight was either yellow or red. A second witness testified that the stoplight was red. The defendant ran through the stoplight and struck an eastbound vehicle in the intersection. The other motorist died of injuries from the collision. Approximately fifteen to twenty empty beer bottles were observed on the floor of the defendant's car, and defendant's blood-alcohol level was measured at 0.17 percent. At the scene of the accident defendant admitted that he was to blame for the accident, stating:
I really fucked up. I was going way too fucking fast. I have had to[o] fucking much to drink.... I have really fucked up bad this time. I was going way too fast.... [I]t was all my fault, I should not have been driving. I know I'm drunk.
The defendant was charged with second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549, and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, causing the death of another person, M.C.L. § 257.625(4); M.S.A. § 9.2325(4). Following preliminary examination, the district court denied the prosecutor's motion to bind defendant over on the second-degree murder charge, stating that, while defendant's behavior was "reprehensible," there was no evidence of the intent needed to support a murder charge. Instead, the court bound defendant over on the alternative charge of OUIL, causing death.
The prosecutor filed a motion in circuit court seeking to amend the information to reinstate the second-degree murder charge. Defendant asked that the motion be denied, arguing that the prosecution should have proceeded by appeal and that a motion to amend the information was an improper means of gaining review of the district court's decision. The circuit court granted the motion to amend, finding that defendant's alleged intoxication, speeding, and disregard of traffic signals raised a question of fact for the jury regarding the intent element of second-degree murder.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's bindover decision where a timely appeal as of right or an application for leave to appeal was not filed in the circuit court. 5 The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to bind defendant Goecke over on the murder charge. We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal. 6
On July 21, 1988, at approximately 11:30 p.m., defendant Baker was driving a pickup truck south on Grand Traverse Road in the city of Flint. The speed limit was thirty-five miles an hour. Witnesses estimated that defendant was traveling between sixty and seventy miles an hour. Defendant failed to stop for a red stoplight at the intersection of Grand Traverse Road and Atherton Road. He collided with the victims' vehicle, which was on Atherton Road properly crossing the intersection with the green light. Both occupants in the victims' car were killed. Approximately three hours after the accident, defendant's blood-alcohol level was 0.18 percent.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that there was insufficient evidence of defendant's state of mind to support a finding of malice, and that evidence of drunk driving and the reckless driving behavior that often goes with it could not, without more support a finding of malice. 7 We granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal. 8
On July 3, 1994, defendant Hoskinson and some friends were drinking beer and working on defendant's automobile. At approximately 7:00 p.m., defendant and his friends drove to a bar where they drank beer and shots of liquor for approximately two hours. Defendant was staggering when he left the bar. Testimony indicated that defendant may have refused the offer of one of his friends to drive. Defendant twice drove his vehicle into a parked car while trying to leave the parking lot. He next drove through a residential neighborhood at speeds of approximately forty to sixty miles an hour. Speed dips were located at almost every intersection throughout this neighborhood. Defendant had driven down this street numerous times and was aware of the speed dips.
A vehicle traveling westbound just ahead of the defendant was stopped at a stop sign. Defendant swerved into the eastbound lane and passed the stopped vehicle, and then immediately swerved back into the westbound lane in order to avoid hitting an oncoming vehicle. Defendant hit a speed dip and lost control of his vehicle. He hit the westbound curb, swerved left, then swerved right, and struck a car parked on the right side of the street. Defendant jerked his wheel to the left, accelerated, drove across the eastbound lane, over the curb, and across some grass where he hit four-year-old Miranda Andres who was riding her tricycle on the sidewalk. Miranda's body was dragged across two lawns before defendant's automobile returned to the street. 9 Defendant continued to drive before bringing his vehicle to a stop approximately six blocks from the victim's home.
An officer who was called to the accident scene testified that defendant approached...
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...(1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse." People v. Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 463-464, 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998). "Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in want......
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