Loaiza v. Loaiza

• Decision Date: 11 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2-02-361-CV.,2-02-361-CV.
• Citation: 130 S.W.3d 894
• Parties: Christina Teadora Varrasso LOAIZA, Appellant, v. Esteban Antonio LOAIZA, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

130 S.W.3d 894

Christina Teadora Varrasso LOAIZA, Appellant, v. Esteban Antonio LOAIZA, Appellee.

No. 2-02-361-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

March 11, 2004.

Rehearing Overruled April 29, 2004.

Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller, L.L.P., Joseph E. Spence, J. Christopher Nickelson, Gary L. Nickelson, Fort Worth, TX, for Appellant.

Kobs & Haney, P.C., Jeff H. Kobs, Mark A. Haney, Fort Worth, TX, Lori Deangelis, Charles Smith, Arlington, TX, for Appellee.

PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and WALKER, JJ.

OPINION

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice.

Christina Teadora Varrasso Loaiza appeals from the trial court's decree granting her and Esteban Antonio Loaiza a divorce and dividing the marital estate. In one point, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make a just and right division of the community estate. Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court erred by finding that she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that appellee wasted community assets, breached fiduciary duties owed to appellant, or committed fraud on the community. Additionally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in characterizing appellee's post-divorce guaranteed payments under his baseball contract with the Toronto Blue Jays as his separate property. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant married appellee, a major league baseball player, in October of 1998. Prior to the wedding, appellee's team traded him to the Texas Rangers. Two weeks before his wedding to appellant, appellee began an affair with 19-year-old Ashley Esposito, a nanny employed by one of his teammates. A few days before the wedding, Ashley began making harassing phone calls to appellant. When confronted, appellee denied having an affair. Ashley continued calling appellant, as well as appellant's mother and sisters, after the parties' marriage and during the 1999 baseball season, telling them she and appellee were having an affair and threatening to harm appellant.

In January of 2000, appellant and appellee bought a lot and began building a home in Pennsylvania. While the home was being built, appellee left for Texas to begin spring training with the Texas Rangers. The threatening calls from Ashley began again. In July of 2000, while appellant was at a wedding in Mexico, appellee met Ashley at a resort in Arizona. Appellee also invited his cousins and paid for everyone's airfare and hotel. During this rendezvous, Ashley told appellee that she was pregnant with his child.

Shortly after appellee's trip with Ashley, he was traded to the Toronto Blue Jays. Appellant and appellee moved to Toronto for the remainder of the 2000 season. Around the same time, appellee began making plans to divorce appellant. He purchased Ashley a $64,000 Lexus and bought both his brother and sister new cars at about $30,000 each. On August 31, 2000, appellee filed for divorce in Tarrant County, Texas, but did not tell appellant that he was divorcing her. Instead, he told her he would return home to her in Pennsylvania after the last game of the 2000 season. Instead, he flew to DFW and went shopping for a home with Ashley in Texas.

Two days after appellee's arrival at DFW, he and Ashley both signed papers to lease a house, with an option to purchase it in the future. Appellee used $75,000 in community funds as the down payment for the purchase option. Several days later, appellee's attorney forwarded the divorce papers to appellant. In November and December of 2000, appellee purchased several Rolex watches for teammates, a car for his mother, and two cars for himself all totaling approximately $184,000.

During his separation from appellant, appellee signed a contract with the Toronto Blue Jays on February 27, 2001. The contract "guaranteed" appellee payments of $4 million in 2001 and $5.8 million in 2002. Appellant continued his affair with Ashley, who had his baby in March 2001. Appellee paid all her medical bills. Additionally, appellee paid Ashley's mother $72,000 a year to care for the baby during the day.

At trial, the court ruled that the parties were divorced as of April 30, 2002. The trial court found that appellant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that appellee wasted community assets, breached fiduciary duties owed to appellant, or committed fraud on the community. Additionally, the trial court determined that the post-divorce payments under the Toronto Blue Jays contract were appellee's separate property because he was required to complete his services as a baseball player before he was entitled to the money.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court has broad discretion in dividing the marital estate, and we presume the trial court exercised its discretion properly. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex.1981). In dividing the parties' community estate, the trial court shall order a division of the property that it deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 (Vernon 1998). The party who complains of the trial court's division of property must demonstrate from evidence in the record that the division was so unjust that the trial court abused its discretion. Zeptner v. Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d 727, 734 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (op. on reh'g); Pletcher v. Goetz, 9 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g).

The trial judge may order an unequal division of marital property when a reasonable basis exists for doing so. Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991), writ denied, 867 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.1993). This court will correct the trial court's division of marital property only when an abuse of discretion has been shown. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698; Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 398. It is this court's duty to consider every reasonable presumption in favor of the proper exercise of discretion by the trial court in dividing the community estate. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698; Massey, 807 S.W.2d at 398.

To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Tex.2002); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). Merely because a trial court may decide a matter within its discretion in a different manner than an appellate court would in similar circumstances does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-42.

Under an abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual sufficiency are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Beaumont Bank v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d at 734. They are not, however, independent grounds of error. Ditraglia v. Romano, 33 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.); Crawford v. Hope, 898 S.W.2d 937, 940 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied).

Waste of Assets, Fiduciary Duty, and Fraud

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to divide the community estate of the parties in a just and right manner. This argument is based primarily on appellant's contention that she conclusively established that appellee breached fiduciary duties he owed to her as his wife, committed constructive fraud, and wasted significant community assets. Appellant asserts that the trial court erroneously found that she failed to prove these claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

Appellant contends that appellee committed waste of the assets in the community estate. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized waste of community assets as a factor to be taken into consideration in the division of the community estate. Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex.1998); see also Harper v. Harper, 8 S.W.3d 782, 783-84 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). However, while one spouse's fraud on the community estate could justify an unequal division of the estate, "there is no independent tort cause of action for wrongful disposition by a spouse of community assets." Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 589.¹

In Schlueter, Mrs. Schlueter filed for divorce, complaining that her husband had diverted $12,565 in cash and an emu business worth $10,000 to his father to avoid having these assets included in the community estate. Id. at 586. The jury found that Mr. Schlueter had defrauded the community estate and the trial court rendered judgment that the community recover $12,850 from Mr. Schlueter and his father, jointly and severally, that Mrs. Schlueter recover $30,000 in punitive damages and $18,500 in attorney fees from her husband, and $15,000 punitive damages from her father in law. Id. The court of appeals affirmed. Schlueter v. Schlueter, 929 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996), rev'd, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.1998). The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that one spouse's fraud on the community estate could justify an unequal division of the estate but that there is no independent tort cause of action for wrongful disposition of community assets by a spouse. 975 S.W.2d at 589-90.

In addition to waste, appellant complains that appellee breached his fiduciary duty to her and committed fraud. A fiduciary duty exists between a husband and a wife regarding the community property controlled by each spouse. Zieba v. Martin, 928 S.W.2d 782, 789 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) (op. on reh'g); In re Marriage of Moore, 890 S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994 no writ). "Fraud on the community" is a judicially created concept based on the theory of constructive fraud and is applied when there is a breach of a legal or equitable duty, which violates this fiduciary relationship existing between spouses. Zieba, 928 S.W.2d at 789; Moore, 890 S.W.2d at 827. Although...