Local 1219, Intern. Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Connecticut Labor Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 03 August 1976
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2098, 79 Lab.Cas. P 53,842, 80 Lab.Cas. P 53,923 LOCAL 1219, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS v. CONNECTICUT LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

Page 952

370 A.2d 952

171 Conn. 342, 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2098,

79 Lab.Cas. P 53,842,

80 Lab.Cas. P 53,923

LOCAL 1219, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS v. CONNECTICUT LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Aug. 3, 1976.

Norman Zolot, Hamden, with whom was Burton S. Rosenberg, Hamden, for appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas J. Daley, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., and Donald E. Wasik, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

LOISELLE, Associate Justice.

On May 3, 1973, the plaintiff, Local 1219, International Association of Fire Fighters, filed a complaint with the defendant board pursuant to General Statutes § 7-471(4) ¹ alleging that the borough of Naugatuck had engaged in and was engaging in practices prohibited by § 7-470 in that the borough had refused to bargain in good faith because the borough 'unilaterally withheld the benefit of premium pay for overtime and other substantial benefits which benefits were provided for in the contract by virtue of a final and binding decision of the (Connecticut) State Board of Mediation and Arbitration Case 7273-A-72.' After hearings, the defendant issued a decision on June 5, 1974, in which it dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to § 4-183. The court rendered a judgment of dismissal and the plaintiff has appealed to this court. See General Statutes §§ 4-184 and 52-6a.

The facts are not in dispute. The defendant board found that on April 1, 1971, the borough, a municipal employer under § 7-467(1), and the plaintiff, an employee organization under § 7-467(3), entered into a collective bargaining agreement for a three-year term. ² One part of the agreement referred to as the parity clause, states: 'It is understood and agreed that if the borough grants to the police department any additional yearly wage, sick leave, number of holidays, vacations, funeral leave or hospital, surgical or life insurance, or other benefits over and above the terms of this contract and during its term, the employees in this bargaining unit will be granted the same additional benefits, effective the first of the month following the granting of such benefits to the police department.' Another part of the agreement said that the borough would pay employees at the same hourly rate for overtime work as they were paid for regularly assigned duty.

On or about April 1, 1972, the borough entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Local 325, International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the bargaining representative for employees of the borough's police department. In contrast to the provisions for overtime pay for the plaintiff's members, the police agreement provided: 'If an employee works after eight (8) hours in any one day, or over forty (40) hours in any one week, but not both, he shall be paid at the rate of regular time plus one half for each hour of overtime worked. If an employee works as much as 12 hours in a day, he shall be paid double time for work in excess of 12 hours.' The borough, however, did not apply these overtime terms to the plaintiff's members. It continued paying fire fighters the same hourly rate for all work. The plaintiff protested this practice through the agreement's grievance procedure and presented it to the state board of mediation and arbitration on November 16, 1972. On January 8, 1973, the board of mediation and arbitration determined that the borough was in violation of the parity clause of the collective bargaining agreement and ordered the borough to pay the plaintiff's members time and a half for overtime work, retroactive to May 2, 1972. The borough began paying for overtime work in accordance with the award.

On April 10, 1973, the defendant board filed decision number 1128, In re City of New London and New London Police Union Local #724 and International Association of Fire Fighters Local Union #1522, case number MPP-2268, and In re Local 1522, International Association of Fire Fighters and New London Police Union Local #724, case number MUPP-2343, both cases referred to in this opinion as City of New London, holding that the enforcement of a parity clause similar to the one here involved constituted a violation of the Municipal Employee Relations Act (General Statutes §§ 7-467 to 7-477), referred to in this opinion as the act, and that such clause was void. On April 17, 1973, the borough's attorney issued a legal opinion stating that the parity clause was void and that compliance with it would constitute a practice prohibited by the act. The borough has thereafter refused to pay members of the plaintiff time and a half for overtime work. On October 23, 1973, the Court of Common Pleas upheld the defendant's decision in City of New London and there has been no further appeal from that decision. Local Union No. 1522, International Association of Fire Fighters v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 31 Conn.Sup. 15, 319 A.2d 511.

In its decision in the present case the defendant reached the following conclusions of law: '1. The parity clause in the present case is void and unenforceable under the reasoning in the New London case from and after April 10, 1973. 2. The award of the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration became binding on the parties hereto by operation of the principle of res judicata. 3. The res judicata effect of such award did not survive the New London decision which so changed the legal atmosphere that an application of res judicata would result in inequity in the administration of the Act.'

The trial court, acting under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (General Statutes §§ 4-166 to 4-189), found that the plaintiff was aggrieved by the defendant's order within the meaning of § 4-183(a) and that the proceedings below constituted a 'contested case' as defined by § 4-166(2). The court further found that the decision of the state board of mediation and arbitration relating to overtime pay and the parity clause was not res judicata on the question of the validity of the parity clause, and that the borough did not repudiate its collective bargaining agreement when it refused to honor the parity clause contained therein. ³

The plaintiff now claims that the trial court erred by failing to hold that the defendant board violated provisions of the General Statutes, exercised its discretion in an arbitrary and unwarranted manner, abused its discretion, and rendered a decision based on an error of law when the defendant board failed to hold the borough in violation of § 7-470(a)(4). Although the plaintiff makes several assertions in support of this claim, the main issue is whether the defendant board's decision in City of New London and its application to the present case is 'arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.' General Statutes § 4-183(g)(6).

General Statutes § 7-468(a) provides that municipal employees shall have the right 'to bargain collectively . . . on questions of wages, hours and other conditions of employment . . . free from . . . interference, restraint or coercion.' Municipal employers are prohibited by § 7-470(a)(1) from interfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of those rights guaranteed in § 7-468(a). Employee organizations or their agents are similarly prohibited, under § 7-470(b)(1)(A), from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights. In City of New London the fire fighters union had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with the city of New London that contained the following provision: 'Any increase in wages which is granted to any employee of the Police Department, which is greater than that received by any employee of this Bargaining Unit who has the same relative length of service in a comparable rank to that held by such Police Department employee, shall be simultaneously granted and effective for such Bargaining Unit employee, and shall be in addition to the provisions of this agreement.' City of New London, supra, 2-3. The defendant board concluded that the mere presence and necessary operation of the clause would inevitably interfere with, restrain and coerce the police union in future negotiations with the city of New London and that the act of agreement upon such clause constituted a violation of § 7-470(a)(1) by the city and § 7-470(b)(1)(A) by the fire fighters union. Elaborating upon its conclusion, the defendant said: 'What we find to be forbidden is an agreement between one group (e.g., firemen) and the employer that will impose equality for the future upon another group (e.g., Policemen) that has had no part in making the agreement. We find that the inevitable tendency of such an agreement is to interfere with, restrain and coerce the right of the later group to have untrammeled bargaining. And this affects all the later negotiations (within the scope of the parity clause) even though it may be hard or impossible to trace by proof the effect of the parity clause upon any specific terms of the later contract (just as in the case before us). The parity clause will seldom surface in the later negotiations but it will surely be present in the minds of the negotiators and have a restraining or coercive effect not always consciously realized.' City of New London, supra, 9. The defendant also made it clear that it was not deciding that parity between policemen and firemen was forbidden by the act, or that the existence of a parity clause in and of itself was unlawful, or that the police and fire units could not agree upon, or bargain jointly for, equal benefits.

The conclusions of the defendant board in City of New London are not based on caprice or whim. There are good reasons for its actions. The defendant's inferences were those that could have reasonably been drawn from...