Town of Stratford v. Local 134, IFPTE

• Decision Date: 16 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 12779,12779
• Citation: 201 Conn. 577,519 A.2d 1
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2052 TOWN OF STRATFORD v. LOCAL 134, IFPTE, et al.

Page 1

519 A.2d 1

201 Conn. 577, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2052

TOWN OF STRATFORD v. LOCAL 134, IFPTE, et al.

No. 12779.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 8, 1986.

Decided Dec. 16, 1986.

Rod Farrell, with whom were Anthony M. Guerrera, and, on the brief, Richard P. Gilardi, Town Atty., for appellant (plaintiff).

Donald J. Deneen, for appellee (named defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, DANNEHY, CALLAHAN and MARY R. HENNESSEY, JJ.

SHEA, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court confirming an arbitration award and concomitantly denying an application to vacate the award. The plaintiff, the town of Stratford, attacks on constitutional and public policy grounds the validity of a provision in its collective bargaining agreement with the named defendant, Local 134, International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, under which the municipality must provide all members of the bargaining unit with hypertension or heart disease benefits mandated for municipal fire or police personnel under General Statutes § 7-433c. The plaintiff asserts additionally that the trial court erred in denying its application to vacate the arbitration award, because the failure of the arbitration panel to address the constitutional and policy issues rendered the award not "mutual, final and definite," as required by General Statutes § 52-418. We conclude that neither the challenged bargaining agreement provision nor the contested award violates public policy or any provision of our state constitution.

The parties stipulated to the facts. The defendant Warren Johns began working for the plaintiff in the public works department in 1971. At that time Johns passed a physical examination, indicating that he was then free from heart disease. In the years 1975 through 1977, however, he suffered a series of heart attacks, which culminated in bypass surgery in October, 1977. In 1978 Johns applied to the plaintiff for heart disease benefits, claiming coverage under article XII, § 3, of the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant union. ¹ That portion of the agreement extends to all members of Local 134 the hypertension and heart disease benefits mandated for municipal fire or police department employees under General Statutes § 7-433c. ² The plaintiff terminated Johns's employment without paying him such benefits.

Johns filed a grievance with the personnel appeals board for the town of Stratford, which the board denied. Johns then sought a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court. The court, Saden, J., dismissed the action because the parties had consented, under the terms of their collective bargaining agreement, to submit questions of contract interpretation to the state board of mediation and arbitration. ³ In the arbitration proceedings that followed the plaintiff argued both that the bargaining agreement should be interpreted to preclude Johns's recovery, and that a contrary interpretation would render the provision unconstitutional and contrary to public policy. The arbitration panel interpreted the contract provision to afford Johns the payments he sought, but declined to discuss the constitutional and policy issues because "such matters are outside the jurisdiction of this arbitration panel." ⁴

The Superior Court, Gerety, J., granted the defendants' application to confirm the arbitration award and denied the plaintiff's opposing application to vacate, which had been filed pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-417 and 52-418 respectively. ⁵ In this appeal the plaintiff claims the trial court erred in concluding (1) that the award, which addressed only the limited issue submitted to the arbitration panel, ⁶ was mutual, final and definite, and (2) that the plaintiff was precluded from litigating the constitutional and policy aspects of article XII, § 3, of the collective bargaining agreement. Presupposing that its constitutional and policy claims are reviewable, the plaintiff further asserts (3) that the challenged contract provision violates article first, § 1, of our state constitution by creating a class preference, ⁷ and (4) that the contract provision contravenes public policy by granting public works employees a special bonus.

I

We first reject the plaintiff's contention that because the arbitrators refused to consider the constitutional issue their award was not mutual, final and definite, and, therefore, ought to have been vacated pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418(d). We conclude, nevertheless, that the factors enumerated in § 52-418, each of which, if found, would require that an arbitration award be vacated, are not exhaustive and consequently do not in all instances limit the scope of judicial review of such awards.

A

It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that, when an award is challenged pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418(d) on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award was not made, the reviewing court is properly limited to a comparison of the award with the submission. E.g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A.2d 685 (1983); Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 23, 453 A.2d 1158 (1983); Trumbull v. Trumbull Police Local 1745, 1 Conn.App. 207, 212, 470 A.2d 1219 (1984). The award will not be vacated under § 52-418(d) if it conforms to the submission, and the award need contain no more than the actual decision of the arbitrators. Ramos Iron Works, Inc. v. Franklin Construction Co., 174 Conn. 583, 589, 392 A.2d 461 (1978).

The issue submitted to the arbitration panel in the present case was whether the plaintiff had violated the labor contract in refusing to pay Johns the benefits he sought, and, if so, what the remedy should be. In their award the arbitrators answered that the plaintiff had violated the contract, and accordingly ordered it to make remedial payments. It is clear, therefore, that the award conformed to the submission. The award was dispositive of the dispute the parties had submitted to the panel. Because the submission, containing no limiting or conditional language, was unrestricted, the award was final and binding and not reviewable for errors of law or fact. See, e.g., Wilson v. Security Ins. Group, 199 Conn. 618, 626-27, 509 A.2d 467 (1986); Milford Employees Assn. v. Milford, 179 Conn. 678, 683, 427 A.2d 859 (1980). Finally, the award was definite in its terms. We conclude, therefore, that the arbitrators did not imperfectly execute their powers within the meaning of § 52-418(d).

B

The plaintiff contends that it was reversible error for the trial court to deny the plaintiff an opportunity to litigate the constitutional and public policy aspects of the contract provision underlying the arbitrators' award. Our response is that the trial court, however succinctly, did address and dispose of those issues. ⁸ We next consider whether judicial review of the constitutional and policy claims raised by the plaintiff is permissible.

We have said that "[t]he right to review an arbitration award is wholly encompassed within the parameters of § 52-418." Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 189 Conn. at 22, 453 A.2d 1158. Moreover, we have implied that in consensual arbitration, as opposed to arbitration made compulsory by statute, the parties can be deemed to have waived their right to challenge any constitutional infringement that the award may entail. Carofano v. Bridgeport, 196 Conn. 623, 637-38 495 A.2d 1011 (1985). In cases in which the parties have bargained for and agreed to an arbitration procedure, this court's respect for the autonomy of that process has motivated us to recognize such a notion of waiver. See Waterbury Board of Education v. Waterbury Teachers Assn., 168 Conn. 54, 62, 357 A.2d 466 (1975); cf. Carofano v. Bridgeport, supra (compulsory arbitration).

Arbitration in the present case was a creature of the parties' agreement and not mandated by legislative enactment. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons for considering the merits of the plaintiff's constitutional and policy claims. Our concern is not with whether the arbitrators have properly construed the collective bargaining agreement, but only with whether the agreement, and, a fortiori, the arbitration award itself, is capable of being enforced. See Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, 179 Conn. 184, 196 n. 6, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979). " 'Just as private parties cannot expect a court to enforce a contract between them to engage in conduct which is illegal or otherwise contrary to public policy, they cannot expect an intervening arbitral award approving (or ordering) that conduct to receive judicial endorsement.' Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unionization and Collective Bargaining (1976) p. 593." Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, supra, at 195, 425 A.2d 1247. Furthermore, when an arbitration panel declines to hear constitutional claims on the basis of this court's decision in Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff'd, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 105 S.Ct. 2914, 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (1985), ⁹ the parties cannot reasonably be deemed to have waived their rights to make those claims.

In the present case the plaintiff did raise its constitutional and policy claims in its brief before the state board of mediation and arbitration. The defendants responded in their brief that our holding in Caldor precluded arbitral consideration of those claims. The parties may have felt that it would have been futile formally to submit such issues to the arbitration panel, because this court in Caldor had upheld the panel's refusal to consider a constitutional question clearly included within the unrestricted submission. In any event, the arbitrators in the present case agreed that policy matters as well as...