Local 494 Mutuel Race Track Emp. of R. I. of Intern. Hod Carriers' Bldg. and Common Laborers' Union of America, AFL-CIO v. Kelley, 2707

• Decision Date: 25 May 1959
• Docket Number: No. 2707,2707
• Citation: 151 A.2d 374,89 R.I. 128
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: LOCAL 494 MUTUEL RACE TRACK EMPLOYEES OF RHODE ISLAND OF INTERNATIONAL HOD CARRIERS' BUILDING & COMMON LABORERS' UNION OF AMERICA, A.F. of L.-C.I.O. v. Edmund KELLEY et al., Being Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board. Eq.

Page 374

151 A.2d 374

89 R.I. 128

LOCAL 494 MUTUEL RACE TRACK EMPLOYEES OF RHODE ISLAND OF INTERNATIONAL HOD CARRIERS' BUILDING & COMMON LABORERS' UNION OF AMERICA, A.F. of L.-C.I.O. v. Edmund KELLEY et al., Being Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board.

Eq. No. 2707.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 25, 1959.

Edward I. Friedman, Aram K. Berberian, Providence, for petitioner.

Francis A. Manzi, Providence, for respondents.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This is a petition under the state Labor Relations Act, General Laws 1956, § 28-7-16, wherein provision is made for the certification of bargaining agents for employee groups. In 1956 the petitioner filed with the board its petition for the holding of an election for the designation of such a bargaining agent for a group of race track employees. Section 28-7-16 provides in part 'that the board shall not have authority to investigate any question or controversy between individuals or groups within the same labor organization or between labor organizations affiliated with the same parent labor organization.' The board found that the petition concerned a dispute between two labor organizations affiliated with the same parent organization and dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.

The petitioner thereupon filed with the superior court its petition for a review of the decision of the board, alleging that it was aggrieved by such decision within the meaning of § 28-7-29. A justice of the superior court denied and dismissed this petition for review on the ground that the decision was not a final decision within the meaning of that term as used in § 28-7-29, and a decree was entered on May 16, 1958. From that decree petitioner has appealed to this court.

The petitioner argues that a decision of the board dismissing a petition for certification under § 28-7-16 is a final decision reviewable by the superior court under the provisions of § 28-7-29. It is clear that petitioner predicates this argument upon the proposition that what the board did in this case was to deny a petition for certification under the pertinent provision of § 28-7-16.

If it were our opinion that the action of the board was in effect to decide the merits of the petition for certification, the decision would be 'in the nature of an interlocutory decision * * *' as we said in McGee v. Local No. 682 of Brotherhood of Painters, etc., A.F. of L., 70 R.I. 200, at page 210, 38 A.2d 303, at page 308. Such decision in itself would not be reviewable by the superior court under the provisions of § 28-7-29 because it lacks any element of finality.

However, we are of the opinion that the board limited its consideration to the question of its jurisdiction and...