LOCAL DIVISION 589, ETC. v. Com. of Mass.
| Decision Date | 17 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 79-2058-S. |
| Citation | 511 F. Supp. 312 |
| Parties | LOCAL DIVISION 589, AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, AFL-CIO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
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Harold B. Roitman, Segal, Roitman & Coleman, Boston, Mass., I. J. Gromfine, Douglas Taylor, Gromfine & Sternstein, Washington, D. C., Linda Hirshman, Jacobs, Burns, Sugarman & Orlove, Chicago, Ill., William J. Riley, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.
Joseph H. Elcock, Gen. Counsel, M.B.T.A., Dwight Golann, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boston, Mass., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
In this action the plaintiff, Local Division 589, Amalgamated Transitnion ("Transit Union") seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA") and its Chairman of the Board, and also against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the following respects:
Boston Lodge 264 of District 38, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (hereinafter "Machinists' Union") has been allowed to intervene on behalf of machinists employed by the MBTA, 58 of whom are scheduled to be laid off on March 21. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Advisory Board (hereinafter "Advisory Board") has appeared and argued in opposition to the positions of the plaintiff and the intervenor. The Machinists' Union takes the same position as the Transit Union, except that with respect to lay offs it asserts protection under its contract which the Transit Union does not claim. It also seeks arbitration with respect to the lay off of its 53 members.
The claims of the two unions are asserted under section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 ("UMTA"), 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c), the "13(c) agreement" executed by the MBTA in 1974 and the contract clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, section 10.
In July of 1980 the Transit Union initiated collective bargaining under the then-current provisions of its collective bargaining contract. Negotiations continued until the end of September 1980 without success. As provided in the collective bargaining agreement the parties then proceeded to interest arbitration in the manner specified in the agreement. Thereafter the MBTA refused to participate in the selection of the third arbitrator and asserted that it was without authority to arbitrate except in accordance with c.405 of the Acts of 1978. The matter was referred to the Secretary of Labor, who apparently took the position that the contract procedure was in force by reason of section 13(c). There was apparently some further backing and filling, but as of November the parties were at a stand-off: the MBTA was willing to arbitrate only in accordance with c.405 and the unions were willing to arbitrate only in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement.
In November of 1978, the MBTA ran over its budget. The Governor exercised purported emergency powers to keep it running. In the course of the legal and legislative flurry that followed, the legislature enacted c.581 of the Acts of 1980. The Advisory Committee thereafter approved a budget for 1981 for the MBTA which was $7 million less than that for the previous year. The MBTA has scheduled cuts in service and the lay offs above referred to purportedly in an effort to reduce its expenses to the budgeted level.
Argument as to jurisdiction is foreclosed by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Local Div. No. 714, etc. v. Greater Portland, etc., 589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), as is argument as to the existence of a claim upon which relief can be granted. In that case it was held that the union had the right to enforce the terms of section 13(c) of UMTA, which meant in effect the ter of the agreement entered into in compliance with that statute. The Court recognized that by reason of the authority delegated to the Secretary of Labor the agreement might well impose requirements on a transit authority broader than the minimum requirements specified in the statute. Accordingly, the terms of the agreement are the primary source of rights and liabilities, to which the statute and its legislative history provide only the most general guide.
The defendants and the Advisory Board all urge this court to abstain because of the pendency in the state courts of several actions relating to some of the same subjects. One of these cases is MBTA v. Adams, in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, No. 79-388 Civil. That case was removed to this court but was remanded for lack of removal jurisdiction because the plaintiff could not have originated the case in this court. (Memorandum and Order, C.A. 79-2059-S). MBTA v. Adams is an action to set aside an "award" of an arbitrator which consists of a legal ruling that c.405 is invalid and ineffective to alter the arbitration procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement. MBTA v. Adams could be resolved in terms of the arbitrator's authority with consideration of the underlying federal questions. The second case is Local 589, etc. et al. v. MBTA, Suffolk Superior Court, C.A. No. 45919. That case has so far been concerned with the parties' rights under the extension period of the collective bargaining agreement in the light of c.581 of the Acts of 1980, although the complaint contains a reference to the contract clause of the Constitution, Art. I, section 10. The case has not been concerned with the effect of section 13(c) of UMTA or the 13(c) agreement.
Where the jurisdiction of the court has properly been invoked, this court is obliged to act in the absence of compelling reasons of comity and practicality. While state law does underlie the resolution of this case, as far as I can determine there are not any significant questions concerning state law at issue in the state cases, the resolution of which will aid in the decision of this case.2 In these circumstances abstention is at best a discretionary matter. Puerto Rico International Airlines, Inc. v. Silva Recio, 520 F.2d 1342, 1345 (1st Cir. 1975). One of the issues to be considered in the exercise of discretion is the exigency of the issue to be decided. It is clear that significant arbitration necessary to resolve the current labor dispute affecting this critical transit system will not proceed until the federal questions are resolved. This does not strike me as the time for an elegant game of jurisdictional shuttlecock. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed. 440 (1964). Accordingly, I shall proceed with an attempt to resolve the federal questions.
Section 13(c) of UMTA and the agreement thereunder are essentially preservative rather than creative of contract rights, as is the contract clause of the Constitution. A useful first inquiry is to determine whether the collective bargaining agreements pre-date the 1974 13(c) agreement or post-date it; similarly, whether they predate c.405 or post-date it. All agree that they pre-date c.581 of the Acts of 1980.
The defendants contend that the Transit Union's current collective bargaining agreement is dated August 8, 1979, and the Memorandum of Understanding, dated August 8, 1979, merely incorporated by reference all of the unamended provisions of the Articles of Agreement of January 1, 1973.
They argue further that the notification of desire for change under Section 600 terminates the contract, since there is no other explicit provision for termination.
If the notification of a desire for change ovides only for amendment, then it would superficially appear, as defendants say, that the contract rolls on in perpetuity. Massachusetts law, however, provides for termination of such contracts by operation of law, in some cases on appropriate notice. Simons v. American Dry Ginger Ale Co., Inc., 335 Mass. 521, 524, 140 N.E.2d 649 (1957); Phoenix Spring Beverage Co. v. Harvard Brewing Co., 312 Mass. 501, 506, 45 N.E.2d 473 (1942); Marble v. Standard Oil Co., 169 Mass. 553, 561, 48 N.E. 783 (1897). I need not consider what would be necessary to terminate the agreement in this case, because neither party has made any attempt to do so.
The Memorandum of Understanding by its explicit terms provides:
Section 600 of the Articles provides that it shall continue in force "until and including the thirty-first day of December, 1975, and from year to year thereafter unless changed by the Parties hereto." Section 601 provides for arbitration in the event of a disagreement with respect to requested changes, "and the Award shall then be entered into and become a part of this Agreement. Emphasis supplied. I take the Memorandum of Understanding as an authentic interpretation and resolution by the parties of the inconsistent provisions of Sections 600 and 601.
I conclude from the...
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