Phoenix Spring Beverage Co. v. Harvard Brewing Co.
Decision Date | 02 December 1942 |
Citation | 45 N.E.2d 473,312 Mass. 501 |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Parties | PHOENIX SPRING BEVERAGE COMPANY v. HARVARD BREWING COMPANY & others. |
September 21, 1942.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, DOLAN COX, & RONAN, JJ.
Contract, What constitutes, Construction, Termination. Agency, Termination of agency. Evidence, Extrinsic affecting writings. Equity Pleading and Practice, Master: exceptions to report.
Of two letters written by a manufacturer to one of his distributors, the first in effect stating that the manufacturer intended "at no time" to withdraw the agency from the distributor so long as he performed satisfactorily but also stating that the manufacturer would be "glad to offer" the distributor "a contract" and that his representative would discuss with the distributor "our future mutual relations, in detail," and the second, specifically assented to by the distributor in writing,
"confirming" his appointment as distributor for a specified territory and stating certain terms of the relationship, the second letter and the assent thereto alone constituted the contract between the parties.
An unequivocal written contract, whereby a manufacturer appointed an exclusive distributor for his product in a certain territory without specifying the term of the relationship, was terminable by either party at will upon reasonable notice.
A master's admission of evidence of a custom as bearing on an interpretation that a contract in writing, which was the basis of the suit, was terminable at will, and his finding that both parties believed and knew it to be so, were not harmful where the contract was unequivocal and the proper interpretation of its provisions was that it was terminable at will.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on November 25, 1941. Following confirmation of a master's report, the plaintiff appealed from a final decree dismissing the bill, entered by order of Dillon, J.
The evidence of a custom referred to in the opinion was testimony "that it was the custom of the trade in the community in which these sales were handled to terminate an agency with a distributor at any time."
In this court the case was submitted on briefs. S. M. Salny, for the plaintiff.
H. H. Hartwell & J.
F. Driscoll, for the defendant Harvard Brewing Company.
The plaintiff seeks to have the defendant Harvard Brewing Company, hereinafter referred to as the defendant specifically perform an alleged agreement whereby the plaintiff was appointed an exclusive distributor in a certain district of merchandise manufactured by the defendant, and also to recover damages alleged to have been incurred by reason of the alleged wrongful termination of said agreement by the defendant. The relief originally sought on account of alleged misrepresentations by the defendant and discriminatory practices against the plaintiff is no longer an issue. The allegations in respect to these matters are not found to have been sustained. The suit was referred to a master, who states in his report that "his findings of fact, upon which" his "ultimate findings have been made, are based upon the subsidiary facts reported".
The master found that the plaintiff, a corporation organized on June 24, 1937 took over a business that had been conducted by a partnership under the name of Phoenix Spring Company. In February, 1935, this partnership was appointed as "exclusive draught distributor of Harvard products for a certain district." Provisions were made for the terms of credit upon which merchandise was to be sold to the partnership, and, thereafter, additional sales territory was assigned to it. On November 23, 1936, the defendant's president wrote the following letter to the partnership:
Under date of December 10, 1936, the partnership received the following communication that was signed in behalf of the defendant by its vice president: It seems that the following was attached to, or was a part of this communication: "This agreement was executed by the plaintiff" and was sent to and received by the defendant.
Thereafter, the defendant made changes in the territory previously assigned, taking away several towns and one city. The plaintiff's treasurer objected to these changes and asked to have the territory restored, but it was not. He made no claim, however, that the defendant did not have the right to make such changes as it saw fit. There is a statement that any reference in the report to the plaintiff will be understood as ". . . [the treasurer] acting for and speaking for the plaintiff."
In the fall of 1940, arrangements were made for the giving of a bond or "guarantee" for the payment of the plaintiff's outstanding account. The question arose as to what assurance would be given to the...
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