Local No. 1186, AFSCME v. Board of Ed. of City of New Britain

• Decision Date: 12 August 1980
• Citation: 438 A.2d 12,182 Conn. 93
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 1 Ed. Law Rep. 887 LOCAL # 1186, AFSCME, et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF NEW BRITAIN, et al.

Page 12

438 A.2d 12

182 Conn. 93, 1 Ed. Law Rep. 887

LOCAL # 1186, AFSCME, et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF NEW BRITAIN, et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 3, 1980.

Decided Aug. 12, 1980.

Harold J. Geragosian, New Britain, for appellant (named plaintiff).

Richard T. Biggar, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was William W. Weber, Corp. Counsel, New Britain, for appellant (plaintiff city of New Britain).

Russell L. Post, Jr., Avon, with whom, on the brief, was Jewel A. Gutman, Avon, for appellees (defendants).

Before COTTER, C. J., and BOGDANSKI, PETERS, HEALEY and PARSKEY, JJ.

PETERS, Associate Justice.

This case arises out of the decision of a local board of education to hire and to test its nonprofessional employees without regard to a city civil service system or a city-wide union contract purporting to cover these employees. The plaintiffs, Local # 1186, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 4, AFL-CIO (hereinafter the union) and the city of New Britain (hereinafter the city) brought a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants, the New Britain board of education (hereinafter the board), its individual members and its superintendent of schools, alleging that the board was violating state statutes, the New Britain charter, and a binding collective bargaining agreement. After a trial to the court, Graham, J., judgment was rendered for the defendants on the ground that the board was authorized by the New Britain charter to exercise plenary power over its nonprofessional employees, except as to their removal from employment which was subject to the merit system as administered by the city's personnel director and civil service commission, and that the board was not bound by the labor agreement between the city and the union. The union and the city have appealed from this declaratory judgment.

The trial court's findings of fact, which are not contested on this appeal, ¹ establish the following: New Britain has a city charter which was enacted in 1961, pursuant to the Home Rule Act. ² The charter entrusts responsibility for the educational system to the defendants, the board, its members and its superintendent of schools, and responsibility for the merit system to the civil service commission and its personnel director. The merit system covers generally the personnel in the classified service of the city. Although the merit system excludes unclassified service from its coverage, the board's employees who are the subject of the present dispute, the school custodians and educational secretaries, do not fall within the charter's definition of the unclassified service.

The board of education is given, by § 912 of the New Britain charter, the power to "make, change, amend or alter any rules and regulations as to the duties, terms of office, mode of election, and compensation of all persons employed by said Board," and thus has the power to determine the wages and the conditions of employment of all of its employees. It is the board that pays, out of its budget, the salaries, the insurance and the fringe benefits of its custodians and its educational secretaries; it is the board that assigns their work, sees to their training, supervises them, disciplines them, and evaluates them. All nonprofessional persons within the New Britain school system are employees of the board, and as such are employees of the city.

The merit system has never covered all classified city employees, even apart from the present controversy about school custodians and educational secretaries. Other classified employees that have historically been excluded are: the paraprofessionals within the school system, the employees of the redevelopment agency and the employees of the housing authority.

From 1947, when the civil service system was adopted, until February 14, 1977, the hiring of nonprofessional employees of the board such as custodians and educational secretaries (but not of its paraprofessionals) was processed through the civil service commission, which conducted examinations and rated applicants. There is, however, a history of escalating conflict between the board and the civil service commission, arising out of the commission's repeated delay and occasional denial of the board's requests to fill vacant positions.

The plaintiff union became the certified exclusive collective bargaining agent for all classified city employees in 1965, and continues to represent all such employees except those of the housing authority, the redevelopment agency and the paraprofessionals in the school system. The custodians and the educational secretaries employed by the board have been part of the bargaining unit and have their dues regularly checked off and paid; none of these employees has requested otherwise. Collective bargaining contracts have been negotiated between the union and the city, without the participation of the board, which has not been a party to the contracts. These contracts, which cover school custodians and educational secretaries, affect the operation of the schools by setting the total hours of work and vacation schedules (some while schools are in session), and by setting wage increases and fringe benefits subsequent to approval of the board's budget. Furthermore, the union contract has been interpreted to require the board to hire laid-off employees of other city departments without testing and with transferred seniority rights.

As a result of prior conflicts with the civil service commission and disagreement with its interpretation of the union contract, the board officially and formally determined, on February 14, 1977, that it would assume sole responsibility for the employment of its nonprofessional staff. In order to retain control over the disciplinary procedures, transfer rights, seniority systems, and work assignments for the school employees, the board would henceforth hire from its own lists and use its own tests. It would no longer select its custodians and its educational secretaries from lists furnished by the civil service commission. This decision precipitated the present controversy.

Before we reach the merits of the suit for declaratory judgment, it is important to clarify what is not at stake. The defendant board has never asserted, nor does the law suit claim to the contrary, the right to make appointments at will or to disregard the right of board employees to bargain collectively. The issue is not whether board employees will be hired on the basis of merit or whether they will continue to be represented by a union or this union. The board asserts only that it, and not the city, is the proper agency to administer appropriate testing and to negotiate an appropriate collective bargaining agreement.

The declaratory judgment action sought a determination of three issues. These issues, and the trial court's resolution thereof, are as follows. Question 1(a) asked "whether the Board of Education, acting under the provisions of Connecticut General Statutes, Section 10-218 et seq. may hire (and) conduct tests to employ classified nonprofessional employees such as, custodian and educational secretaries and others." This question was answered "yes." Question 1(b) asked "whether the Personnel Director of the City of New Britain, acting under the provisions of the City Charter, Chapter 3, Articles 1-15 inclusive, of the City of New Britain, and the provisions of the Merit System Provisions of the Charter, Rules of the Civil Service Commission, may enforce provisions relating to the appointment, duties, promotion, pay and removal of non-professional, classified employees of said Board of Education." This question was answered "(n)o, but with the qualification that the Personnel Director may enforce the provisions of the merit system and the rules of the Civil Service Commission as they relate to the removal of nonprofessional classified employees of the Board." The final question, question 1(c), asked "whether the Defendant, Board of Education, is subject to the provisions of the Labor Agreement between the City of New Britain and the Plaintiff (Union) herein specifically, Subsection 4.3 and 4.5." This question was answered "no." The plaintiff's appeal contests the trial court's resolution of each of these questions, as well as the court's resolution of other subordinate questions of law.

I

In our review of these questions on this appeal, we will deal jointly with the first two questions, since they address opposite sides of the same coin. The ultimate authority to hire and test nonprofessional classified employees of the board must rest either with the board or with the civil service commission. The board has taken no cross appeal, and there is therefore no present disagreement that the power to regulate removal of nonprofessional employees is vested in the civil service commission. ³

The authority vested in local boards of education is derived from a multitude of sources. On the one hand, local boards act as agencies of the state to carry out the constitutional guarantee of free public education contained in article eighth, § 1 ⁴ and implemented by General Statutes § 10-220. Pursuant to § 10-220, local boards are specifically charged with the duty to "maintain good public elementary and secondary schools" and to see to "the care, maintenance and operation of buildings, lands, apparatus and other property used for school purposes." ⁵ See Maitland v. Thompson, 129 Conn. 186, 191, 27 A.2d 160 (1942). Furthermore, although it is the municipalities that appropriate the funds for the maintenance of public schools, General Statutes § 10-220 provides that it is the local boards that decide, in their discretion, how those funds shall be budgeted and expended. Board of Education v. Ellington, 151 Conn. 1, 6, 193 A.2d 466 (1963); cf. Fowler v. Enfield, 138 Conn. 521, 530, 86 A.2d 662 (1952). On the...