Board of Ed. of Town of Ellington v. Town of Ellington

• Decision Date: 11 July 1963
• Citation: 151 Conn. 1,193 A.2d 466
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF ELLINGTON v. TOWN OF ELLINGTON et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 466

193 A.2d 466

151 Conn. 1

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF ELLINGTON v. TOWN OF ELLINGTON et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 11, 1963.

Robert D. King, Rockville, with whom, on the brief, was Robert C. DuBeau, Amston for appellants (defendants).

William W. Sprague, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

J. Read Murphy, Hartford, as amicus curiae.

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ.

BALDWIN, Chief Justice.

This action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction arises out of a dispute between the board of education of the town of Ellington, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, and the board of finance of that town, hereinafter referred to as the defendant. Ellington operater under a town meeting form of government, with a board of selectmen and other boards and commissions as authorized by the General Statutes. Its fiscal year extends from July 1 to the following June 30. In 1958, the town established the defendant pursuant to General Statutes, § 7-340. Since then, the plaintiff and the defendant have disagreed over their respective powers in the management of funds appropriated by the town for school purposes.

Prior to April 4, 1961, when the town held its annual meeting to consider and act on appropriations for the ensuing fiscal year, the plaintiff, pursuant to General Statutes, § 10-222, submitted to the defendant an estimate of its budget requirements for the fiscal year 1961-62 in the total amount of $699,187. This estimate listed, among other items, $410,200 for classroom teachers, $9706 for a curriculum coordinator, $18,854.50 for maintenance of the school properties, and $19,656.14 for capital outlay. The defendant recommended to the town meeting a total appropriation of $605,204.43 for the plaintiff's budget for the fiscal year 1961-62. This amount allowed no more than $379,000 for classroom teachers, thereby providing for three fewer teaching positions than the plaintiff had requested. The sum did not include any appropriation for a curriculum coordinator, for maintenance of school properties or for capital outlay. The defendant, however, recommended that there be included in the budget for general government services two special appropriations, totaling $46,300. One, for $21,065, was to a contingency fund; $16,300 of it would be available for the three teaching positions in question, but only if they were actually filled. The other appropriation, for $25,235, was to a capital account; from it capital outlay for school purposes as well as expenditures for the maintenance of school properties was to be made by the selectmen on the plaintiff's request. These two appropriations were intended by the defendant for school purposes only. Both were for purposes for which the plaintiff was entitled by law to request funds in its own budget. By making the two appropriations, the defendant found, in effect, that the financial condition of the town was such that it could afford the total amount of these expenditures for school purposes.

At the town meeting on April 4, 1961, the budget estimates recommended by the defendant were approved. The total appropriation of $605,137 which was made directly to the plaintiff was inadequate to operate the schools for the entire fiscal year 1961-62. Unspent and unencumbered funds in the plaintiff's budget could not last beyond January, 1962. The plaintiff twice sought to have $46,300, the amount of the two special appropriations in the general government budget transferred to the plaintiff's budget, but the defendant refused. Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had been forewarned by the defendant that no appropriation for a curriculum coordinator would be recommended, the plaintiff renewed the contract of the incumbent curriculum coordinator for the fiscal year 1961-62. The plaintiff considered a curriculum coordinator very important to the school system.

The trial court rendered judgment declaring that the defendant could not, pending the need for or accomplishment of specific purposes for which the plaintiff had requested appropriations in its own budget, lawfully establish in separate funds appropriations for those purposes. The court also issued a mandatory injunction ordering the defendant to transfer the $46,300 from the general government budget to the plaintiff's budget. The defendant has appealed.

It is obvious that the two boards were at odds as to which should have priority: expenditures for unfilled teaching positions, school property maintenance and capital outlay or expenditures for a curriculum coordinator. The defendant sought to resolve this dispute by recommending the appropriation of moneys for school property maintenance and capital outlay in the general government budget, where the moneys would be expended, for these purposes only, by the selectmen on request by the plaintiff, and by recommending the appropriation of moneys to a contingency account in the general government budget, to be expended only after the plaintiff had incurred definite obligations which had previously been approved by the defendant. The defendant's purpose in recommending the establishment of the capital and contingency accounts in the general government budget was to prevent the plaintiff from using the sums involved for purposes other than those specified in the defendant's recommendations. Since the defendant recommended no appropriation in the plaintiff's budget for a curriculum coordinator, and 80 percent of the appropriation in the plaintiff's budget had already been contracted for, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiff to make transfers within its own budget to employ a curriculum coordinator.

'A town board of education is an agency of the state in charge of education in the town, and broad powers are granted it by the legislature to that end. In the exercise of those powers or in the incurring of expense necessitated thereby to be paid by the town, the board of education is beyond control by the town or any of its officers except as limitations are found in statutory provisions.' Fowler v. Enfield, 138 Conn. 521, 530, 86 A.2d 662, 666, and cases cited. In the absence of special charter provisions, the power of any municipality to control the budget of its board of education is derived from General Statutes, § 10-222. This statute requires the board of education to prepare an itemized estimate of the cost of maintaining the public schools for the ensuing year and to submit its estimate to the board of finance at least two months before the annual meeting at which appropriations are to be made. The estimate must be itemized so that the board of finance can determine whether a proposed expenditure is for a purpose which it is the duty of the board of education to effectuate or which the board of education can determine in its own independent discretion, or, on the other hand, whether the proposed expenditure is for purposes not within either of those two classifications. Fowler v. Enfield, supra, 138 Conn. 531, 86 A.2d 662; Board of Education of Stamford v. Board of Finance, 127 Conn. 345, 350, 16 A.2d 601, 604; Groton & Stonington Traction Co. v. Groton, 115 Conn. 151, 161, 160 A. 902. In Ellington, the power of budgetary control is exercised in the first instance by the board of finance, acting under chapter 106 of the General Statutes, and, ultimately, by the town meeting, which can reduce, but cannot increase, the appropriations recommended by the board of finance. General Statutes, § 7-344.

The function of a board of finance is 'first, to eliminate wasteful or extravagant expenditures by considering the financial aspects of the municipal government as a whole rather than from the limited viewpoint of any particular department, whether it is the department in charge of education or of fire prevention or of police protection; and, secondly, to insure, as far as possible, the payment of the municipality's current debts out of its current income.' Risi v. Norwalk, 144 Conn. 525, 528, 134 A.2d 514, 516; see Groton & Stonington Traction Co. v. Groton, supra, 115 Conn. 158, 160 A. 902. To fulfill this function, the board of finance has a broad but not unlimited power to determine the amount that the municipality will appropriate, among other things, for educational purposes. 'Where a town board of education includes in the estimates it submits to a board of finance expenditures for a purpose which is not within statutory provisions imposing a duty upon it nor within one which vests it with a discretion to be independently exercised, the board of finance may, if in its judgment, considering not only the educational purpose to be served but also the financial condition of the town, it finds that the expenditure is not justified, decline to recommend an appropriation for it; where, however, the estimate is for an expenditure for a purpose which the statutes make it the duty of the board of education to effectuate or they vest in the board of education a discretion to be independently exercised as to the carrying out of some purpose, the town board of finance has not the power to refuse to include any appropriation for it in the budget it submits and can reduce the estimate submitted by the board of education only when that estimate exceeds the amount reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, taking into consideration along with the educational needs of the town, its financial condition and the other expenditures it must make. The board of finance in such a case must exercise its sound judgment in determining whether or to what extent the estimates of the board of education are larger than the sums reasonably necessary and...