Local No. 261, Intern. Union United Auto., Aircraft and Agr. Implement Workers of America, C.I.O. v. Schulze

• Decision Date: 08 April 1958
• Citation: 89 N.W.2d 191,3 Wis.2d 479
• Parties: , 42 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2177, 34 Lab.Cas. P 71,435 LOCAL NO. 261, INTERNATIONAL UNION UNITED AUTO., AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. O., Appellant, v. Cecilia SCHULZE, Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 191

89 N.W.2d 191

3 Wis.2d 479, 42 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2177,

34 Lab.Cas. P 71,435

LOCAL NO. 261, INTERNATIONAL UNION UNITED AUTO., AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, C I. O., Appellant, v. Cecilia SCHULZE, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

April 8, 1958.

Charne & Kops, Milwaukee, for appellant.

Rheingans, Ketterer & Heidtman, Milwaukee, for respondent.

CURRIE, Justice.

Unless the 'escape' clause in the maintenance of membership provisions of the collective bargaining contract superseded Article 6, Section 16, of the constitution of the international union, the plaintiff union is entitled to prevail in this action. This is because the defendant, upon becoming a member of the plaintiff union, became bound by all legal provisions of the international union's constitution by reason of the membership application blank which she had signed.

Such constitution constitutes a binding contract between the union and its members. Herman v. United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 1953, 264 Wis. 562, 567, 59 N.W.2d 475; Government & Civic Employees Organizing Committee, C. I. O. v. Windsor, 1955, 262 Ala. 285, 78 So.2d 646; Mandracio v. Bartenders Union, Local 41, 1952, 41 Cal.2d 81, 256 P.2d 927; Bires v. Barney, 1954, 203 Or. 107, 258 P.2d 120, 277 P.2d 751; and Williams v. National Organization, Masters, Mates & Pilots of America, Local No. 2, 1956, 384 Pa. 413, 120 A.2d 896. One of the obligations placed upon the defendant by the constitution of the international was that requiring her to pay dues. Seymour v. Essex County Printing Pressmen, 1941, 23 A.2d 169, 170, 19 N.J.Misc. 665, 666; and 87 C.J.S. Trade Unions, § 40, p. 834.

Under Article 6, Section 16, of the international's constitution, the notice of withdrawal given by defendant to the plaintiff union in April, 1955, was insufficient to relieve her from the liability to pay dues for the remainder of the year 1955. Whether such notice of withdrawal so given in April would be sufficient to end her dues paying liability as of December 31, 1955, without the necessity of giving further notice of withdrawal by registered mail during the ten day period preceding such date, we find it unnecessary to here determine. The fact, that a further provision in the international's constitution provided for automatic suspension from membership of a member who becomes two months delinquent in paying dues, is insufficient to relieve defendant from her liability for payment of delinquent dues.

We now come to the crucial issue in the case, viz., did the 'escape' clause in the maintenance of membership provisions of the collective bargaining contract supersede the stipulated conditions for withdrawal from membership which are set forth in Article 6, Section 16, of the international's constitution?

In the case of Marlin Rockwell Corporation (1955), 114 N.L.R.B. 553, the same international union before us in the instant case and one of its locals were found guilty of an unfair labor practice in violation of sec. 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(1)(A), (2). Such violation consisted of invoking, or attempting to invoke, the discharge provision of a maintenance of membership clause of a collective bargaining contract against three employees whom the union claimed owed delinquent union dues. The effective date of such collective bargaining contract was October 12, 1953. Several weeks before the three employees had tendered their written withdrawals of membership to the union. The union contended such withdrawals from membership were ineffective because they violated the maintenance of union membership clause of the prior collective bargaining contract then in effect; and that under the international's constitution a notice of withdrawal of membership could only be given between December 21st and December 31st. The majority of the board held that, irrespective of any compulsory union membership clause in a collective bargaining contract, a union member is granted by sec. 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act ¹ the right to withdraw from membership in the union at any time; but that such employee may still be subject to discharge under the collective bargaining contract if he fails to pay union dues for the period that the compulsory membership provision of the contract is to continue in effect. Following this reasoning, the board held that the three employees were not members of the union at the time the new collective bargaining contract took effect on October 12, 1953, and, therefore, were not union members within the meaning of the maintenance of membership clause of such new contract.

However, it is not the holding in chief, but a dictum appearing in the Marlin Rock-well Corporation decision, which is of particular interest in the instant appeal. We quote such dictum as follows (114 N.L.R.B., at p. 561):

'In considering this issue, we are willing, for the purposes of this case, to recognize the factual merit of the Union's claim that the employees committed a patent breach of their union membership contract by submitting resignations in September 1953. To the extent that the employees used their 'resignations' as reasons for refusing to contribute dues for the period between the end of the 1950 contract and the date they were permitted to resign under the Union's rules, the Union was involuntarily deprived of the financial benefits insured to it under the membership contract. In these circumstances, a part, if not all, of the Union's demands upon the employees for dues following their acts of disaffiliation from the Union can be viewed, factually, as attempts to remedy the effect of an employee breach of an intraunion membership contract. The question we must here decide, however, is whether the Union was entitled to use the sanction of actual or threatened discharge action against...