Local Union 1397, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 23 November 1984
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,A,AFL-CI,No. 84-3141,84-3141
• Parties: 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3115, 102 Lab.Cas. P 11,253 LOCAL UNION 1397, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,; Ronald Weisen; Thomas Jugan; and Thomas Katona, Appellants, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 180

748 F.2d 180

117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3115, 102 Lab.Cas. P 11,253

LOCAL UNION 1397, UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO Ronald Weisen; Thomas Jugan; and Thomas Katona, Appellants, v. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Appellee.

No. 84-3141.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued Oct. 2, 1984.

Decided Nov. 23, 1984.

Arthur Z. Schwartz (argued), Hall, Clifton & Schwartz, New York City, for appellants.

Michael H. Gottesman (argued), Bredhoff & Kaiser, Washington, D.C., Bernard Kleiman, Chicago, Ill., Carl B. Frankel, United Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO, Pittsburgh, Pa., Bruce A. Miller, William A. Wertheimer, Miller, Cohen, Martens & Sugerman, P.C., Detroit, Mich., for appellee.

Arthur L. Fox, II, Alan B. Morrison, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae, Association for Union Democracy.

Before ALDISERT, Chief Judge, and HUNTER, and WEIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge:

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the court below erred in applying the six-month limitations period of section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b) (1982), to an action brought pursuant to section 102 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 412 (1982). ¹ Relying on the Supreme Court's analysis in DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), we concur in the reasoning of the court below, and affirm the dismissal of appellants' action for failure to state a timely claim.

I.

Appellants, Local Union 1397 of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO ("Local 1397"), Ronald Weisen, Thomas Jugan, and Thomas Katona brought this action against appellee, the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO ("USWA") following the imposition of disciplinary action against appellants by the USWA Executive Board Appeal Panel on December 14, 1982. Local 1397 is a chartered local of the USWA, and Weisen, Jugan, and Katona are, respectively, President, Recording Secretary, and Safety Committee Chairman of Local 1397.

Accepting, as we must, the facts stated in appellants' complaint as true for purposes of this appeal, the record reveals that substantial differences existed between the leadership of the USWA and the leadership of Local 1397, as represented by the individual appellants, on a wide range of issues concerning Local 1397's membership. These issues included the level of pollution control in U.S. Steel Corporation plants, collective bargaining strategy, construction of new plants, arbitration policies, and internal union governance. In particular, Weisen actively sought, both through the union's political process and through the local's newspaper, 1397 Rank and File, to oust USWA officials with whom he disagreed, and to alter USWA policies.

Appellants contend that their disagreements with the USWA leadership, as summarized above, motivated the USWA Executive Board to retaliate against appellants. This retaliation allegedly took the form of disciplinary action imposed upon them by the USWA Executive Board Appeal Panel in December, 1982. The disciplinary action arose from complaints made by two members of Local 1397 against Weisen, Katona, and Jugan. The first member, John Balint, charged that both Weisen and Katona had threatened him with physical harm for actively opposing and criticizing the performance of Weisen and Katona in their official duties. The second member, Robert Chasko, Jr., charged Jugan with failing to inform the local membership of critical comments made by USWA auditors concerning the Local's finances. Although all three officers were acquitted at the local level, the USWA Executive Board Appeal Panel on appeal reconvened a hearing on the charges, reversed the local level findings, and imposed discipline on the three officers. Specifically, Weisen and Katona were officially reprimanded, and Jugan was suspended from his office for thirty days. The Executive Board Appeal Panel also reserved for eighteen months the right to hold a hearing and to take appropriate action on any further allegations of wrongdoing against Local 1397 and its officers. Appellants contend that this latter decision constituted the imposition of discipline against Local 1397.

Appellants filed their complaint in the federal court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in November, 1983, approximately eleven months after the imposition of the allegedly unlawful disciplinary action. The complaint was brought pursuant to section 102 of the LMRDA, and alleged that the disciplinary action violated appellants' rights as protected under section 101 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411 (1982). ² The USWA moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred, arguing that the appropriate limitations period was the six-month period of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b) (1982).

The district court, 580 F.Supp. 866, granted the motion, reasoning that in the absence of a specific limitations period under the LMRDA, the most appropriate limitations period was the six-month period of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b) (1982). In so holding, the district court rejected appellants' argument that the appropriate limitations period was Pennsylvania's six-year period for the tort of interference with business relations. See Harrison v. AFL-CIO, 452 F.Supp. 102 (E.D.Pa.1978) (Pennsylvania's six-year limitations period for interference with business relations appropriate period for LMRDA suit alleging wrongful expulsion from union). We now affirm.

II.

The LMRDA does not provide a limitations period for suits brought pursuant to section 102 of the Act. Accordingly, federal courts entertaining such suits must "borrow" the most appropriate limitations period from some other source. See, e.g., DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). Although recognizing that precepts of interstitial lawmaking instruct federal courts to look generally to state law for "gap-filling" principles, see, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946), the Court in DelCostello noted:

In some circumstances, however, state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law. In those instances, it may be inappropriate to conclude that Congress would choose to adopt state rules at odds with the purpose or operation of federal substantive law.

103 S.Ct. at 2289. Elaborating on this principle, the Court went on to state:

[W]hen a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from state law.

103 S.Ct. at 2294.

The Court then held that the appropriate limitations period for "hybrid" section 301 actions was the six-month period found in section 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b) (1982). The Court noted the practical similarity between an unfair labor practice charge brought by an individual employee under the NLRA, and a breach of the duty of fair representation claim and a breach of contract claim brought by an individual employee against his union and employer under section 301. Equally important to the Court was the close similarity in policy considerations relevant to the choice of a limitations period for an unfair labor practice charge and for a "hybrid" section 301 action. In both situations, the federal labor policy in promoting stable bargaining relationships necessitates prompt resolution of disputes between an individual and his union or an individual and his employer, disputes that may affect the bargaining relationship between union and employer. This interest in prompt resolution, however, must be balanced in both situations against the individual employee's legitimate interest in attacking what he believes to be an unfair action taken against him. Recognizing that Congress adopted a six-month limitations period as an appropriate balance between these considerations in the unfair labor practice context, the DelCostello Court accepted that same balance for "hybrid" section 301 suits.

Applying that same analysis to this appeal, we find that section 10(b) of the NLRA provides a more appropriate limitations period for suits brought under section 102 of the LMRDA than the state limitations periods urged upon us by appellants. As in DelCostello, an analogy between unfair labor practice charges and section 102 suits exists not only in practice, but more importantly in the considerations that underlie the choice of a limitations period in the federal labor law field. Further, we believe that a six-month, rather than a longer limitations period, is fair to all parties given the practicalities of most litigation under the LMRDA.

Despite appellants' protestations to the contrary, suits brought under section 102 of the LMRDA do bear a "family resemblance" to unfair labor practice charges. ³ Cf. DelCostello, 103 S.Ct. at 2293 (finding a "family resemblance" between unfair labor practice charges and breach of the duty of fair representation claims). Both section 8(b)(1) of the NLRA and section 102 are addressed to the same basic concern: the protection of individual workers from arbitrary action by unions, which have been appointed the exclusive representatives of such individuals in the workplace. Appellants' attempted distinction between the "internal" concerns of the LMRDA and the "external" concerns of section 8(b) of the NLRA is thus flawed. In our scheme of labor relations, a union has but one function: the representation of individual workers in collective bargaining with their employer. Whether an individual's dispute with his union concerns an "internal" matter, such as the freedom to speak against union leadership, or an "external" matter,...