Harrison v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, ETC., Civ. A. No. 76-1884.
Decision Date | 07 June 1978 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 76-1884. |
Citation | 452 F. Supp. 102 |
Parties | Bonzell HARRISON v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees and the District Council #33 and Local 54. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Bonzell Harrison, pro se.
Bruce M. Ludwig, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
This is an action under Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415, for unlawful suspension and expulsion from a labor union. Jurisdiction is conferred by § 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412. The case is before me on a motion by defendant Local 54 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) to dismiss the claim against it.
The June 5 telegram stated that plaintiff was "engaging in conduct imminently dangerous to the welfare of the local union" and ordered plaintiff's suspension from the office of president. Id., Exhibit 10a. After a hearing before an AFSCME judicial panel, which plaintiff repeatedly calls a "Kangaroo Court" (id. ¶ 3), plaintiff was expelled from the union on October 1, 1970. His appeal of that decision to the AFSCME International Convention was frustrated by Wurf, who changed the location of the convention from New York City to Houston, Texas, without notifying plaintiff. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges a number of additional injuries, including deduction of union dues from his pay after he had been expelled (id. ¶¶ 9, 11), a forced "non-scheduled vacation for twenty (20) working days, without pay" (id. ¶ 10), and dismissal from his job (id.), all of which were related to his suspension and expulsion from the union. On page 14 of the complaint, plaintiff states:
"The essence of the complaint, is that the Plaintiff invoked District Court's jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. Section 412, since the Plaintiff was improperly suspended from union membership for asserting the jurisdictional rights against Local 590."
Plaintiff contends that the defendants' actions deprived him of rights secured under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution in violation of §§ 101(a)(2), (5) and 102 of the LMRDA. He asks for compensatory and punitive damages and reinstatement in the union.
Since Local 54 has filed an answer to the complaint, I interpret its motion as one for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule 12(c). Local 54 contends that the action against it should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because there are no allegations upon which the Local can be held liable and because the action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 101(a) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a), provides:
Section 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412, provides:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 have been infringed by any violation of this subtitle may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.
The complaint asserts that plaintiff was expelled from the union because of certain assertions made by him as to Local 54's jurisdiction. In its motion, Local 54 assumes arguendo that these allegations state a claim under the quoted sections of the LMRDA, but contends that the allegations apply only to AFSCME's International Union and not to Local 54, since the only persons alleged to have committed wrongful conduct are agents and officers of the International.
Review of the prolix allegations in the complaint contradicts Local 54's contention. The complaint contains numerous references to actions by Local 54, e. g., that "Local 54's Executive Board Members brought criminal charges against the plaintiff," which apparently affected his standing in the union, and that "eventually the Secretary-Treasurer of Local 54 improperly suspended the plaintiff from union membership." Local 54 analyzes the complaint and pertinent exhibits attached to it and reaches the conclusion that these contentions do not really mean what they say and that any claims against the Local are without basis. On a motion such as this, however, I must interpret the complaint in a manner most favorable to plaintiff. This is especially so where, as here, the complaint has been inarticulately drafted pro se. Interpreting the averments in plaintiff's favor, I conclude that these allegations state a claim against Local 54. This case is now on the trial list and will be called to trial shortly. That is the best forum in which to assess plaintiff's claim against Local 54.
Because the LMRDA contains no statute of limitations of its own, claims under it are governed by the limitations period applicable to the most analogous claims under the law of the forum state. Sewell v. Grand Lodge of International Association of Machinists, 445 F.2d 545, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024, 92 S.Ct. 674, 30 L.Ed.2d 674 (1972). It therefore is necessary to analyze plaintiff's claim and Pennsylvania law to determine the closest analogy and then to analyze the Pennsylvania limitations statutes to determine what time period applies to that type of claim. Id. at 549; cf. Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Association, 559 F.2d 894, 899-903 (3d Cir. 1977) ( ).
The complaint states that its "essence" is that plaintiff "was improperly suspended from union membership for asserting the jurisdictional rights against Local 590." Local 54 contends, and I agree, that this type of claim sounds in tort rather than contract since it arises from breach of a statutory duty rather than breach of a contractual promise. Accord, Sewell, at 549-50; see Meyers, at 901. Ascertainment of the closest state tort analogy requires consideration of defendants' conduct, plaintiff's injury, and the relief requested. Meyers, at 901.
Local 54 does not identify any particular tort analogy, but instead contends that plaintiff's claim falls within a general class of torts relating to personal injury for which the limitations period under an 1895 statute, 12 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 34 (Purdon), is two years. It relies on cases, e. g., MacMurray v. Board of Trustees, 428 F.Supp. 1171, 1178-79 (M.D.Pa.1977), holding that civil rights actions for denial of free speech and association are analogous to personal injury claims for statute of limitations purposes. This is not just a civil rights action for denial of First Amendment rights, however; other interests are involved. The proper analysis in this case is to select a particular tort analogy in accordance with the criteria dictated by the Court of Appeals in Meyers.
Under Meyers, one of the factors to be considered is the conduct of defendants. In this case, that conduct was the suspension and later expulsion of plaintiff from union membership. Plaintiff's exercise of his right of free speech was the alleged reason for this action,...
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