Loch v. Board of Educ. of Edwardsville
| Decision Date | 15 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-CV-0017-MJR.,06-CV-0017-MJR. |
| Citation | 573 F.Supp.2d 1072 |
| Parties | Thomas H. LOCH, Glenna H. Loch and Kayla N. Loch, Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF EWARDSVILLE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT # 7, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Thomas H. Loch, Edwardsville, IL, pro se.
Glenna H. Loch, Edwardsville, IL, pro se.
Kayla N. Loch, Edwardsville, IL, pro se.
Laura M. Sinars, Jennifer A. Fletcher, Robbins, Schwartz et al., Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Plaintiffs, Thomas, Glenna and Kayla Loch1, filed suit against Defendant, Board of Education of Edwardsville Community Unit School District No. 7 ("the District"), asserting claims against the District arising under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 et seq., the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 ("CRRA"), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, et seq., and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. The action proceeds on the Lochs's amended complaint, filed November 8, 2006 (Doc. 44).
The Lochs appeal the decision of Impartial Hearing Officer ("HO") Gail Friedman who, after a six-day due process hearing, found entirely in favor of the District. Specifically, the HO found as follows: (1) the District appropriately found that Kayla was ineligible for special education and related services; (2) the District did not violate the parents' procedural rights under the IDEA and Illinois law as it provided adequate prior written notice under 34 C.F.R. 300.503 and 23 Ill.Adm.Code § 226.160(d); and (3) Kayla's parents, Thomas and Glenna, were not entitled to reimbursement for Kayla's unilateral placement at the community college.
Kayla alleges that the District, inter alia, failed to evaluate her in a timely manner, refused to honor dual credit courses and discriminated against her on the basis of sex. Thomas and Glenna allege that the District violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA, retaliated and discriminated against them for having filed a complaint with the Human Rights Authority; and deprived Kayla of a free appropriate public education ("FAPE").2
Kayla was diagnosed with Diabetes Mellitus (Type 1, insulin dependent) in 1997 when she was ten years old. In June, 2003, Kayla was diagnosed with "adjustment disorder-mixed anxiety and depression," and, in June, 2004, she was diagnosed with "social anxiety disorder." After Kayla was diagnosed with diabetes, the school district developed a plan for accommodating her disability under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (). Although Kayla began to miss school regularly, she maintained good grades, and teachers continued to rate her social development well. Her attendance record eroded further in eighth and ninth grades and in the first semester of tenth grade, but she still kept up with her work and performed well.
Beginning in March, 2004, during the second semester of her sophomore year, Kayla stopped attending classes at Edwardsville High School ("EHS") and began to attend Lewis and Clark Community College ("LCCC"). This step was taken without consultation or prearrangement with EHS or District administrators. Because Kayla stopped attending classes and completing her work, she failed most of her classes that semester, and her enrollment was dropped.
In July, 2004, the Lochs met with the EHS principal and proposed allowing Kayla to take all of her classes for the following academic year at LCCC. They proposed that Kayla remain registered at EHS and receive credit toward graduation from EHS. The principal responded that school board guidelines did not allow such an arrangement but that he and the assistant superintendent for curriculum would work with the Lochs to devise an appropriate plan for Kayla's continued education at EHS.
Thomas then requested an evaluation under the IDEA to determine whether Kayla was eligible for special education. After conducting a series of tests and meeting with Kayla's therapist, psychiatrist and pediatric endocrinologist, school officials concluded that Kayla's intellectual and psychological functioning were well within the normal category but that she was "at risk" in the "School Maladjustment" domain. In sum, school officials found that Kayla was not in need of special education services.
The Lochs were dissatisfied with this result and ultimately submitted a request for a due process hearing. As outlined above, the HO found in favor of the District, and there was no change in Kayla's status or her eligibility for special education. Because the Lochs could not obtain the accommodations that they sought, they filed the instant action against the District. Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. 161, 163).
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, interrogatory answers, admissions and affidavits reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Vukadinovich v. Board of Sch. Trs. of N. Newton Sch. Corp., 278 F.3d 693, 698-99 (7th Cir.2002).
The mere existence of an alleged factual dispute is not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Salvadori v. Franklin Sch. Dist., 293 F.3d 989, 996 (7th Cir.2002). Rather, to successfully oppose summary judgment, the nonmovant must present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal. Vukadinovich, 278 F.3d at 699.
The Seventh Circuit has clarified that the "usual Rule 56 standard of review applies to cross-motions for summary judgment." Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 293 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir.2002) (citing Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 349 (7th Cir.1983)). Thus, in evaluating the District's arguments for summary judgment and determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains, the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to non-movants, the Lochs. In evaluating the Lochs's motion and determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains, the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to non-movant, the District.
The District contends that most allegations in Counts II (§ 504) and IV (§ 1983) are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Specifically, the District argues that Kayla's claims regarding incidents in her freshman (2002-2003) and sophomore years (2003-2004), prior to January 10, 2004, are entirely barred. Kayla filed her initial complaint on January 10, 2006.
The Lochs do not argue that the twoyear statute of limitations is inapplicable. Rather, they argue that their claims are timely because they did not begin to accrue until the Lochs had knowledge of the injury. Among the dates proposed by the Lochs, only one falls within the two yearperiod prior to their filing the instant complaint: Thomas's and Glenna's filing for an IDEA due process hearing on February 11, 2005. See Doc. 168, p. 3, fn 1. The Lochs also contend that their claims remain timely under the continuing violations doctrine because the discrimination and injury are ongoing. The District controverts this latter assertion, arguing that the continuing violations doctrine is inapplicable outside employment settings and, in the alternative, is inapplicable to the facts of this proceeding.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act contains no statute of limitations, so the Court borrows the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury suits in Illinois. Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, ¶ 13-202); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Similarly, § 1983 does not contain an express statute of limitations, and the Court adopts the two-year limitations period for personal injury claims. Henderson v. Bolanda, 253 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir.2001) (citing 735 ILCS § 5/13-202; Wilson, 471 U.S. at id., 105 S.Ct. 1938).
Pinpointing accrual in the present case poses a complex question, inasmuch as the Lochs's action challenges an entire course of conduct by the District. However, the injury alleged in this case is denial of special education benefits, the failure to provide certain procedural safeguards and denial of reimbursement for attending classes at LCCC. The limitations period does not run from the various dates of the individual discrete injuries as suggested by the District, but rather from the date that the District denied the special education program the Lochs sought. See, e. g., Bd. of Educ. v. Wolinsky, 842 F.Supp. 1080, 1085 (N.D.Ill.1993). Thus, the two-year limitations period began on January 18, 2005, when the District notified Thomas and Glenna that Kayla was not eligible for special education and related services.
Alternatively, because the IDEA requires administrative exhaustion before Rehabilitation Act or § 1983 claims premised on IDEA violations can be brought in state or federal court, the Lochs's § 504 and § 1983 claims may not have accrued until January 24, 2005, the date they requested a due process hearing, as required under § 1415(l). See Weyrick v. New Albany-Floyd County Consolidated School Corp., 2004 WL 3059793, *15 (S.D.Ind. 2004) (citing 20 U.S.C....
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