Locke v. Canady
| Decision Date | 26 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:22cv116-AW-MAF |
| Parties | WENDELL TERRY LOCKE, Plaintiff, v. CHIEF JUSTICE CHARLES CANADY, JUSTICE RICKY POLSTON, JUSTICE JORGE LABARGA, JUSTICE ALAN LAWSON, JUSTICE CARLOS G. MUNIZ, JUSTICE JOHN D. COURIEL, JUSTICE JAMIE R. GROSSHANS, and CLERK JOHN A. TOMASINO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 32. Defendants contend Plaintiff's complaint is “nothing more than a collateral attack on” the Order from the Florida Supreme Court[1] which imposed discipline on Plaintiff for attorney misconduct. Id. at 2. Defendants further argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this case, that Defendants are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the Ex Parte Young exception is inapplicable. Id. at 2-3. Finally Defendants assert their entitlement to absolute immunity. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff who is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has filed a response in opposition. ECF No. 33. Plaintiff contends the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply “because the state court proceeding had not ended when Locke filed his Complaint ....” Id. at 2. Plaintiff also argues that Eleventh Amendment immunity is not applicable because he seeks prospective injunctive relief from the Defendants in their official capacities. Id. at 4-5. Further, he maintains that judicial immunity is inapplicable Id. at 7-10. Finally, even though Defendants did not raise the Younger abstention doctrine, Plaintiff asserts that his case falls within the exception because the state proceedings were “brought in retaliation” to his exercising his First Amendment rights. Id. at 10-14. The motion is ready for a ruling.[2]
Plaintiff presents an eight count complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 against the seven Justices[3] of the Florida Supreme Court and its Clerk. ECF No. 1. In general, Plaintiff requests that this Court declare a March 1, 2022, Order from the Florida Supreme Court to be “null and void,” and to enjoin the Defendants from enforcing the Order which suspended Plaintiff from practicing law for one year and imposed other sanctions and costs. See ECF No. 1-8. More specifically, Count I is asserted as a substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the “denial of access to fair and impartial tribunal. ECF No. 1 at 35. Plaintiff's requested relief is “an emergency and immediate injunction” which will declare the March 1, 2022, Order of the Florida Supreme Court to be “null and void” and correspondingly enjoin the enforcement of sanctions including “suspension and taxing of costs.” Id. Count II is duplicative of Count I.[4] Id. at 36. Count III is a substantive due process claim for the “denial of right and ability to” self defense. Id. at 37. The request for relief is the same. Id. Count IV is duplicative of Count III. Id. at 38. Count V is a substantive due process claim for the denial of equal protection, requesting the same relief. Id. at 39. Count VI is duplicative of Count V. Id. at 40. Count VII is a First Amendment claim of retaliation, also brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Count VIII is duplicative of Count VII. Id. at 41-43.
This case arises from the state court case number DSC-19-1913, brought against Plaintiff by The Florida Bar. ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff alleged that The Florida Bar (“TFB”) initiated an investigation at the urging of the United States of America in early 2018. Id. at 4-5. The United States' actions stemmed from a federal civil rights case, although Plaintiff contends his law firm has “no connection to the underlying civil rights case.” Id. at ¶ 5, 7. Plaintiff alleged that only the “two Black attorneys” were investigated and the “United States of America did not ask TFB to investigate the conduct of the Caucasian attorneys in that same case ....” Id. at 5.[5] Additionally, at approximately the same time the investigation began, Plaintiff was making inquiries about the reassignment of the civil rights case to United States District Judge Carlos E. Mendoza. Id. at 6-9. He also was inquiring as to “why he was being investigated by the [Bar's] grievance committee in the 13th Judicial Circuit in Hillsborough County” instead of the “17th Judicial Circuit in Broward County where he lives and his law practice was located.” Id. at 9. Unsatisfied with responses, Plaintiff filed a petition for mandamus in the United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as complaints of judicial misconduct against two judges from the Middle District of Florida, and a case against the clerk from the Middle District. Id. at 10-11. All were dismissed. Id. at 11-13.
TFB's formal complaint was filed against Plaintiff in the Florida Supreme Court on November 12, 2019. ECF No. 1 at 14. The following month, that Court granted Plaintiff's motion to transfer the Bar's disciplinary action to Broward County. Id. at 15-16. Plaintiff appears to contend that the disciplinary proceedings were brought against him merely because he was sending “letters.” ECF No. 1 at 27.[6] The Bar Referee found Plaintiff “guilty of violating all purported rules proffered by TFB” and recommended a 90-day suspension. Id. Both Plaintiff and TFB sought review of the Report of Referee. Id. at 29. On March 1, 2022, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Referee as to Plaintiff's guilt, “but increased the sanction period from a 90-day suspension to a one-year suspension beginning on March 31, 2022.” Id. at 32; see also ECF No. 1-8. On March 16, 2022, Plaintiff “timely moved for rehearing and for clarification of the March 1, 2022, Order, thereby making said Order not final at the time this Complaint was filed.” Id. at 34. This lawsuit was filed on March 16, 2022.
Plaintiff alleges that because of the “conduct of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida, the Clerk and TFB, which is an arm of the Supreme Court of Florida, Locke will experience irreparable injury that is both great and immediate.” ECF No. 1 at 33. “Further, because of the foregoing conduct of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida, the Clerk and TFB, which is an arm of the Supreme Court of Florida, Locke has shown bad faith, harassment and other unusual circumstances that calls for equitable relief.” Id. at 34. As noted above, Plaintiff's request for relief is “to prohibit the defendants, collectively acting in their official capacity to form the Supreme Court of Florida, from admonishing, reprimanding, suspending, disbarring or otherwise disciplining Locke because Locke was denied due process, denied equal protection under the law and the Florida Supreme Court's actions are in retaliation to Plaintiff's First Amendment rights available to attorneys.” ECF No. 1 at 1-2.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 32. To state a claim, the complaint must allege enough plausible facts to support the claim stated. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A complaint is facially plausible when there is sufficient factual content to allow ‘the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoted in Riddick v. United States, 832 Fed.Appx. 607, 611 (11th Cir. 2020)). The factual allegations must be “accepted as true,” but legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient. Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation omitted). Thus, “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
One additional principle bears highlighting: a motion to dismiss does not test the truth of a complaint's factual allegations. “Instead, it remains true, after Twombly and Iqbal as before, that ‘federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.'” Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993) ().
Defendants first argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. ECF No. 32 at 2, 6-11. Put simply, the doctrine prohibits a plaintiff from using federal district court “to review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments.” In re Galvin, No 21-10411,2021 WL 5105819, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov. 3, 2021) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005)). The doctrine derives from two United States Supreme Court cases - Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, - which held that a loser in state court may not challenge that judgment “in a federal district court because only the Supreme Court has appellate authority to reverse or modify a state-court judgment.” 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) (cited in Galvin, 2021 WL 5105819, at *2). District court “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but that statute does not...
To continue reading
Request your trial