Locke v. McPherson

• Decision Date: 14 May 1901
• Citation: 63 S.W. 726,163 Mo. 493
• Parties: LOCKE et al. v. McPHERSON.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

63 S.W. 726

163 Mo. 493

LOCKE et al. v. McPHERSON.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

May 14, 1901.

DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION — CONFLICT OF LAWS — DEATH OF MARRIED WOMAN WITHOUT DESCENDANTS — HUSBAND'S RIGHT TO PERSONAL ESTATE.

Plaintiff, a resident of New York, married a woman who resided in Missouri. They intended to make New York their residence, and he returned there shortly after the marriage; the wife remaining until certain property belonging to her could be disposed of. Within a month after her marriage she died, leaving no descendants; two brothers being her next of kin. There is no statute of distribution in New York applying to the estate in personal property of a married woman dying without descendants; the law being that the surviving husband takes the estate by the title to his wife's personal property that vested in him at marriage by the common law. Rev. St. 1899, § 254, provides that, when administration shall be taken in Missouri on the estate of any person who at the time of his decease was an inhabitant of any other state or country, his personal estate shall be distributed and disposed of according to the laws of the state or country of which he was an inhabitant. Held, where administration was had in Missouri, in an action by the husband, as domiciliary administrator appointed in New York and as surviving husband, that, assuming decedent's residence to be in New York, the personality in the hands of the Missouri administrator would be distributed between decedent's brothers according to the law of Missouri, since there is no statute of distribution applicable in New York, and the husband does not acquire such title to his wife's personality by marriage in Missouri as he would if married in New York.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; H. D. Wood, Judge.

Action by William J. McPherson against William C. Locke and others. From a judgment of the circuit court reversing a decree in favor of plaintiff rendered in the probate court, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

This suit arises in the administration of the estate of Mary B. McPherson, deceased, and concerns its distribution. The contest is between the respondents, who were the brothers, claiming as distributes, and the appellant, who was the husband of the intestate. The facts are as follows: On February 20, 1895, the intestate, who up to that date was Mary B. McVean, intermarried with the appellant, William J. McPherson. At the date of her marriage she was living in St. Louis, and had resided here for several years, and owned considerable real and personal property in this state. The appellant, William J. McPherson, was then, and for many years had been, and has since continued to be, a resident and citizen of New York. They were married in St. Louis, but it was her intention to go with her husband to his home, in New York, and that was to be their residence. But her going was deferred until she might dispose of her house here. Her husband returned to his home, leaving her in St. Louis, where in a few days she was taken ill, and died March 22, 1895, it being little more than one month after her marriage, and she died intestate. leaving no descendants. Her two brothers are her next of kin. The Mississippi Valley Trust Company was appointed administrator of her estate in this state, and paid all debts for which it was liable, and has on hand a considerable amount of personal property for distribution, and is ready to make final settlement. The husband was appointed administrator in New York, and, claiming to be the domiciliary administrator, and also claiming as surviving husband, filed his petition in the St. Louis probate court, asking that the Missouri administrator turn over to him the personal property in hand. The probate court decided in his favor, but on appeal to the circuit court the judgment was that the estate be distributed to the two brothers, from which judgment the husband has taken this appeal.

John H. Overall, for appellant. Adiel Sherwood, John R. Myers, and Geo. E. Smith, for respondents.

VALLIANT, J. (after stating the facts).

The sole question is whether the estate is to be distributed according to the statutes of this state relating to descents and distributions, or according to the law of New York determining the rights of a husband in personal property that belonged to his deceased wife in her lifetime. There is an interesting and learned discussion in the briefs of counsel on the question whether the deceased, who was up to that time a resident and citizen of this state, became on her marriage a resident and citizen of New York, or an inhabitant of that state, within the meaning of our statute presently quoted. If the view we have taken of the subject in the end is correct, it would not be decisive of this case to concede that appellant is right in his contention that on the instant of her marriage the wife became an inhabitant of New York. Appellant's proposition is that immediately upon the marriage the abode of the husband in New York became the abode of the wife, and although her sudden illness and death prevented her removal in fact and her death occurred in this state, yet she was at that time, in contemplation of law, an inhabitant of New York, and her personal property here is to be distributed according to the laws of New York. Our statute on which appellant relies is: "When administration shall be taken in this state on the estate of any person, who at the time of his decease was an inhabitant of any other state or country * * * his personal estate shall be distributed and disposed of according to the laws of the state or country of which he was an inhabitant." Rev. St. 1899, § 254. This has been the statute law of this state since 1845 (Rev. St. 1845, p. 102, § 19), and has been repeated without change in all revisions since that date. At the origin of the enactment our statute in regard to the property rights of married women was not in existence; we are not, therefore, forced to construe it as applying to such case unless its provisions naturally embrace it. Assuming for the present that the intestate at the time of her death was an inhabitant of New York, the difficulty in applying that statute to this case is that in New York there is no statute of distribution applying to the estate of a married woman dying without descendants. The law of that state in reference to the administration of the estate of an intestate does not recognize that a married woman without a descendant has an estate in personal property to pass in succession at her death. The surviving husband in such case takes the estate, not as distributee or under the statute of...