Lockett v. Chicago Police Bd.

• Decision Date: 03 November 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-2129,87-2129
• Citation: 176 Ill.App.3d 792,126 Ill.Dec. 210,531 N.E.2d 837
• Parties: , 126 Ill.Dec. 210 Stafford E. LOCKETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO POLICE BOARD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 837

531 N.E.2d 837

176 Ill.App.3d 792, 126 Ill.Dec. 210

Stafford E. LOCKETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO POLICE BOARD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87-2129.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fourth Division.

Nov. 3, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 29, 1988.

James W. Reilley & Associates, Dianne Ruthman, DesPlaines, for plaintiff-appellant.

Judson H. Miner, Corp. Counsel for the City of Chicago, Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch, Chief Asst. Corp. Counsel, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Stafford E. Lockett, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County that dismissed his complaint, without leave to amend, for administrative review. Plaintiff sought review from the decision of defendants, the Chicago Police Board (hereinafter the Board) and its members, to terminate his employment with the Chicago Police Department. The complaint was dismissed because plaintiff failed to name the superintendent of the Chicago Police Department as a party defendant in his complaint for administrative review, and to serve the superintendent with summons within 35 days of the date of the Board's decision. Plaintiff contends that the court erred in granting defendants' motion to dismiss.

We reverse.

The record reflects that on November 6, 1985, Fred Rice, the superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, filed charges with the Board against plaintiff, alleging violations of various departmental rules. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Board, on September 29, 1986, entered a decision finding that the charges brought by the superintendent were supported by the evidence presented at the hearing and ordering plaintiff to be discharged from his position as a police officer with the City of Chicago. On October 30, 1986, plaintiff filed his complaint for administrative review and named the Board and its members, but not the superintendent, as defendants. Summons was issued and served on the named defendants.

On November 25, 1986, defendants moved to strike and dismiss plaintiff's complaint, alleging that he had failed to name and serve a necessary party to the action, the superintendent. In his response filed on December 23, 1986, plaintiff maintained that the superintendent was not a necessary party to the administrative review action and that, in the alternative, he should be allowed to amend his complaint to name the superintendent as a defendant. Defendants filed objections to plaintiff's request to name the superintendent as a party defendant, arguing that the motion was untimely.

In an order entered on June 3, 1987, the circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint without leave to amend, finding that the failure to add the superintendent of police as a party defendant was a fatal defect. It is from this order that plaintiff appeals.

The issue presented for review is whether plaintiff's complaint for administrative review of the Board's decision is fatally defective for failure to join as a party defendant the superintendent of police. In our judgment, it was not.

Section 3-103 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 3-103), provides in part that "[e]very action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected thereby." The filing of the complaint for administrative review within the time period specified is a jurisdictional requirement and judicial review of the administrative decision is barred if the complaint is not filed within the time specified. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 109 Ill.2d 202, 211, 93 Ill.Dec. 360, 486 N.E.2d 893.

Defendants concede that plaintiff filed his complaint for administrative review within the 35 days specified by law. Defendants, however, argue that the complaint was fatally defective because plaintiff failed to name the superintendent of the Chicago Police Department as a party defendant and to serve him with summons within 35 days of service of the Board's decision. We disagree.

Section 3-107 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch....