Lockett v. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 45A05–1407–CT–340.,45A05–1407–CT–340.
• Parties: Angelique LOCKETT and Lanetra Lockett, Appellants–Plaintiffs, v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF INDIANA, INC., and Cathy McGee, Appellees–Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

42 N.E.3d 119

Angelique LOCKETT and Lanetra Lockett, Appellants–Plaintiffs

v.PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF INDIANA, INC., and Cathy McGee, Appellees–Defendants.

No. 45A05–1407–CT–340.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed Aug. 17, 2015.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 2015.

Kevin W. Vanderground, Church, Church, Hittle & Antrim, Rick C. Gikas, Merrillville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory A. Crisman, Carly A. Brandenburg, Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP, Hammond, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

BAILEY

, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Angelique Lockett (“Angelique”) and her mother Lanetra Lockett (“Lanetra”)¹ (collectively, “the Locketts”) appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc.² (“Planned Parenthood”) after Angelique, then a seventeen-year-old minor, intentionally misrepresented herself to be eighteen-years-old and obtained an abortion at a Planned Parenthood clinic without Lanetra's consent. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that Indiana Code chapter 16–34–2 does not confer upon the Locketts a private cause of action to enforce the statutory provisions. As to the Locketts' remaining common law claims against Planned Parenthood, we hold that Planned Parenthood did not owe Lanetra a duty at common law and Lanetra is not in the class of persons intended to be protected by Indiana Code section 16–34–2–4

(parental consent and judicial bypass provisions); therefore, Planned Parenthood is entitled to summary judgment on Lanetra's claims for negligence and negligence per se. As to Angelique's claims, we affirm the court's grant of summary judgment on the grounds that (1) an immunity provision of the Health Care Consent Act (“HCCA”)³ relieves Planned Parenthood of civil liability under these facts, and (2) Angelique is equitably estopped from pursuing her claims due to her fraudulent acts. However, to the extent the trial court's order appears to have dismissed all of the Locketts' claims against defendant Cathy McGee (“McGee”) even though McGee may never have been served,⁴ we reverse and remand.

Issues

[2] The Locketts present three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the following one: whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood.

[3] We also address sua sponte the status of the Locketts' claims against McGee.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] In early 2010, then seventeen-year-old Angelique suspected she was pregnant and informed her boyfriend's mother, McGee. Present during the conversation with McGee was Raven Francis (“Francis”), the girlfriend of another of McGee's sons. Although unsure if she was pregnant, Angelique discussed with McGee and Francis the possibility of obtaining an abortion at Planned Parenthood. Francis, who was eighteen-years-old at the time, offered to loan Angelique her Indiana State-issued identification (“ID”) and Medicaid cards so that Angelique could represent herself to Planned Parenthood as old enough to independently consent to medical treatment. Francis's boyfriend opined that Angelique and Francis resembled each other, even though Angelique weighed twenty pounds less and stood four inches shorter than the weight and height listed on Francis's ID card. Angelique was skeptical that the ruse would work, but took Francis's ID. Angelique did not tell her mother, Lanetra, of her suspected pregnancy or plans to visit Planned Parenthood.

[5] On January 22, 2010, McGee took Angelique to Planned Parenthood's Merrillville office. Angelique stated that the “whole purpose of going there was first to see if I was pregnant.” (App. 130.) Upon arrival, Angelique represented herself to the office staff as eighteen-year-old Francis, and McGee, using her own name, posed as Angelique's mother. Angelique presented Francis's ID to the front office staff, who looked at it and made a copy. The employee who accepted the ID attested that she checked the ID, “compared the photograph to the young woman standing” in the office, “saw no reason to doubt the identity that the patient had presented[,]” and “observed that the patient's identification showed her age to be 18.” (App. 73.) Angelique and McGee were then given forms to fill out, some of which McGee filled out on Angelique's behalf.

[6] During the visit, Angelique underwent an ultrasound and blood and urine tests

. The tests confirmed that Angelique was pregnant and in her first trimester. After undergoing counseling outside of McGee's presence, Angelique forged the name “Raven Francis” on a form consenting to an abortion and acknowledging that she had received the statutorily-prescribed information regarding the procedure and abortion alternatives. Angelique specifically recalled signing this form, further describing it as:

[a] form saying nobody was forcing me physically to come in and have an abortion, a form that says I am Raven Francis. Those are the two main forms I really remember, a list of questions saying nobody's forcing you, and are you Raven Francis is like the main paperwork that I signed her name.

(App. 156–57.) Angelique did not tell anyone at Planned Parenthood that she was actually Angelique Lockett or that McGee was not her mother. McGee paid in advance for the procedure.

[7] Six days later, on January 28, 2010, Angelique returned to Planned Parenthood. Angelique was not asked to present ID during the second appointment, but she again represented herself as Francis. The copy of Francis's ID made on the first visit was included in Angelique's patient file, which the physician reviewed and found “to be in order.” (App. 76.) McGee was not present at the beginning of the appointment, but arrived later. An abortion was performed. Lanetra, who was not aware that her daughter was pregnant and considering an abortion, did not consent to the procedure.

[8] On August 30, 2011, Angelique, now an adult, and Lanetra filed a complaint against Planned Parenthood and McGee, alleging that Angelique and Lanetra were harmed when Planned Parenthood's physician performed an abortion on Angelique without Lanetra's consent.

[9] On December 5, 2013, Planned Parenthood filed a motion for summary judgment, in which it argued that an immunity provision of the HCCA⁵ relieved Planned Parenthood of liability and that the Locketts should be equitably estopped from pursuing their claims due to Angelique's misrepresentations. After the Locketts filed their response on May 28, 2014, Planned Parenthood filed a reply brief on June 5, 2014, in which it also argued that Indiana's statutes governing abortion, including Indiana Code chapter 16–34–2, do not create a private cause of action for individuals such as the Locketts.

[10] On June 13, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on Planned Parenthood's motion for summary judgment. The court also heard argument on the Locketts' motion to strike portions of affidavits designated by Planned Parenthood in support of its summary judgment motion.

[11] On June 20, 2014, the trial court entered an order granting the Locketts' motion to strike certain evidence. The court also found: “There is no genuine issue that the Statute I.C. § 16–34–2–4

[governing parental consent and judicial bypass procedures for abortions performed on minors] does not confer on the Plaintiff a private right of action, which would allow her to bring a civil suit against the Defendants.” (App. 1.) The trial court then granted Planned Parenthood's motion for summary judgment. The court also dismissed the Locketts' complaint in its entirety and entered “Judgment for Defendants.”

[12] The Locketts now appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[13] Indiana Trial Rule 56

governs motions for summary judgment. Trial Rule 56(C) provides that a trial court shall grant summary judgment for the movant “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” When we review a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as for the trial court. Asklar v. Gilb, 9 N.E.3d 165, 167 (Ind.2014). The moving party must show there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the moving party carries its burden, then the non-movant must present evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

[14] When we decide whether summary judgment was properly granted or denied, we consider only the evidence the parties specifically designated to the trial court. T.R. 56(C), (H)

. We construe all facts and all reasonable inferences established by the designated evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Asklar, 9 N.E.3d at 167. “As a reviewing court, we are not limited to reviewing the trial court's reasons for granting or denying summary judgment but rather may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any theory supported by the evidence.” Keaton & Keaton v. Keaton, 842 N.E.2d 816, 821 (Ind.2006).

Private Cause of Action

[15] The Locketts argue that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment on the basis that Indiana Code chapter 16–34–2 does not confer upon the Locketts a private cause of action to enforce the statutory provisions.⁶

[16] When a civil cause of action is premised upon violation of a duty imposed by statute, the initial question to be determined by the court is whether the statute in question confers a private right of action. Estate of Cullop v. State, 821 N.E.2d 403, 408 (Ind.Ct.App.2005)

, reh'g denied. To determine whether a civil cause of action exists, we first examine legislative intent. Id. We determine whether the statute is designed to protect the general public and whether the statutory scheme contains an enforcement mechanism or remedies for violation of the duty. Id. A private party generally may not enforce rights under a statute designed to protect the public...