Price v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs.

• Decision Date: 25 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 49A05–1602–PL–380.,49A05–1602–PL–380.
• Citation: 63 N.E.3d 16
• Parties: Mary PRICE, on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated, Appellants–Plaintiffs, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES ; Director, Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellees–Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

63 N.E.3d 16

Mary PRICE, on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated, Appellants–Plaintiffs,

v.INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES ; Director, Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellees–Defendants.

No. 49A05–1602–PL–380.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Oct. 25, 2016.

Kenneth J. Falk, Gavin M. Rose, ACLU of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Andrea E. Rahman, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant–Plaintiff, Mary Price (Price), on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of those similarly situated, appeals the trial court's grant of Appellees–Defendants', Indiana Department of Child Services; Director, Indiana Department of Child Services (collectively, DCS), motion for dismissal of Price's Complaint for failing to state a claim for relief pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6).¹

[2] We affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and remand.

ISSUES

[3] Price raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

(1) Whether Price has a private right of action to enforce the maximum caseload standard included in Indiana Code section 31–25–2–5 ; and

(2) Whether Price's Complaint states a claim for relief as an action for mandate.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Under Indiana law, the DCS is charged with the responsibility of providing various services to protect children and to strengthen families. The family case managers (FCMs), employed by the DCS, are “the backbone of Indiana's child welfare system” and the key components in safeguarding the safety of Indiana's children. (Appellant's App. p. 4). They are responsible for, among other things, investigating reports of abuse or neglect of children in Indiana, ongoing case management services if the reports indicate that abuse or neglect actually occurred, providing family support services to strengthen families to help assure that abuse or neglect will not recur, and offering adoption or other permanency services if children cannot safely be returned to their homes. Some FCMs may only provide initial assessments, while others are permanency workers who monitor and supervise active cases after abuse or neglect is substantiated. In smaller counties, one FCM may often perform both functions.

[5] Indiana Code section 31–25–2–5 provides, in part, referring to DCS as “the department,” that:

(a) The department shall ensure that the department maintains staffing levels of family case managers so that each region has enough family case managers to allow caseloads to be at not more than:

(1) Twelve (12) active cases relating to initial assessments, including investigations of an allegation of child abuse or neglect; or

(2) Seventeen (17) children monitored and supervised in active cases relating to ongoing services.

(b) The department shall comply with the maximum caseload ratios described in subsection (a).

This statutory requirement is further emphasized by Indiana Code section 31–25–2–10, which clarifies:

(a) This section applies after June 30, 2008.

(b) The department of child services:

(1) must have sufficient qualified and trained staff to:

(A) fulfill the purpose of this article;

(B) comply with the maximum caseload ratios for:

(i) Family case managers; and

(ii) Child welfare caseworkers; as set forth in [I.C. § ] 31–25–2–5.

[6] Price is currently employed by DCS in Marion County as a permanency worker. Therefore, pursuant to the statute, her caseload should be limited to no more than 17 children. However, in the past four years, Price's caseload has “always greatly exceed[ed] this number” and at the time of filing the Complaint amounted to “approximately 43 children.” (Appellant's App. p. 25). In its 2014 Annual Report to the State Budget Committee and Legislative Council, the DCS reported that it would need to employ an additional 216.2 FCMs to comply with the caseload standards mandated by Indiana law. Although additional money was appropriated to hire more FCMs during the 2015 legislative session, insufficient money was made available to allow the mandated statutory caseload standards to be achieved.

[7] Because of the increasing caseload, Price and other FCMs work much longer than a 40–hour week in an effort to keep up with their cases. Due to the excessive caseload, turnover among the FCMs has become a serious problem as they “frequently leave to find employment that is less stressful and demanding.” (Appellant's App. p. 26).

[8] On July 14, 2015, Price filed her Verified Class Action Complaint for Mandate and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, contending that DCS violated Indiana Code section 31–25–2–5 by failing to ensure that the department meets the FCM standards mandated by statute. Price requested the court to enter an order mandating or enjoining DCS to take all steps necessary to comply with Indiana Code section 31–25–2–5. On July 16, 2015, she filed her motion asking to certify the case as a class action, with the class defined as all FCMs employed by the DCS.

[9] On September 9, 2015, DCS filed its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(6) and supporting memorandum, arguing for the dismissal of the cause because Price and the putative class cannot enforce the explicit caseload standards contained in the statute. Price responded on September 30, 2015, claiming that a cause of action to enforce the statute existed but that, in any event, she also had a claim for mandate. In its reply of October 13, 2015, DCS rejected the mandate.

[10] On January 6, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on DOS's motion for dismissal. During the hearing, DCS contended, for the first time, that mandate is not appropriate because Price had an adequate remedy at law in Indiana's Civil Service Complaint procedure. On February 22, 2016, the trial court granted DOS's motion and dismissed Price's complaint. The trial court concluded that no private right of action existed under Indiana Code section 31–25–2–5 because the protections included in the statute are for the benefit of the general public. “Any benefit gained by [FCMs] through compliance with I.C. § 31–25–2–5 is ancillary or secondary to that purpose.” (Appellant's App. p. 17). Secondly, the trial court held that Price and the putative class of FCMs could not bring an action for mandate because they had an adequate remedy at law through the Civil Service Complaint procedure.

[11] Price now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[12] The standard of review on appeal of a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss for the failure to state a claim is de novo and requires no deference to the trial court's decision. Bellows v. Bd. of Comm'rs of County of Elkhart, 926 N.E.2d 96, 110 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss turns only on the legal sufficiency of the claim and does not require determinations of fact. Id. “ ‘A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Lei Shi v. Cecilia Yi, 921 N.E.2d 31, 36 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) ). Thus, while we do not test the sufficiency of the facts alleged with regard to their adequacy to provide recovery, we do test their sufficiency with regards to whether or not they have stated some factual scenario in which a legally actionable injury has occurred. Id.

II. Private Cause of Action

[13] Price first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that Indiana Code section 31–25–2–5 only conferred a public benefit, and did not grant her a private cause of action. Although Price does not dispute the public benefits derived from the statute, she argues that the statute also awarded a private cause of action because

[i]f [Price] and the other FCMs have caseloads that are manageable they will be able to perform their duties. They will not have to work overtime to try to keep up with their work. They will not suffer “burnout” and quit. These are all direct, private [ ] benefits to the FCMs. The fact that the FCMs will have better working conditions if DCS complies with the statute will inure directly to the public, but it will also bestow a clear and identifiable private benefit on the FCMs.

(Appellant's Br. p. 22).

[14] When a civil cause of action is premised upon a violation of a duty imposed by statute, the initial question to be determined by the court is whether the statute confers a private right of action. Lockett v. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 42 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), trans. denied. To find the existence of a civil cause of action, we first examine legislative intent. Id. We ascertain whether the statute is designed to protect the general public and whether the statutory scheme contains an enforcement mechanism or remedies for violation of the duty. Id. A private party generally may not enforce rights under a statute designed to protect the public in general and containing a comprehensive enforcement mechanism. Id. Whether a statute creates a private right of action is a question of law for the court. Id.

[15] Contending that I.C. § 31–25–2–5 combines a public right of action with a private benefit, Price relies on Whinery v. Roberson, 819 N.E.2d 465 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. dismissed, and Galloway v. Hadley, 881 N.E.2d 667 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). In both cases, this court noted that “statutes that confer public and private benefits ... establish a private cause of action. Indeed, it makes little sense to preclude recovery for violations of specific rights merely because the public receives an ancillary benefit from the statute conferring the rights.” Whinery, 819 N.E.2d at 475 ; Galloway, 881 N.E.2d at 672. Applied to I.C. § 31–25–2–5, Price asserts that “the general...