Lockhart v. State, S15A1461.

• Decision Date: 01 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. S15A1461.,S15A1461.
• Citation: 782 S.E.2d 245,298 Ga. 384
• Parties: LOCKHART v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

298 Ga. 384

782 S.E.2d 245

LOCKHART

v.The STATE.

No. S15A1461.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 1, 2016.

Steven Eric Phillips, Office of the Public Defender, Atlanta Judicial Circuit, Atlanta, for appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Jason Matthew Rea, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Lori Lee Canfield, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul L. Howard Jr., Dist. Atty., Paige Reese Whitaker, Deputy Dist. Atty., Sean Alexander Garrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fulton County District Attorney's Office, Atlanta, for appellee.

HINES

, Presiding Justice.

Joe Lockhart appeals from his convictions and sentences for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, all in connection with the death of Bernard Campbell. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.¹

Construed to support the verdicts, the evidence showed that Lockhart had supplied Campbell some automobile wheel rims to sell. Campbell, together with Carl Freeman, sold the rims and then went to Freeman's home at 6:00 p.m. on August 18, 2008. Campbell then left and went to a nearby park. Lockhart, seeking his share of the proceeds from the sale of the rims, went with Horace Holt to Freeman's home, and Freeman told them Campbell had gone to the park. Lockhart and Holt went to the park and found Campbell; Holt left, driving Lockhart's vehicle. Later, Campbell drove by Freeman's home and, from the vehicle, said that Lockhart "pulled a pistol on me," and continued driving.

Reginald Blessett was driving near the park when he came upon Campbell's vehicle stopped in the road; Blessett drove around Campbell's vehicle, and his vehicle was then struck in the rear by Campbell's. Campbell's vehicle pushed Blessett's vehicle for a distance, and then went around it. Lockhart then opened the door to Blessett's vehicle, got inside and, pointing a revolver at him, told Blessett to follow Campbell's vehicle. At an intersection, Lockhart directed Blessett to get next to Campbell's vehicle; Lockhart quickly exited Blessett's vehicle, shot Campbell multiple times, striking him with at least five projectiles, and quickly reentered Blessett's vehicle. Lockhart then directed Blessett to drive back to the area where he had entered Blessett's vehicle, told Blessett "I know you," and exited the vehicle. Seven weeks later, Campbell died of his gunshot wounds

.

1. The evidence authorized the jury to find Lockhart guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)

.

2. Lockhart contends that his trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance in regard to an incident that occurred during jury voir dire. In order to prevail on this claim, he must show both that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense. Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783(1), 325 S.E.2d 362 (1985)

, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To meet the first prong of the required test, he must overcome the "strong presumption" that counsel's performance fell within a "wide range of reasonable professional conduct," and that counsel's decisions were "made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. The reasonableness of counsel's conduct is examined from counsel's perspective at the time of trial and under the particular circumstances of the case, id. at 784, 325 S.E.2d 362, and decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course. Redding v. State, 297 Ga. 845, 850(5), 778 S.E.2d 774 (2015). To meet the second prong of the test, Lockhart must show that there is a reasonable probability that, absent any unprofessional errors on counsel's part, the result of his trial would have been different. Smith, supra at 783, 325 S.E.2d 362. " ‘We accept the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.’ [Cit.]" Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76, 586 S.E.2d 313 (2003).

During jury voir dire, the court asked the panel of prospective jurors if anyone knew Lockhart. Prospective Juror 18 indicated that he did, and when asked how he knew Lockhart, responded, while the entire panel remained present: "Before I started driving trucks, I worked for the Fulton County Sheriff's Department for 14 years. And I worked on the maximum security floor, sixth and seventh floor, dealing with violent criminals." The court said: "Okay. So that's where you know him from. Okay. Thank you, sir. You may be seated." Prospective Juror 18 was later brought before the court without the remainder of the panel present, and stated that he had left the employ of the Sheriff's Department the previous year, recalled no specific issues with Lockhart during detention, but recognized his face; after discussion, Prospective Juror 18 was excused for cause. Later, before the jury was selected, defense counsel raised to the court the possibility of the court instructing the panel of prospective jurors that Prospective Juror 18 had come into contact with Lockhart pursuant to the case at issue during pretrial detention; the court expressed a willingness to do so, but noted that the panel may not have paid particular attention to Prospective Juror 18's remark. After discussion regarding the potential effect of an instruction from the court, defense counsel declined to have the court give an instruction and stated: "I probably should leave it alone for the good of my client."

Lockhart contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in not seeking the dismissal of the entire panel of prospective jurors because of Prospective Juror 18's remarks. See Kinder v. State, 284 Ga. 148, 150(2), 663 S.E.2d 711 (2008)

; Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 688(5), 531 S.E.2d 84 (2000). During the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel was asked about his failure to do so, and testified that he should have done so "having looked back on it." However, that does not control the question of whether counsel was pursuing a reasonable strategy; even counsel's own hindsight "has no place in an assessment of the performance of trial counsel, the United States Supreme Court having instructed that a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532, 533(2)(a), 773 S.E.2d 755 (2015) (Citation and punctuation omitted.) The strong presumption that counsel's conduct was within the wide range of reasonable conduct remains, and Lockhart must show that counsel's actions were patently unreasonable. Id.; Redding, supra.

And, other evidence brought forth during the motion for new trial hearing shows that counsel pursued a reasonable strategy in choosing to go forward with the prospective jury panel that remained after the dismissal of Prospective Juror 18. Counsel testified that he made a decision before jury selection not to address the matter further than he did, had "a pretty good idea of what the [jury] pool was to draw from," that as far as asking for...