Lockhart v. Thirty-Sixth Dist. Court Judge

• Decision Date: 02 May 1994
• Docket Number: THIRTY-SIXTH,Docket No. 144965
• Citation: 204 Mich.App. 684,516 N.W.2d 76
• Parties: Steve LOCKHART, Petitioner-Appellee, v.DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 76

516 N.W.2d 76

204 Mich.App. 684

Steve LOCKHART, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THIRTY-SIXTH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, Respondent-Appellant.

Docket No. 144965.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 19, 1994, at Detroit.

Decided May 2, 1994 at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication June 10, 1994.

Lynda M. Mays, Detroit, for defendant.

Before MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, P.J., and MARILYN J. KELLY and ERNST, ^* JJ.

MARILYN J. KELLY, Judge.

Defendant, 36th District Court Judge John Cozart, appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting a writ of superintending control. The writ instructed Judge Cozart, inter alia, to accommodate attorneys and litigants whose matters have been scheduled simultaneously in different courtrooms in the real estate division of the 36th District Court. We affirm.

I

Steve Lockhart, an attorney for the United Community Housing Coalition, brought the action. He alleged that on December 20, 1990, another attorney approached him to adjourn the hearing on a motion to set aside a default judgment scheduled that day in the real estate division. Lockhart agreed. The other attorney was to inform the judge, John Cozart. After checking in according to the real estate division's established procedure Lockhart began a trial before District Court Judge Nancy Farmer. During the trial, Lockhart was notified that Judge Cozart had set aside the judgment in the real estate division matter, scheduled trial and assessed costs of $200 against him.

Lockhart sought a writ of superintending control. He alleged Judge Cozart's action was not an isolated occurrence and that the costs assessed were unreasonable and without basis. He asserted that the judge's conduct violated canons 1 and 3 of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. He argued that Judge Cozart had a policy of imposing sanctions if an attorney was not physically present when his case was called and that the policy violated MCR 8.116(C). The court rule states:

(C) Staggered Scheduling: A judge shall stagger the docket schedule so that an attorney or party may be heard within a time reasonably close to the scheduled time, and, except for good cause, the docket shall be called in order.

Judge Cozart moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The motion was denied.

A bench trial was held on the complaint on May 10, 1991. Judge Cozart's attorney informed the court that the costs the judge had assessed against Lockhart had been rescinded on appeal. The circuit court limited the hearing to:

[T]he claim that Judge Cozart without a countervailing [sic] policy reason to benefit the efficient running of that court, has not allowed attorneys to represent multiple clients in other courts and by doing so has violated the court rule on staggering the call.

After taking considerable testimony on the operation of the real estate division of the 36th District Court, the circuit court judge found

[T]hat the judge in taking actions in his courtroom and controlling the proceedings, needs little justification to support why he requires the presence of an attorney or why he doesn't for when matters are scheduled and when matters are called.

But, at the same time, this court clearly finds under the law that some level of justification is required. MCR 8.116(C) is a court rule that places a limitation upon a court's general power under the court rules to control proceedings in their court. It requires a staggered docket. The rule is mandatory not discretionary.

The judge went on to conclude that Judge Cozart had a policy which required attorneys and litigants to wait in his courtroom until their case was called. The court found the policy worked a hardship on attorneys and litigants. The court also found that Judge Cozart failed to offer justification for the policy in the instances introduced at trial. The circuit judge concluded that, by adoption of the policy, Judge Cozart violated a clear legal duty. He granted a writ of superintending control which states:

It is further ordered that the Honorable John Cozart shall reasonably accommodate attorneys and litigants who have matters set for hearing in his court and other 36th District Court courtrooms on the same day.

It is further ordered that if a case is called in the Honorable John Cozart's courtroom when an attorney or litigant has checked in to Judge Cozart's courtroom but the attorney or litigant is unavailable because that attorney or litigant has gone to another 36th District Court courtroom to represent a client or him/herself in another case, Judge Cozart shall pass the case without sanction of the attorney or litigant, UNLESS Judge Cozart shall have, and shall so state on the record, the docket control justification for not passing the case until the attorney or litigant shall return to Judge Cozart's courtroom, or UNLESS all other cases on that day's docket of Judge Cozart have been completed.

Judge Cozart requests that the writ of superintending control be vacated.

II

The circuit court, this Court and our Supreme Court have jurisdiction to issue superintending control orders to lower courts under MCR 3.302. Recently, a panel of our Court observed that superintending control is the proper vehicle to challenge the general practices of an inferior court. In re Lafayette Towers, 200 Mich.App. 269, 272, 503 N.W.2d 740 (1993), citing Bd. of Library Comm'rs v. Judges of the 70th Dist. Court, 118 Mich.App. 379, 325 N.W.2d 777 (1982). An earlier panel of our court reached a similar conclusion when it observed that:

Because appellant's method of conducting his general court proceedings in all cases which present a common, legal and factual situation is at issue, superintending control is the proper avenue for relief. [Detroit v. Recorder's Court Judge, 85 Mich.App. 284, 289, 271 N.W.2d 202 (1978).]

Generally, for superintending control to lie, a plaintiff must establish the absence of an adequate legal remedy and that a defendant failed to perform a clear legal duty. In re Recorder's Court Bar Ass'n v. Wayne Circuit Court, 443 Mich. 110, 134, 503 N.W.2d 885 (1993). The nature and extent of the legal duty required by MCR 8.116(C) is a question of law subject to de novo review. Cardinal Mooney High School v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 437 Mich. 75, 80, 467 N.W.2d 21 (1991).

The rules of statutory construction apply to court rules. Michigan Basic Property Ins. Ass'n v. Hackert Furniture, 194 Mich.App. 230, 234, 486 N.W.2d 68 (1992). A court rule should be construed in accordance with the ordinary and approved usage of the language in light of the purpose to be accomplished by its operation. Larson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 194 Mich.App. 329, 332, 486 N.W.2d 128 (1992). Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act. Dep't of Social Services v. Brewer, 180 Mich.App. 82, 84, 446 N.W.2d 593 (1989). Absurd and unreasonable results are to be avoided. Gibson v. Bronson Methodist Hosp., 197 Mich.App. 67, 73, 495 N.W.2d 162 (1992), lv. gtd. 443 Mich. 869, 511 N.W.2d 895 (1993). Moreover, the court rules are to be construed to secure the just, speedy and economical determination of every action. Construction should avoid the consequences of error that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. MCR 1.105.

We find portions of MCR 8.116(C) clear and unambiguous. First, use of the term "shall" indicates that the judge has a legal duty to stagger the docket schedule to allow an attorney or party to be heard without unreasonable delay. Furthermore, the court rule clearly indicates that the docket must be called in order.

However, the clear obligations to stagger the schedule and call cases in order are not absolute, because the rule uses the vague phrase "except for good cause" to temper them. The phrase "except for good cause" means that the trial judge has considerable discretion to decide when and if it is appropriate to pass over a case. Moreover, it enables the judge to implement other courtroom practices to promote the just and efficient handling of the docket.

III

We are called upon to determine, in this case, whether Judge Cozart's practices and policies in this regard amounted to an abuse of discretion. We find that the judge did abuse his discretion by implementing policies and practices which failed to recognize the problems of the court and the needs of the parties. In so doing, the judge failed to perform a clear legal...