Lockhart v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 17 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 3:96-CV-0670 AS.,3:96-CV-0670 AS.
• Parties: Andrew LOCKHART, Rick Long, Val Martin, and Richard Zilienski, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, United States Postal Service, Marvin T. Runyon, Jr., Postmaster General, Gene Mills, Agency Representative, Larry Dauby, P.O.M., Ron E. Akin, O.I.C., Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States, Sally Leath, EEO Manager, Judy Lucas, EEO, Herman West, Clarence White, John F. Tarwacki, Steve Couture, Jackie Smith, Robert Barros, Linda Fish, Kathy Means, Fred Patterson, Treva Frank, David Blackburn, Michael Skoczylas, Karen Labuzienski, Sherry McCormick, and John S. Humphrey, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

961 F.Supp. 1260

Andrew LOCKHART, Rick Long, Val Martin, and Richard Zilienski, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, United States Postal Service, Marvin T. Runyon, Jr., Postmaster General, Gene Mills, Agency Representative, Larry Dauby, P.O.M., Ron E. Akin, O.I.C., Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States, Sally Leath, EEO Manager, Judy Lucas, EEO, Herman West, Clarence

White, John F. Tarwacki, Steve Couture, Jackie Smith, Robert Barros, Linda Fish, Kathy Means, Fred Patterson, Treva Frank, David Blackburn, Michael Skoczylas, Karen Labuzienski, Sherry McCormick, and John S. Humphrey, Defendants.

No. 3:96-CV-0670 AS.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

April 17, 1997.

Andrew Lockhart, South Bend, IN, Pro Se.

Clifford D. Johnson, Office of the United States Attorney, South Bend, IN, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, District Judge.

This cause is before the court pursuant to two separate motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. The first motion to dismiss, filed on December 4, 1996, by all defendants except the United States of America and the Postmaster General, seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On February 3, 1997, the second motion to dismiss was filed by the United States of America and the Postmaster General pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

From August 1985 until May 1995, the plaintiff, Andrew Lockhart, worked for the United States Postal Service ("Postal Service") branch located in South Bend, Indiana. On or about August 21, 1994, the plaintiff initiated counseling with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC or Agency") and, subsequently on or about November 7, 1994, filed a formal administrative complaint with the EEOC against the Postal Service. In that complaint, Lockhart alleged that the Postal Service had discriminated against him on the basis of his race and for reprisal based upon his prior filings with the EEOC. Specifically, Lockhart complained that the Postal Service's decision to discipline him for alleged insubordination by forcing him to attend anger management seminars and an Employee Assistance Program amounted to employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. About the same time, Lockhart, through his union representative, also filed an administrative grievance against the Postal Service, relating to the Postal Service's filing of a Notice of Removal.

On or about May 22, 1995, the Agency dismissed Lockhart's administrative complaint, finding that the complaint failed to state a claim and that the claims raised were moot. The Agency also referred to the "Notice of Proposed Removal" issued to Lockhart by the Postal Service on August 17, 1994, and the settlement agreement entered into by Lockhart and the Postal Service with regard to the union grievance filed in response to the notice of removal. This agreement, in part, set forth the following: (1) that the charge of insubordination be removed from Lockhart's personnel record; (2) that Lockhart enroll in, and complete, an Anger Management Program; (3) that upon completion of said Anger Management Program, Lockhart would attend monthly follow-up appointments with administrators of the Program; and (4) that the "Notice of Proposed Removal," issued on August 17, 1994, be rescinded.

Pursuant to the agreement, the "Notice of Proposed Removal" was rescinded by the Postal Service and Lockhart did, in fact, enroll in and complete the Anger Management Program. The Agency, thus, concluded that Lockhart, by signing the settlement agreement, waived his right to process the claims raised in his EEOC complaint. As a result, the complaint was dismissed. Lockhart appealed the dismissal of his complaint, questioning the untimeliness of the Agency's final decision.

On June 19, 1996, Mr. Ronnie Blumenthal, Director of the Office of Federal Operations for the EEOC, affirmed the Agency's decision to dismiss the complaint as to Lockhart's Title VII claim. Thus, Lockhart was provided with his right to sue letter on that date.

On September 9, 1996, after receiving his right to sue letter, Lockhart filed a pro se complaint in this court, alleging employment discrimination during the 10-year period he was employed by the United States Postal Service. In his original complaint, Mr. Lockhart states that he was terminated from his employment with the United States Postal Service due to his race, his color and his sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addition, Mr. Lockhart asserts claims of "Emotional Injury and Money Damage" under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") and a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. See Plaintiff's Original Complaint, ¶ 9. Lockhart has named the United States of America, the Postmaster General-Marvin Runyon-and numerous Postal Service employees as defendants in this action.

On November 18, 1996, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, in which he sought to add other individuals as plaintiffs on whose behalf he seeks relief. Further, he has requested that this case be considered as a class action suit.¹ In addition to adding plaintiffs, Lockhart also added Mr. John S. Humphrey as a defendant and raised an additional claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. ("ADEA").

The United States Attorney in this district was served with a copy of the original and amended complaints on December 2, 1996. Subsequently, a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was filed by the numerous Postal Service employee defendants ("Employee Defendants"), demonstrating the necessary compliance with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.1982). In this motion, the Employee Defendants argue that they are not proper defendants for the plaintiff's claims under the FTCA, Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act or the ADEA. They contend that the only appropriate defendant for the FTCA claims is the United States of America. As for the claims under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADEA, the Employee Defendants assert that the only proper defendant is the head of the federal agency in which the plaintiff was employed — in this case, the United States Postmaster General, Marvin Runyon. Thus, the Employee Defendants submit that the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief against them and, thus, all claims against them should be dismissed. The defendant filed a response to the Employee Defendants' motion to dismiss on December 13, 1996, to which the Employee Defendants replied on December 18, 1996.

On February 3, 1997, the remaining defendants-the United States of America and the Postmaster General ("Federal Defendants") — filed their own motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.² Under Rule 12(b)(1), the defendants argue that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claim under the FTCA because the plaintiff has failed to establish that he has complied with the administrative steps required by the FTCA. Further, the defendants submit that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim under the Rehabilitation Act because the plaintiff failed to exhaust said claim in his administrative complaint filed with the EEOC. As for the plaintiff's claims against the Postmaster General under the ADEA and Title VII, the defendants argue that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived said claims in his settlement agreement with the Postal Service on his administrative grievance. Thus, the Federal Defendants submit that said claims fail to state a claim for relief under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The plaintiff responded to the second motion to dismiss on February 10, 1997, to which no reply was filed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

The defendants in this action move for dismissal pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the most part, motions under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are governed by separate and distinct standards, although the standards may overlap in some basic respects and in particular circumstances. See Malak v. Associated Physicians, Inc., 784 F.2d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir.1986); 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1350, pp. 196, 213-39 & 1995 Supp. p. 77 (2d ed.1990). Thus, the court will address the standards separately.

A. RULE 12(B)(1) STANDARDS

The Federal Defendants claim that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's FTCA and Rehabilitation Act claims and, thus, request that those claims be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard of review for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction depends upon the purpose of the motion. See Freiburger v. Emery Air Charter, Inc., 795 F.Supp. 253, 256 (N.D.Ill.1992); 5A Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: Civil.2d § 1363 at 456 (2d ed.1990). In ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), if the motion simply challenges the sufficiency of the allegations of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir.1995); Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188, 191(7th Cir.1993).

However, when presented with a factual attack to jurisdiction, "[t]he district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Capitol Leasing, 999 F.2d at 191.³ Finally, where the court...