Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 03 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. S088458.,S088458.
• Citation: 63 P.3d 913,131 Cal.Rptr.2d 1,29 Cal.4th 1096
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Bernardino County, Respondent; Roslyn Carrillo et al., Real Parties in Interest. Baumac Corporation, Petitioner, v. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Respondent; Roslyn Carrillo, Real Party in Interest. Petro-Tex Chemical Corporation et al., Petitioners, v. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Respondent; Roslyn Carrillo et al., Real Parties in Interest.

131 Cal.Rptr.2d 1

29 Cal.4th 1096

63 P.3d 913

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Bernardino County, Respondent;

Roslyn Carrillo et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Baumac Corporation, Petitioner, v. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Respondent;

Roslyn Carrillo, Real Party in Interest.

Petro-Tex Chemical Corporation et al., Petitioners, v. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Respondent;

Roslyn Carrillo et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. S088458.

Supreme Court of California.

March 3, 2003.

Holme, Roberts & Owen, Linnea Brown, Denver, CO; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Robert S. Warren, Los Angeles, Robert W. Loewen, Irvine, and Daniel S. Floyd, Los Angeles, for Petitioners Lockheed Martin Corporation and Highland Supply Corporation.

Payne & Fears, David Sweet, Alan G. Ross, Irvine; Law Offices of Terry Bridges and Terry Bridges, Riverside, for Petitioner Highland Supply Company.

Bowman & Brooke, Anthony S. Thomas, Torrance; Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, John D. Dwyer, Steven B. Katz, Los Angeles, and Carrie L. Daughters, for Petitioner FMC Corporation.

Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman, David F. Wood, Ann G. Zuckerman, James C. MacDonald, Los Angeles; Brunick, Alvarez & Battesby and Leland P. McElhaney, San Bernardino, for Petitioner Baumac Corporation.

Zevnik Horton Guibord McGovern Palmer & Fognani, John D. Fognani, Michael John Miguel and K. Eric Adair, Los Angeles, for Petitioners Petro-Tex Chemical Corporation and El Paso Tennessee Pipeline Co.

Nossman, Guthner, Knox & Elliott and Patrick J. Richard, San Francisco, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Hugh F. Young, Jr., and Harvey M. Grossman, Chicago, IL, for The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Atlantic Legal Foundation and Martin S. Kaufman for Ronald E. Gots, Leonard Hamilton, Ronald Hart, Clark W. Heath, Michael Gough, A. Alan Moghissi, Rodney W. Nichols, Frederick Seitz, Barry H. Smith, James Wilson and Richard Wilson as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Crowell & Moring, Victor E. Schwartz and Luther Zeigler, Washington, Dist. of Columbia, for The Coalition for Asbestos Justice, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad, Lisa Perrochet and Mary-Christine Sungaila, Encino, for American Chemistry Council, Chemical Industry Council of California, ExxonMobil Corporation and Union Oil Company of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold and Frederick D. Baker, San Francisco, for Defense Research Institute as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Spriggs & Hollingsworth, Donald W. Fowler, Rebecca A. Womeldorf, Marc S. Mayerson; National Chamber Litigation Center and Robin S. Conrad, Washington, Dist. of Columbia, for United States Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Robie & Matthai, Pamela E. Dunn, Pasadena, and Natalie A. Kouyoumdjian, Los Angeles, for State Farm General Insurance Company and United Services Automobile Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, James C. Martin, Michael K. Brown; Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar, Washington, Dist. of Columbia, for Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners Lockheed Martin Corporation and Highland Supply Company.

No appearance for Respondent.

Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, Walter J. Lack, Gary A. Praglin, Richard P. Kinnan, Los Angeles; Masry & Vititoe, Edward S. Masry, Westlake Village; Girardi & Keese, Thomas V. Girardi, Los Angeles, Howard B. Miller, El Segundo; Ward & Ward and Alexandra S. Ward, San Bernardino, for Real Parties in Interest.

WERDEGAR, J.

In this action for medical monitoring of the residents of a geographic area affected by defendants' toxic chemical discharge, the question before us is whether plaintiffs, in moving for class certification, have met their burden of demonstrating that common issues of law and fact predominate. We conclude they have not. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Roslyn Carrillo et alia allege that defendants Lockheed Martin Corporation et alia, in the course of conducting manufacturing operations in the City of Redlands, beginning in 1954, discharged dangerous chemicals that contaminated the city's drinking water with harmful toxins and that this contaminated water was used by a large portion of the city's residents. In December 1996, on behalf of themselves and persons similarly situated, plaintiffs filed this action in the San Bernardino County Superior Court. Plaintiffs pray that the court order defendants to fund a court-supervised program for the medical monitoring of class members, and for punitive damages.

Plaintiffs moved for certification of a "medical monitoring" class and a "punitive damage" class, defined identically as "People who were exposed to water contaminated with any of the following chemicals: TCE, PCE, TCA, other solvents, Ammonium Perchlorate, Perchlorate, other unknown rocket fuel components and rocket fuel decomposition products, Beryllium, Carbon Tetrachloride, Vinyl Chloride, Hydrazine (and Hydrazine derivatives), Nitrosamines (and Nitrosamine derivatives), Epoxides (and Epoxide derivatives), Triazines (and Triazine derivatives), at levels at or in excess of the dose equivalent of the M.C.L. § (Maximum Contaminant Level),¹ or in excess of the safe dose where there is no MCL, for some part of a day, for greater than 50% of a year, for one or more years from 1955 to the present" within specified geographical limits. (Fns.omitted.) Plaintiffs' class definition indicated that review of relevant water quality documents was ongoing and that the definition would be amended if additional chemicals were identified.

One of plaintiffs' attorneys declared that estimating the number of persons in the class was difficult, because the University of Redlands is located within the specified geographic boundaries, and persons residing, working or studying within the defined area may qualify as class members. The attorney's best estimate was that the class includes between 50,000 and 100,000 people.

The trial court certified the classes, finding that plaintiffs had met their burden of proof under Code of Civil Procedure section 382: "The Court finds that the plaintiffs have a realistic chance of success on the merits. [¶] Specifically, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have shown that there is a realistic chance that the defendants caused contaminants to be leaked into the water table beneath Redlands and that this contaminated water was served to the members of the proposed class." The court also found that there is an ascertainable class, concluding it was "not necessary to determine the levels of toxins received by each plaintiff at this time and that the geographic limits placed on the class are reasonable and related to the alleged contamination." The court concluded, finally, that members of the class have a well-defined community of interest and that common questions of law and fact predominate in the action.

Parties objecting to certification filed three writ petitions in the Court of Appeal, which that court consolidated. Opining that individual issues raised by plaintiffs' claims "clearly predominate, making class certification inappropriate," the Court of Appeal granted a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order certifying the classes. We granted plaintiffs' petition for review.

DISCUSSION

I. Suitability of Medical Monitoring Claims for Class Treatment²

We first addressed the availability of medical monitoring as a form of damages in Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d 795 (Potter). There, residents of homes located near a landfill at which the dumping of toxic substances was prohibited brought, as individual claimants, an action against a tire manufacturing company that had dumped toxic waste materials, alleging that their water supply had thereby been contaminated. The plaintiffs sought damages for, inter alia, fear of cancer and the costs of medical monitoring. (See id. at pp. 975-979, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550,863 P.2d 795.) Recognizing that "`expenditures for prospective medical testing and evaluation, which would be unnecessary if the particular plaintiff had not been wrongfully exposed,'" are "`detriment proximately caused'" by negligent disposal of toxic substances (id. at p. 1005 & fn. 24, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550,863 P.2d 795, quoting Civ.Code, § 3333), we held that "the cost of medical monitoring is a compensable item of damages where the proofs demonstrate, through reliable medical expert testimony, that the need for future monitoring is a reasonably certain consequence of a plaintiffs toxic exposure and that the recommended monitoring is reasonable" (Potter, supra, at p. 1009, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550,863 P.2d 795).

"In determining the reasonableness and necessity of monitoring," we stated, "the following factors [(hereafter the Potter factors)] are relevant: (1) the significance and extent of the plaintiffs exposure to chemicals; (2) the toxicity of the chemicals; (3) the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff as a result of the exposure, when compared to (a) the plaintiffs chances of developing the disease had he or she not been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members of the public at large of developing the disease; (4) the seriousness of the disease for which the plaintiff is at risk; and (5) the clinical value of early detection and diagnosis." (Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1009, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d 795.)

We have not previously addressed the prerequisites for class treatment of medical monitoring claims. "Section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes class suits in California when `the question is one of a common or general...