Locklear Dodge City, Inc. v. Kimbrell
| Decision Date | 16 May 1997 |
| Parties | LOCKLEAR DODGE CITY, INC. v. Dorothy Ann KIMBRELL. 1950776. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
A. Courtney Crowder and W. David Ryan of Davidson, Wiggins & Crowder, P.C., Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
Christopher H. Jones of Zeanah, Hust, Summerford, Davis & Jones, L.L.C., Tuscaloosa, for appellee.
Locklear Dodge City, Inc. ("Locklear"), appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for a judgment as a matter of law (a judgment formerly known as a judgment notwithstanding the verdict; see Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P.) or, in the alternative, a new trial, following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff, Dorothy Ann Kimbrell, $150,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Mrs. Kimbrell had alleged in her complaint that Locklear had fraudulently suppressed the fact that the used automobile she purchased from Locklear had previously been involved in two accidents.
On January 26, 1993, Mrs. Kimbrell and her husband purchased from Locklear a used 1990 Chrysler New Yorker automobile, for $14,196. During their test drive, the Kimbrells heard a "bumping" or a "popping" noise, which the salesperson promised Locklear would repair if the Kimbrells purchased the car. Also during the test drive, Mr. Kimbrell allegedly asked whether the car had been wrecked. The salesperson stated that to the best of his knowledge the car had not been wrecked. In fact, the car had been repossessed from the original owner and then purchased by Locklear at a Chrysler Credit Corporation auction. The documents Locklear received from Chrysler Credit did not indicate whether the car had previously been involved in an accident. However, Mrs. Kimbrell subsequently discovered that the car had been involved in two accidents and had had repairs costing a total of $18,000 to $20,000.
The Kimbrells signed several documents during the actual sale: the "Bill of Sale," a "Disclosure of Prior Use," an "Offer to Purchase," and an "Application for Certificate of Title." Each document was explained to Mrs. Kimbrell, and Locklear gave her the opportunity to read the documents before signing them. However, because Mr. Kimbrell was very sick and Mrs. Kimbrell wanted to get home as soon as possible, she did not read any of the documents before signing them.
One of the documents signed by Mrs. Kimbrell, the "Disclosure of Prior Use," specifically stated that the dealer had purchased the car at auction; therefore, it made no representation about the car's prior use. Moreover, immediately above the signature line was the following:
The day following the sale, the Kimbrells brought the car back for Locklear to repair the bumping noise. However, shortly after picking up their car, the Kimbrells again heard the noise. After a second unsuccessful attempt to have Locklear repair the car, Mrs. Kimbrell decided to sell it. While attempting to sell the car, she discovered that it had been wrecked.
Mrs. Kimbrell sued Locklear in July 1993, alleging revocation of acceptance, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, fraudulent misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and fraudulent suppression. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Locklear on all counts except fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent suppression. The case proceeded to trial, and at the close of the evidence the trial court directed a verdict in favor of Locklear on the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Kimbrell on the fraudulent suppression claim and awarded her $50,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. After the court denied Locklear's motion for a judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or a remittitur of the damages, Locklear appealed.
The standard for reviewing a denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law is as follows: A judgment as a matter of law is proper " ' "only where there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue or where there are no controverted questions of fact on which reasonable people could differ" and the moving party is entitled to [a] judgment as a matter of law.' " Floyd v. Broughton, 664 So.2d 897 (Ala.1995) (quoting earlier cases). Moreover, in reviewing such a denial, the reviewing court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860 (Ala.1988). In order for the plaintiff to withstand a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff must prove all the elements of his or her claim. The elements of a fraudulent suppression claim are:
"(1) that the defendant had a duty to disclose a material fact, (2) that the defendant concealed or failed to disclose this material fact, (3) that the defendant's concealment or failure to disclose this material fact induced the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting, and (4) that the plaintiff suffered actual damage as a proximate result."
Hines v. Riverside Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 655 So.2d 909, 918 (Ala.1994); Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-102.
Locklear contends that because Mrs. Kimbrell signed a disclosure statement informing her that the used automobile she purchased "MAY HAVE UNDISCLOSED MECHANICAL OR BODY REPAIRS OR MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN ACCIDENTS," Locklear, as a matter of law, did not wrongfully conceal or fail to disclose any material facts. Therefore, Locklear argues that the plaintiff did not prove all the elements of a claim of fraudulent suppression. We agree, and we hold that the trial court improperly denied Locklear's motion for a judgment as a matter of law.
This Court has previously held that an automobile buyer cannot recover for misrepresentation where the buyer has signed a disclosure statement revealing the possibility of the kind of damage the buyer alleges was suppressed. Young v. Serra Volkswagen, Inc., 579 So.2d 1337 (Ala.1991); Couch v. Woody Anderson Ford, Inc., 558 So.2d 888 (Ala.1989); Planchard v. Dobbs Mobile Bay, Inc., 529 So.2d 942 (Ala.1988); Page v. Dobbs Mobile Bay, Inc., 599 So.2d 38 (Ala.Civ.App.1992). Moreover, In Hines v. Riverside Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., supra, this Court stated:
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