Locklear v. Southeastern Stages
| Decision Date | 02 April 1940 |
| Docket Number | 15052. |
| Citation | 8 S.E.2d 321,193 S.C. 309 |
| Parties | LOCKLEAR v. SOUTHEASTERN STAGES, INC., et al. SMOAK v. SAME. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Hugh O. Hanna, of Hampton, for appellants.
Murdaugh & Murdaugh, of Hampton, for respondents.
These two cases, in which the same defendants are involved, were consolidated for trial; one opinion will dispose of the appeal in both cases.
The litigation arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on South Carolina State Highway No. 28, in the unincorporated village of Cummings, in Hampton County, about 9:30 o'clock P. M., on September 18, 1937. The plaintiff Locklear, sues for the recovery of damages on account of injuries which he received. Smoak, as administrator of the Estate of Reubin Capers, sues for the benefit of the mother of Reubin Capers, on account of his death, which resulted from the same accident.
On the day in question a passenger bus owned by the defendant Southeastern Stages, Inc.--which we shall hereafter refer to as the Bus Company--and driven by C. W. Hughes, its agent was en route from Varnville to Cummings, and points beyond. After the bus entered the environs of the town of Cummings, four negroes, who desired to become passengers on the bus, and who were standing about 300 yards beyond it signaled it to stop. The driver of the bus immediately reduced his speed and blew his horn, indicating that the bus would stop at the point desired. It proceeded on, slowing down gradually, and came to a stop on the western side of the highway opposite to a ditch, with the two wheels on the left side of the bus on the paved portion of the highway, and the two wheels on the right side of the bus on the dirt shoulder. The bus was eight feet wide. Five feet of its width occupied the dirt shoulder, and three feet were upon the pavement. At this point the paved road is eighteen feet wide.
The dirt shoulder running along the western side of the paving where the bus stopped is about seventeen feet in width. It was smooth and level for six or seven feet contiguous to the paved surface, after which it gradually sloped downward toward the ditch, and became rougher. The ditch was eight feet wide, and was filled with water to a depth of three feet. It runs alongside the highway right-of-way for a considerable distance beyond the town of Cummings. The entire width of the highway right-of-way is seventy-five feet. The four negroes who wished to board the bus, including the plaintiff, Locklear, and Capers, the deceased, were standing between the bus and the ditch. When the bus stopped, the driver opened the door on his right, and as the negroes were in the act of getting aboard, a Chevrolet automobile, coming from behind at a high and reckless rate of speed, suddenly swerved to its right, and ran into the group of negroes standing near the bus, painfully injuring Locklear and killing Capers. This automobile was occupied by five negroes, including the driver, and after striking the negroes proceeded about thirty feet beyond the bus, coming to rest on the ditch bank.
When the driver received the signal to stop the bus, he gradually pulled to the right of the road, and switched on his inside lights. On its front the bus was equipped with two headlights, five markers, and two red lights, and at the rear there were two reflectors and two rear lights, which were connected with the stop lights. All of these lights were burning. The highway is straight and level, and the bus, with these lights burning, could be seen from both directions for a distance of more than 300 yards. To the left of the stationary bus there was an open space of from 35 to 40 feet, upon which other motor vehicles upon the highway might pass. There was testimony that another automobile, coming from the direction opposite that in which the bus was traveling, passed abreast of the bus as the colliding automobile turned to its right and struck the negroes standing between the bus and the ditch. The driver of this passing automobile testified, however, that the Chevrolet had room to pass on the left of the bus if it had not been going at such a high and reckless rate of speed.
The plaintiff, Locklear, and Capers' administrator sued the Bus Company and its insurance carrier, the defendant, Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, claiming that the injuries to the plaintiff and the death of Capers were proximately due to the negligence of the Bus Company. The plaintiffs contend that the driver of the bus was negligent in stopping partly on the paved portion of the highway, and thus partially blocking the road--contrary to the statute--instead of stopping completely off of the pavement, and altogether on the shoulder.
The specifications of negligence charged are:
(a) In stopping the motor bus upon the paved part or the improved part or main traveled part of the highway, when it was practical to stop the bus completely off of such part of said highway;
(b) In stopping the bus upon the highway without leaving a clear and unobstructed width of at least twenty feet to its left for free passage of other motor vehicles traveling thereon;
(c) In failing properly to establish and maintain a suitable and safe place at said point on the said highway at which to take up passengers; and
(d) In stopping said bus at a place where it was inherently dangerous so to do.
The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Locklear in the sum of $50.00, actual damages; and a verdict in favor of the administrator of Capers in the sum of $500. The main assignment of error is that the lower Court erred in refusing to grant a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the appellants. They contend, first, that the driver of the bus was not guilty of any negligence; and, second, that his negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the injuries and death sustained by the plaintiffs, but that the negligence of the negro driver of the Chevrolet automobile was the sole proximate cause thereof.
The statute invoked was enacted in 1937, Acts 1937, 40 St. at large, Pages 222-235, and its pertinent parts are found on pages 223 and 231.
Section 26 on Page 231 of the Act provides: "Upon any highway outside of a business or residence district no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled part of the highway when it is practical to stop, park, or so leave such vehicle off such part of said highway, but in every event a clear and unobstructed width of at least 20 feet of such part of the highway opposite such standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle be available from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon such highway. ***
On Page 223, the Act defines a "business district" as being that territory contiguous to and including a highway when fifty per cent or more of the frontage thereon for a distance of 300 feet or more is occupied by buildings in use for business. And defines a "residence district" as being the territory contiguous to and including a highway not comprising a business district when the property on such highway for a distance of 300 feet or more is in the main improved with residences.
The appellants also contend that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the testimony is that the place where the bus stopped was in a business or residential district as those terms are defined by the Act, and therefore that the Court erred in refusing to charge the jury as it was requested to do, that subdivision (a) of Section 26 did not apply in this case.
The trial Judge held that under the evidence he could not say as a matter of law that the bus was or was not stopped in a business or residence district, but that he would submit the issue to the jury, and charge them the law as to what constitutes such a district, within the meaning of the statute. The testimony on this point, which we deem it unnecessary to review, was conflicting and somewhat indefinite. While some of it tended to support the contention that the place where the bus stopped is...
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