Lockley v. CSX Transp. Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 March 2013
• Citation: 66 A.3d 322,2013 PA Super 48
• Parties: Albert LOCKLEY, Appellee v. CSX TRANSPORTATION INC., Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

66 A.3d 322

2013 PA Super 48

Albert LOCKLEY, Appellee

v.CSX TRANSPORTATION INC., Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Feb. 5, 2013.

Filed March 8, 2013.

Andrew E. Tauber, Washington, DC, for appellant.

Lawrence A. Katz, Bala Cynwyd, for appellee.

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J. ^*

OPINION BY MUNDY, J.:

Appellant, CSX Transportation, Inc., appeals from the March 20, 2012 order, granting Appellee, Albert Lockley's, motion to assess post-judgment interest from the date of the jury's verdict, and denying its motion to strike the same. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history as follows.

[Appellee], age 53, commenced this litigation against [Appellant], pursuant to the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60, and the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act (FLIA), 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq.

[Appellee] alleged that [Appellant] failed to provide him with a reasonably safe place to work during 34 years of employment on [Appellant's] yard locomotives. [Appellee] also alleged that [Appellant] violated the FLIA by providing faulty seats in the locomotive cab. [Appellee] sought damages for cumulative trauma injuries, including disabling herniated discs, failed surgery on his cervical spine and other serious medical conditions caused by and/or aggravated by, inter alia, whole body vibrations, jolts and shocks, awkward postures and defectively mounted seats.

[Appellant] responded by asserting that [Appellee] was provided with a reasonably safe workplace. [Appellant] contended that [Appellee]'s spinal condition [was] the result of age related degenerative changes. [Appellant] presented the jury with its safety training programs and manuals. Further, [Appellant] argued that [Appellee] should have been more proactive to express complaints about neck and back problems. [Appellant] also denied that its seats were not securely mounted and braced.

During two weeks of trial in Spring, 2008, the jury heard from fourteen witnesses, watched several site files and videos, and reviewed hundreds of documents and photos from [Appellee] and [Appellant]. Multiple expert witnesses were presented by each party in the specialty areas of orthopedics, occupational medicine, egonomics [sic], biomechanics, economics, neurology, pain management, and, rehabilitation and vocational counseling. The jury also heard from many fact witnesses who described the work of a Locomotive Yard Engineer.

On May [5], 2008, the jury returned a verdict in favor of [Appellee] in the amount of $2 million. The jury also determined that [Appellee] was 22 percent comparatively negligent for his injuries.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/30/09, at 1–2.

Thereafter, on May 12, 2008, Appellant filed a timely motion for post-trial relief.

The [m]otion was denied on March 30, 2009 by [m]emorandum and [j]udgment [o]rder. The Superior Court affirmed the [t]rial [c]ourt's decision [and our] Supreme Court denied allocator and relinquished jurisdiction on [December 5, 2011]. [Lockley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 5 A.3d 383 (Pa.Super.2010), appeal denied,613 Pa. 668, 34 A.3d 831 (2011).]

On January 5, 2012, [Appellee] filed a [p]raecipe to [a]ssess [p]ost-[j]udgment [i]nterest. On January 9, 2012, [Appellant] filed a [m]otion to [s]trike the [p]raecipe. The sole ground specified for relief rested on a challenge based on Rule 1037 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

Subsequently, [Appellant] changed the basis of its challenge and asserted a new and different challenge in its [m]emorandum.... At this juncture, [Appellant] assert[ed] that [Appellee]'s post-judgment interest accrues from March 30, 2009.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/12, at 1.

On March 20, 2012, the trial court issued an order and memorandum of law denying Appellant's motion to strike the praecipe and granting Appellee's praecipe for post-judgment interest from the date of the jury's verdict on May 5, 2008, rather than from the date of the judgment, March 30, 2009. The trial court awarded total post-judgment interest in the amount of $440,219.18. On April 12, 2012, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.¹

On appeal, Appellant raises two issues for our review.

[1.] Whether the trial court erred in assessing interest in a FELA case for the period between the jury's verdict and the final judgment[?]

[2.] Whether the trial court erred in finding [Appellant] had lost its opportunity to challenge an assessment of post-verdict interest because it failed to appeal the amount of damages in an earlier appeal predating the assessment of post-verdict interest[?]

Appellant's Brief at 3.²

We first address Appellant's argument that it did not waive its challenge to the trial court's calculation of post-judgment interest. Appellant's Brief at 14. The trial court concluded that Appellant had waived its right to challenge the award of post-judgment interest because Appellant “failed to directly appeal any claims relating to the amount of the verdict award, or remittitur or offset, [Appellant] gave up its right to present this collateral attack....” Trial Court Opinion, 3/20/12, at 2. We disagree. ³ It is axiomatic that “[i]n order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings before the trial court. Failure to timely object to a basic and fundamental error will result in waiver of that issue.” Summers v. Summers, 35 A.3d 786, 790 (Pa.Super.2012) (citation omitted). The certified record reflects that Appellant promptly filed its motion to strike Appellee's praecipe to assess post-judgment interest four days after it was first filed. Appellant challenges the starting date used to calculate the post-judgment interest in this case. Thus, “the appropriate stage of the proceedings” to raise the objection to the imposition of the post-judgment interest was after the trial court made its calculation, commencing as of the date of the verdict. Id.; see Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 946 A.2d 744, 750 (Pa.Super.2008) (addressing challenge to separate post-judgment interest motion granted by the trial court after five appeals). Therefore, we conclude Appellant has not waived its claim challenging the starting date of the trial court's award of post-judgment interest, and we proceed to address the merits of Appellant's claim.

Appellant avers that the trial court erred in calculating post-judgment interest from the date of the jury's verdict. We note Appellant's merits claim presents a question of law. See In re Novosielski, 605 Pa. 508, 992 A.2d 89, 99 (2010) (noting that whether federal law preempts state law is a pure question of law). Therefore, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Id. Under Pennsylvania law, post-judgment interest is controlled by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8101, which provides as follows.

§ 8101. Interest on judgments

Except as otherwise provided by another statute, a judgment for a specific sum of money shall bear interest at the lawful rate from the date of the verdict or award, or from the date of the judgment, if the judgment is not entered upon a verdict or award.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8101; accord Hutchison, supra at 752 (concluding under section 8101, “that post-judgment interest should be calculated as of the date the verdict was entered[ ]”). There is no dispute in this case that the March 30, 2009 judgment was entered upon the jury's May 5, 2008 award of $2,000,000.00.

However, Appellant argues that the issue of when post-judgment interest should begin to accrue is a matter of substantive law, and therefore federal law should control.⁴ Appellant's Brief at 8. As a threshold matter, we must therefore consider whether post-judgment interest should be viewed as a procedural matter, or as one of substantive law. Generally, Pennsylvania courts will apply their own procedural laws, even if the substantive claim is federal. Rocker v. Harvey Co., 370 Pa.Super. 32, 535 A.2d 1136, 1140 (1988); accord Jae v. Good, 946 A.2d 802, 809 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008), appeal denied,598 Pa. 790, 959 A.2d 930 (2008), cert. denied, Jae v. Good, 555 U.S. 1156, 129 S.Ct. 1042, 173 L.Ed.2d 474 (2009). ⁵ Our Supreme Court has recognized that “the question of what in particular is substantive and what is procedural is not always clear.” Samuel–Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 55–56 (2011), cert. denied, Kia Motors Am., Inc. v. Samuel–Bassett, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 51, 183 L.Ed.2d 677 (2012). Our Supreme Court has further noted that “[a]s a general rule, substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, while procedural laws are those that address methods by which rights are enforced.” Payne v. Commw. Dep't of Corrections, 582 Pa. 375, 871 A.2d 795, 801 (2005).

Section 8101 does not create a substantive right, rather it builds upon substantive rights already created by the jury's verdict. Once the jury has rendered its verdict, the amount to which the plaintiffis entitled has already been resolved. Similarly, in a federal action such as FELA, once the jury has rendered its verdict, the plaintiff's right of recovery under federal substantive law has been fulfilled. All that remains is to collect the amount of the award from the losing party. Post-judgment interest does not serve to compensate the plaintiff for any damages, the jury's verdict has already accomplished that. Rather, “[p]ost[-]judgment interest serves two important functions—it compensates the judgment creditor for the loss of use of the money until the judgment is paid and it acts as an incentive for the judgment debtor to pay the judgment promptly.” Roden v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 186 Cal.App.4th 620, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 20, 52 (2010) (citation omitted).

Additionally, we note that three federal circuits have viewed post-judgment interest as procedural. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth...