Lockley v. Easley
| Decision Date | 02 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-323,89-323 |
| Parties | Cecil Wayne LOCKLEY and Mary Jane Lockley (Carter), Appellants, v. B. Michael EASLEY, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Robert M. Ford, Wynne, for appellants.
Easley & Hicky, Forrest City, for appellee.
Appellants Cecil Lockley and Mary Jane Carter divorced in 1981. Mrs. Carter has remarried. In May 1988 Mrs. Carter consulted attorney Michael Easley in connection with an arrearage in moneys due her under a property settlement with Mr. Lockley providing for child support, alimony and payments for her interest in unspecified personal property. Mr. Lockley had paid nothing to Mrs. Carter except child support since 1983 and the arrearage exceeded $20,000. Mrs. Carter was unable to pay a fee or costs and she and Mr. Easley verbally agreed on a contingent fee of one-third of any amount collected.
When Mr. Easley petitioned for an order to show cause Mr. Lockley obtained counsel and two cash settlement offers were forthcoming, the first for $4,000 and the second for $6,000. Both offers were rejected.
While the case was in that posture Mrs. Carter contacted Mr. Easley to instruct him to dismiss the petition to show cause. He advised her against dismissing the petition but followed her instructions and on September 19, 1988, the petition was dismissed. Mr. Easley billed Mrs. Carter for $297.50 for services rendered based on his estimate of time invested. The statement was not paid until some months later after suit was filed in small claims court.
After the petition was dismissed Mr. Easley learned that Mr. Lockley had paid Mrs. Carter $6,000 and that on September 30, 1988, Mrs. Carter and Mr. Lockley had signed an agreement in the office of Mr. Lockley's attorney releasing Mr. Lockley of all sums due Mrs. Carter under the property settlement agreement.
Mr. Easley then petitioned the court for judgment and an attorneys lien against Mr. Lockley and Mrs. Carter pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. §§ 16-22-301--310 (1989). During the hearing counsel for Mr. Lockley moved that the petition be dismissed as to Lockley because no cause of action was stated and because there was no proof of any contractual agreement, express or implied, by which Lockley was indebted to Easley for an attorney's fee. Mrs. Carter joined in the motion to dismiss.
The chancellor heard testimony from all parties, took the case under advisement, and later issued a memorandum opinion denying the motions to dismiss and awarding a judgment for $2,000 against Carter and Lockley based on the contingent fee agreement. On appeal Mrs. Carter and Mr. Lockley contend that the chancellor erred, first, by not sustaining their motions to dismiss and, second, by awarding a judgment pursuant to the contingent fee agreement. We find no merit in either point.
Appellants argue that because the petition to show cause had been dismissed and Mr. Easley had been discharged by Mrs. Carter, the oral contingent fee agreement was ended and since Mrs. Carter had ultimately paid the quantum meruit fee of $297.50 she was under no further obligation to Mr. Easley.
Appellants contend the $6,000 offer was rejected, not by Mrs. Carter, but by Mr. Easley. But the import of Mrs. Carter's testimony is that when Mr. Easley informed her of the offers and told her that he had rejected them, that she had tacitly concurred in that course of action. Under questioning by Mr. Easley, Mrs. Carter testified:
The gist of appellants' argument is that the $6,000 payment to Mrs. Carter was not linked to the release of her claims under the property settlement agreement, that the two incidents occurred independently. Appellants point out that the petition was dismissed on September 19, whereas the payment and release did not occur until some ten days to two weeks later. Mrs. Carter testified that she decided to drop the case at the urging of her son and not because of the $6,000. Mr. Lockley's testimony tended to corroborate hers in that he said he decided "to do what was right" after Mrs. Carter's petition was dismissed. The inference we are asked to draw is that these two circumstances--the payment of the $6,000 and the full release of all obligations on Mr. Lockley under the property settlement--were merely coincidental.
But whether there was an explicit agreement between Mr. Lockley and Mrs. Carter need not concern us. The circumstances are entirely sufficient for the chancellor to conclude, as he did, that there was a correlation between the $6,000 payment and the release from which it can be assumed that there was an implicit understanding between the parties. That is the direct implication of the chancellor's findings and we cannot say those findings were clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. ARCP Rule 52. Mr. Lockley had paid nothing toward alimony or personal property for some five years until Mrs. Carter sought legal counsel, at...
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