Lockwood Bros. v. Frisco Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 10 September 1908
• Citation: 97 P. 562,22 Okla. 31,1908 OK 177
• Parties: LOCKWOOD BROS. v. FRISCO LUMBER CO.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

97 P. 562

22 Okla. 31, 1908 OK 177

LOCKWOOD BROS. v. FRISCO LUMBER CO.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

September 10, 1908

Syllabus by the Court.

Where a chattel is sold with a reservation of title in the vendor until the price is paid, the title remains in him until the condition is performed, and a purchaser of the vendee acquires no title, though he buys in good faith for a valuable consideration and without notice of the condition.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 43, Sales, §§ 1377-1390.]

Simply intrusting the possession of chattels to another by the owner under a conditional executory contract of sale is insufficient to estop the owner from setting up title thereto against an innocent purchaser thereof for value and without notice of the condition from the person so intrusted.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig, vol. 43, Sales, §§ 1377-1390.]

Error from the United States Court for the Central District of the Indian Territory, Sitting at Antlers; T. C. Humphreys, Judge.

Action by the Frisco Lumber Company against Lockwood Bros. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Affirmed.

On June 19, 1906, the Frisco Lumber Company, a corporation, defendant in error, plaintiff below, sued C. B. Lockwood and H. A Lockwood, partners as Lockwood Bros., plaintiffs in error defendants below, in the United States Court in the Indian Territory, Central District, at Antlers, in replevin, to recover certain personal property. For answer defendants filed in effect a general denial, and set up title to the property, claiming to have bought it of one Reuben Stone, the alleged former owner, in good faith and for value; that he was in possession of said property, with the apparent right to sell and dispose of the same; and that they had no knowledge of any claim asserted by plaintiff to said property. There was trial to a jury, which resulted in a judgment for plaintiffs for the property in question, the total value of which was assessed at $1,088, and for damages for its unlawful detention. There was motion for a new trial, which was overruled, whereupon defendants filed petition for writ of error and assignment of errors, and prosecuted their appeal to the United States Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory, and the same is now before us for review as the successor of that court.

Brizzolara & Fitzhugh and T. J. Barnes, for plaintiffs in error.

W. P. Stewart, P. L. Soper, J. H. Huckleberry, and Thomas H. Owen, for defendant in error.

TURNER J.

There is very little conflict in the testimony. The evidence, in substance, discloses that Frisco Lumber Company, defendant in error, hereafter called plaintiff, was in December, 1905, engaged in the lumber business near Bokhoma, Ind. T., having in its employ one Reuben Foote, whom it desired to equip for logging and hauling the same to its sawmill, and about that time sent him into Arkansas to buy property for that purpose. He went, and later returned with one Stewart, from whom he had bought for the company 17 head of cattle and two wagons, complete, with yokes and chains, for which the plaintiff took from him a bill of sale, dated December 28, 1905, and paid him $700; that a short time thereafter it again sent Foote into Arkansas, together with one Weathers, another employé, on a similar mission, where they together bought for plaintiff on February 2, 1906, seven yoke of oxen and one yoke of bulls, with yokes and chains complete; also two log wagons, and hooks and logging chains with each wagon, complete, from one W. A. Laster, taking a bill of sale from him therefor to plaintiff, agreeing to pay him $10 cash in hand, which they did, and $490 on delivery of the property to plaintiff at Bokhoma, Ind. T., which said deferred payment was later paid to him by plaintiff on delivery of the property as agreed. These bills of sale were in evidence and cover the property in controversy in this cause. After they were executed and the property delivered to plaintiff, the same was turned over by it to Foote to work under a parol agreement that at any time he would pay plaintiff the amount it had paid for the property that plaintiff would make him title thereto. It was further agreed that plaintiff should advance feed and groceries and enough money to pay off Foote's men employed by him in logging, which it afterwards did from time to time; the same being evidenced by open account, in sums amounting in all to about $500. On this account was also charged the amount plaintiff had paid for the property turned over to Foote pursuant to said agreement. Foote at night kept the cattle separate from those of the company in a corral some two miles away on the company's leased logging grounds, and during the day, when not working, permitted them to run at large. Plaintiff had nothing to do with the management of these cattle after they were turned over to him, and they were referred to as Foote's cattle. They were kept in his possession, and fed and worked as though they were his own, and used by him in hauling logs to the company's sawmill; he being allowed the same price for hauling as if he owned the cattle. Plaintiff cashed his orders given to his hands while so doing, he furnishing his own men to drive them, and took no lien on the cattle or security of any kind from Foote for the debt other than stated. On June 16, 1906, Foote, who claimed title thereto, sold the property in controversy to Lockwood Bros., hereafter called defendants, who bought the property in good faith and for value. Foote then left the country and has not since returned, leaving plaintiff unpaid for the property, and leaving also unpaid his open account with it. On June 10, 1906, plaintiff took possession of the property and left a man in charge, from whom and over his protest defendants took possession of said property, which they have since retained.

The law applicable to the facts in this case is well settled and of easy application. In the language of 1 Mechem on Sales, § 154: "It is a fundamental doctrine of the common law from which all discussion of the question must proceed, that, in general, no one can transfer a better title to a chattel than he himself possesses." Again (section 155): "The universal and fundamental principle of our law of personal property is that no man can be divested of his property without his own consent, and, consequently, that even the honest purchaser under a defective title cannot hold against the true proprietor." It is apparent and conceded that the transaction between plaintiff and Foote was a conditional sale, in which plaintiff reserved title to itself until the purchase money was paid. Until this condition was performed by Foote, it necessarily follows that the title to the property remained in the plaintiff, and that Foote, having no title, could convey none, even to an innocent purchaser for value, as defendants contended they were and may be conceded to be. Mechem (section 599) says: "It is thus clear, as has been seen, that the conditional contract of sale is effective to preserve the title of the vendor from the claims of the vendee's creditors. It is also effective as against subsequent purchasers from the vendee with notice of the condition. Whether it is also operative against bona fide purchasers from the vendee who have no notice of the condition has been the subject of much controversy; and it is now settled by the great weight of authority that, unless otherwise declared by statute, such bona fide purchaser acquires no better title than his vendor had. Such has been the holding in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, South Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and perhaps other states, in Canada, and the Supreme Court of the United States. [Citing authorities.]" In McIntosh & Beam v. Hill, 47 Ark. 363, 1 S.W. 680, this doctrine is upheld as the established rule in Arkansas, and in the syllabus the court said: "Where a chattel is sold, with a reservation of title in the vendor until the price is paid, the title remains in him until the condition is performed,...